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ABSTRACT
The central claim of this thesis is that the combinatorial properties of words are determined by 
their lexical structures. I argue that the lexicalist position follows from the Word Grammar 
(WG) analytical framework. This framework, developed by Hudson (1984, 1990, 1994, 2003), 
is the one that I adopt in the linguistic descriptions in the thesis, and the further development of 
the framework is a significant part of the work.
I consider the work o f a number o f writers, some of whom take a similar lexicalist 
position. 1 show how the lexicalist assumption, together with the analytical properties of WG, 
provides for a meaningful and explanatory analysis of a number of grammatical patterns, 
including the interaction between verbs of motion and their satellites, the syntactic and 
semantic behaviour of resultative expressions and alternation between causative and 
unaccusative uses of verbs. A detailed analysis of the meanings of verbs and prepositions 
provides the means for predicting their syntactic and semantic behaviour in the relevant 
constructions.
I concentrate on English chiefly because it is my own first language, but also because 
of the body of existing work, including corpuses, in or on English which provides a basis for 
the work in the second part. I do consider data from other languages when they show 
illuminating similarities or differences to the patterns found in English.
I concentrate on the structure and behaviour of verbs since they often stand at the 
centre of grammatical structures, determining to a large extent the relationships among the 
elements that surround them. However, it is of course impossible to study the behaviour of 
verbs without also considering the properties o f those other elements. Considerable time is 
spent on the relationships between verbs and other argument-taking words, including 
prepositions, particles and adjectives.
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1. Lexical properties of English verbs
In this, introductory, chapter I introduce the central claim of the thesis: that the 
combinatorial (syntactic) properties of words are determined in part by their meanings, 
and cannot be explained without a detailed analysis of their lexical semantic structure, 
and discuss some reasons for making this assumption in analysing linguistic structures.
I go on, in 1.1.2, to consider the work of some other researchers into the 
relationship between syntactic and semantic structures and I identify two 
complementary sets of approaches: those where (observable) syntactic behaviour is 
used to probe for properties of lexical (semantic) structure; and those where the 
semantic structures of words are applied in the construction of a generative grammar (a 
fuller survey of work in lexical semantics is found in the following chapter). At the end 
of the section I present a list of requirements on a properly developed theory of lexical 
structure.
The rest of the chapter consists of an introduction to Word Grammar (WG), 
the framework that I use in the linguistic descriptions I offer. I position WG with 
respect to three broad schools of thought in linguistics: Dependency Grammar, 
Cognitive Linguistics and Construction Grammar. I also outline the conceptual 
network that represents knowledge of language in WG and show this network in detail 
in the lexical structures of words, word meanings and grammatical relations. The WG 
framework described is an approach to linguistic analysis whereby the grammatical 
structure of sentences is expressed in terms of the lexical requirements of the 
grammatical categories involved, categories ranging from the highly specific 
(individual lexemes) to the highly general (word classes, properties common to all 
words).
In 1.2.4 I begin a treatment in this framework (concluded in the other chapters, 
chiefly chapter 3) of the way in which these lexical structures combine in 
compositional structures. I also offer partially developed accounts (again, the details 
are developed more fully in the following chapters) of the subject and object 
relationships and their linking properties. By way of demonstration, I finish the chapter 
with a detailed treatment of some examples from Levin (1993).
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1.1 Motivation and structure of the thesis
1.1.1 Lexical properties of English verbs: lexicalism; Word Grammar
The central claim of this thesis is that the combinatorial (syntactic) properties of words
are determined by their lexical structures. This view is by no means uncontroversial,
though it is expressed in Chomsky's projection principle:
"Representations at each syntactic level (LF, and D- and S-structure) are 
projected from the lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorisation 
properties of lexical items." (1981: 29, see also Chomsky 1986).
In the following section (1.2), I make it clear that the lexicalist position follows 
naturally (though not obligatorily) from the Word Grammar (WG) analytical 
framework. This framework, developed by Hudson (1984, 1990, 1994, 2003), is the 
one that I adopt in the linguistic descriptions in the final three chapters, and the further 
development of the framework is a significant part of the present work.
In the following chapter (2), I consider the work of a number of writers, some 
of whom take a similar lexicalist position, (including Croft (1998a, 2001), Cruse 
(1986), Faber and Uson (1999), Fillmore (1982), Geeraerts (1994), Goldberg (1995, 
1998, 2002), Jackendoff (1987, 1990, 1991), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987), 
Lemmens (1998), Levin (1993), Perlmutter (1978), Pustejovsky (1991), Rappaport and 
Levin (1988), Wierzbicka (1972, 1966, 1998)).
In the remaining chapters I show how the lexicalist assumption, together with 
the analytical properties of WG, provides for a meaningful and explanatory analysis of 
a number of different grammatical patterns, including the interaction between verbs of 
motion and their satellites, the syntactic and semantic behaviour of resultative 
expressions and alternation between causative and unaccusative uses of verbs. A 
detailed analysis of the meanings of verbs and prepositions provides the means for 
predicting their syntactic and semantic behaviour in the relevant constructions.
I concentrate on English chiefly because it is my own first language, but also 
because of the body of existing work, including corpuses, in or on English which 
provides a basis for the work in the second part (for example I use both Levin (1993) 
and the ICAME collection of corpuses extensively as reference works). It should be 
noted that, while the general organisational principles I use should be common to all 
languages, the details (specific grammatical categories, relationships and
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generalisations over them) need not be. I do not assume a specialised genetic basis for 
language, so the grammar I describe in the second part makes no claim of universality. 
Even basic syntactic categories like subject and object may be inappropriate for some 
languages.
This non-universalist position follows partly from the assumption that 
linguistic structures can be fully derived from lexical structures: the most immediately 
observable differences between different languages are lexical. We do not expect 
words to have the same range of meanings or pronunciations in different languages, so 
we should not expect them necessarily to have the same syntactic or other grammatical 
properties.
I do consider data from other languages, notably Dutch and German, which are 
of course similar to English, and with which I have some familiarity. Data are 
introduced from these and other languages when they show illuminating similarities or 
differences to the patterns found in English.
I concentrate on the structure and behaviour of verbs since they often stand at 
the centre of grammatical structures, determining to a large extent the relationships 
among the elements that surround them. However, it is of course impossible to study 
the behaviour of verbs without also considering the properties of those other elements. 
Some time is spent below on the relationships between verbs and other argument- 
taking words, including prepositions, particles and adjectives.
1.1.2 Lexical semantics: two approaches; a methodological problem; the
requirements
Lexical semantics is discussed at length in the following chapter (2), where the work of 
a number of writers is explored (see the list above). While they form a rather 
heterogeneous set (some of the differences are considered below), these writers share 
the property that they see some advantage in probing the semantic properties of lexical 
items. This exercise may be carried out for its own sake, or because the details of the 
semantic structures of words are to be used to help account for their syntactic 
behaviour.
Levin starts with the assumption that "the behaviour of a verb, particularly with 
respect to the expression and interpretation of its arguments, is to a large extent
12
determined by its meaning", which allows verb behaviour to be used "effectively to 
probe for linguistically relevant pertinent aspects of verb meaning" (1993: 1). This 
would allow a systematic description of syntactic behaviour to be used in the 
construction of a principled account of lexical (semantic) structure. Other writers, 
however (eg Pustejovsky 1992) work in the other direction, assigning appropriate 
semantic structures to words in order to explain their participation in particular 
syntactic patterns, or other aspects of their linguistic behaviour.
Either of these approaches brings with it a special methodological problem. 
The first approach may lead to the (perhaps unwarranted) assumption that a given 
syntactic relationship or pattern always corresponds to the same semantic relationship. 
The converse of this problem is that semantic properties may be proposed in order to 
account for some syntactic regularity, that are not motivated by any other factor than 
the syntactic pattern they are held to explain. In this case they amount to nothing more 
than a "thinly disguised wild card to meet the exigencies of syntax" (Jackendoff 1987: 
371).
For example, EAT, BAKE and d a n c e  all allow an object (1 ) , but this should not 
be taken as sufficient cause to seek to identify some common semantic property. In 
fact, the differences in the meanings of the three examples in (1) are crucial. As (2) 
shows, each verb permits only two of the three kinds of object.
(1) a. Elvis ate a burger.
b. Delia baked a cake.
c. Darcy danced five yards.
(2) a. Elvis ate a burger/a hole in the table/*five yards.
b. Delia baked the batter/a cake/*five yards.
c. Darcy danced *her partner/a mazurka/five yards.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 9) provide a further example of the dangers 
inherent in the linking of semantic and syntactic structures, exemplified in the 
treatment of the different behaviour of the two Italian verbs r u s s a r e  (’snore’) and 
a r r o s s ir e  ('blush'). Rosen (1984) uses these verbs as evidence that syntactic structure 
cannot be predicted directly from verbal semantics. She argues that both verbs profile
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bodily processes, yet they have different syntactic properties, r u s s a r e  takes the 
auxiliary a v e r e  ('have') in perfect constructions, which is taken as evidence that it is 
syntactically unergative, whereas a r r o s s ir e  takes e s s e r e  ('be'), which is taken as 
evidence that it is unaccusative. Levin and Rappaport Hovav argue that this does not 
count as evidence against the projection of semantic onto syntactic structure; rather, it 
shows that the notion 'bodily process verb' is not syntactically relevant.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav quote a number of studies which conclude that the 
important aspects of meaning concern the type of event profiled ('activity', 'change of 
state', etc), rather than the kind of argument that participates in the event ('body', 
'mind', 'animal', etc) (Dowty 1991, Pinker 1989, Pustejovsky 1992, Tenny 1987, Tenny 
1992, van Valin 1990). This issue is touched on at several points in what follows 
(1.3.4, 3.2.1, 3.3, 5.2.2, 5.3). There I show that these force-dynamic properties are very 
important in determining syntactic behaviour but that the other, thematic, properties 
are also relevant.
Above I suggested that a single syntactic pattern (the direct object relationship) 
is apparently related to three separate semantic patterns. There are also cases where it 
is doubtful that any semantic generalisations can be made over words sharing syntactic 
properties, for example the optionality of the object in transitive verbs. Both e a t  and 
d e v o u r  can be used with a direct object referring to the affected argument. Clearly 
this argument must be associated with the meanings of the verbs (since it is selected 
semantically: Eat chocolate!* beer), and the fact that arguments with similar conceptual 
content are linked with direct objects in so many other cases justifies the claim that 
these verbs can have objects because of their conceptual structures (the conceptual 
structures associated with the object relationship are explored below). However, EAT 
and d e v o u r  differ, syntactically, in that the former but not the latter may also appear 
without its object. Can this syntactic difference also be shown to follow from 
properties of the conceptual structures of the two verbs, and do other optional object 
verbs share the relevant conceptual properties of EAT, and obligatory object verbs share 
those of DEVOUR?
We might be tempted somehow to mark the relevant argument positions in the 
conceptual structures of verbs like e a t  as optional, or optionally realised in syntax, but 
this will remain an arbitrary stipulation, one of Jackendoff s wild cards, unless it can be
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shown to follow from a particular semantic property not shared by the verbs like 
d e v o u r . Of course it may be that some relevant property or properties can be found, 
which is also shared by other optional object verbs, or it may be that the optional 
object verbs fall into two or more semantic classes, but whatever semantic properties 
define the class or classes must be independently motivated, or they remain stipulative.
However, there are cases where a lexical semantic account does appear to be 
well motivated. One such case is the contrast between e a t  and d in e . The former, as 
noted, has (optionally) an object, while the latter may not have one. Hudson, Rosta, 
Holmes and Gisborne (1996) suggest that this pattern can be explained by appealing to 
the meaning of d in e , which refers to an eating event, crucially defined by the meal that 
is eaten (in contrast to the verbs b r e a k f a s t  and l u n c h ). Since the food argument is 
filled lexically for d in e , the verb does not permit it to be filled compositionally.
Another case where a lexical semantic approach seems able to provide a 
satisfactory account of syntactic behaviour is that of indirect objects, as I argue below. 
Many verbs permit an indirect object, and in all cases the indirect object refers to an 
intended possessor of the theme of the event profiled by the verb. This pattern is, in 
fact, productive in that it can be used with novel verbs (SMS her the news) or in novel 
combinations with existing verbs (Wanda waggled me her bid with her ears). A 
sensible account for this situation requires a full semantic characterisation of the 
syntactic dependency. Then the dependent will be allowed to appear with any verb 
whose (lexical) semantic structure is compatible with that semantic characterisation.
The semantic structure I propose below is, as I argue more fully there, 
importantly also motivated independently. For example, I propose that the indirect 
object refers to the possessor in the state resulting from the event profiled by the verb, 
so that any verb in an indirect object construction must profile a resultative event. The 
telicity of verbs with indirect objects provides further evidence that they profile 
resultative events: they are, in Vendler's (1967) terms, generally achievements (the 
aspectual properties of verbs and constructions are discussed in chapter 4).
A properly developed theory of lexical structure requires at least the following: 
> an account of how the meanings of words are formed, how they relate to each 
other and how they are learned;
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> an account of how words and their meanings are related, both systematically and 
idiosyncratically, and how systematic word/meaning relationships are learned and 
used productively;
> a structured theory of syntax and other word/word relationships, including 
derivation, collocation and agreement, together with an account of how the 
syntactic and other properties of words are derived from their lexical structures;
> an account of the relationship between words and their forms, which explains 
regular variations in form that correspond to regular syntactic or semantic 
variations; and an account of the relationships that hold among forms.
> Finally, if the syntactic properties (or some of them) are to be shown to follow 
from lexical semantic properties of words, then we require additionally an account 
of how word meanings are combined in compositional structures, and how the 
relationships between word meanings are projected onto syntactic structure. To 
infer a linking rule of this sort, we need a robust syntactic pattern and an equally 
robust semantic pattern and the two need to be clearly related in a regular and 
explanatory (motivated) way.
It is part of the core purpose of this thesis to ask whether (and show how) WG 
can provide all of these things. In the following section (1.1.3) I give a sample analysis
of three English constructions (from Levin 1993), and in the rest of this chapter I 
develop the WG framework in order to show what kinds of lexical structure it supports 
and explore more precisely how it satisfies the requirements identified above.
1.1.3 Word Grammar: a monostratal, declarative dependency grammar;
Levin’s examples
Word Grammar (WG), the analytical framework used in the second part, will be 
described at greater length in the following chapter, so I offer here a fairly brief 
characterisation, that will show that the properties of WG make it possible to exploit 
and build upon the successes of lexical semantics. WG is a dependency grammar, in 
that all grammatical structure is represented in a network of asymmetric pairwise 
relationships between linguistic elements (ie words and their meanings). It is also 
monostratal, there being no distinction between 'deep' and 'surface' representations,
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and declarative as opposed to procedural in that the rules of grammar consist of well- 
formedness constraints on linguistic structures, rather than procedures describing the 
construction of well-formed strings. The dependencies (ie grammatical relations) are 
basic and abstract, so that they provide a rich grammatical structure which is capable 
of representing generalisations over the properties of words.
Furthermore, the dependency structure is used for both syntactic and semantic 
representations, so that both syntactic and semantic structure can be described 
explicitly in terms of the individual functions of particular words and their meanings. 
This decompositional feature of the framework goes, as I hope to demonstrate, some 
way towards answering Lehrer's plea: "a major step forward would be to place the 
work on lexical semantics within a more general semantic and syntactic model." 
(1988: 206).
By way of demonstration, I shall briefly present a WG analysis of the four 
verbs (or verb classes) and three constructions discussed by Levin in her introduction 
(1993: 5-10) (b r e a k , c u t , h it , t o u c h ; conative, body-part possessor ascension, 
middle). Some features of the analysis will necessarily be glossed over here, but all 
will be addressed in the second part of the thesis. The purpose of the demonstration is 
to show that the explicit relational structure of WG syntax and semantics allows the 
relationships between the various verbs (or verb classes) and constructions to be 
explained in terms of specific features lexically associated with them.
Levin begins her discussion by noting that all four verbs can appear in 
transitive constructions (the examples in this part are mostly drawn from Levin; the 
numbering is my own):
(3) Margaret cut the bread.
(4) Janet broke the vase.
(5) Terry touched the cat
(6) Carla hit the door frame.
However, she goes on to point out that they differ as to whether they permit middle
(7)-(10), conative (11 )-(14) and body-part possessor ascension (15)-(l 8) constructions. 
The possibilities are summarised in Table 1 (also from Levin (ibid: 7)).
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7) The bread cuts easily.
8) Crystal vases break easily.
9) ♦Cats touch easily.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
♦Door frames hit easily.
Margaret cut at the bread.
♦Janet broke at the vase.
♦Terry touched at the cat.
Carla hit at the door.
Margaret cut Bill on the arm. 
♦Janet broke Bill on the finger. 
Terry touched Bill on the shoulder. 
Carla hit Bill on the back.
TOUCH HIT CUT BREAK
conative no yes yes no
body-part possessor ascension yes yes yes no
m iddle no no yes yes
Table 1. Four verbs and three constructions.
Next, Levin shows how the patterns in the table can be explained with 
reference to the respective meanings of the verbs and the constructions.1 I shall present 
the relevant semantic properties and show how they can be characterised in terms of 
specific semantic relationships (the more precise details of the analysis follow the 
introduction to WG at the end of the chapter).
First the body-part possessor ascension (BPA) construction. This construction 
is identified by the preposition o n  and allows TOUCH, h it  and c u t  but not b r e a k . 
Levin argues that the construction is sensitive to the notion of contact, only permitting 
verbs whose meanings "necessarily involve contact" (ibid: 8). This criterion clearly 
selects among our verbs in the appropriate way, but how can it be represented and 
exactly how is the construction to be limited to the appropriate verbs? My claim is that
1 In fact Levin's account is based on the sensitivity o f diathesis alternations to components o f  verb 
meaning (ibid: 7). This difference between the two accounts (mine and Levin's) is not relevant here, but 
it is discussed below.
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the lexical semantics of the three verbs that permit the construction must include a 
touching event.
The result of (non-stative) touching is that the toucher and the touchee are in 
contact; similarly for hitting. Cutting involves touching as an intermediate stage: the 
contact between the instrument and the theme results in the final state. Below (1.2.5) I 
present the relevant semantic structures (those of the verbs and the preposition) in 
more detail, but for now it is enough to say that the meanings of these three verbs must 
contain a touching event. This property is enough to license the BPA construction 
because of the semantics of ON itself. This clearly refers to a touching event (which is 
one of the things that distinguishes ON from, say, b y ) and it is this fact that accounts 
for the pattern in (15)-(18). When a verb is used in the BPA construction, the 
preposition refers to the touching event in the lexical semantics of the verb. So in the 
case of a verb that lacks this component (eg br eak), the construction is not licensed.
Levin goes on to argue that the conative construction requires a motion 
component in addition to the contact component that licensed the BPA construction. 
This follows naturally from the particular meaning of AT in this construction, which is 
typified by its use with verbs like THROW, as in (19), where the preposition refers to an 
intended point of contact.
(19) Carla threw a brick at Bill.
In order to satisfy this condition, the thrower must intend the missile to make contact 
with the referent of the complement of the preposition and the missile must follow a 
path leading towards the point of contact (though it need not eventually make contact). 
This requires that the lexical semantics of the verb supply a relevant path and end 
point. It is for this reason that the construction excludes to uc h , which does not entail 
motion.
The explanation for the behaviour of these verbs with respect to the middle 
construction turns crucially on their force-dynamic properties. The two verbs CUT and 
break  profile a change of state in the argument referred to by the object: this argument 
is the first argument of the state resulting from the action profiled by the verb (the 
bread is cut, the vase broken). This contrasts with resultative (ie inchoative) TOUCH,
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where the first argument of the result state is the referent of the subject (Terry (or a 
part of Terry) touches the cat), and with h it , whose profile does not define a resulting 
state.
The middle construction is characterised by the presence of a 'modal' element 
(which may be an adverbial such as easily/with difficulty or a modal or auxiliary verb). 
The subject refers to the theme of a state defined by that modal element. The state is a 
property assigned to the referent of the subject, relating it to the state referred to by the 
modal element, which is predicated of the action profiled by the verb: a middle can be 
glossed something like ‘x has the property that it is easy/difficult/impossible/highly 
possible/... to do y (to it)’.
Levin claims that the verb must profile a change of state, and that the middle’s 
subject refers to its patient (affected argument) and she advances the examples in (20) 
in support of this claim (1993: 26). However, it is clear from examples like those in 
(21) that the construction also admits non-resultative verbs.
(20) a. *This metal won’t pound.
b. This metal won’t pound flat.
(21) a. This wine drinks remarkably smoothly for a 2001 Syrah.
b. How does the Welsh Black eat? [BBC Radio 4: The Food Programme]
c. Pinker’s new book reads very well.
The subjects in (21) do all refer to the patient of the verb’s sense: though 
eating, drinking and reading do not necessarily refer to telic (resultative) events, they 
nevertheless do refer to affective events (ones where some process is carried out on the 
patient). In chapter 3 I define a class of affective dynamic events which have both 
agents and patients and my claim here is that the middle construction admits only 
verbs that can have a sense in this class.
Levin assigns further semantic properties to the middle construction: it is 
understood generically both with respect to time and with respect to the agent. This is 
explained by the fact that it is the sense of the verb that appears as the second argument 
of the state referred to by the middle: the sense of a verb corresponds to the most
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general such event, and has an unspecified time and agent. Notice that when the past 
tense is used in a middle, it determines the time of the state, and not of the event:
(22) The car started perfectly until that day when it got stuck in the river.
Rosta (1995) argues that these semantic properties are merely accidental 
properties of the middle, advancing examples like those in (23) that are not construed 
generically. Under the analysis found here, these examples involve a separate 
construction (unaccusative) and so do not provide counterexamples to the semantic 
constraints on middles. See chapters 3 and 5 for more discussion of unaccusatives.
(23) a. The door wouldn’t open (yesterday/when I tried it), 
b. The door opened to Kitty but not to me.
In the above discussion I hope to have given an impression of the benefits 
associated with explicit and decompositional lexical structure. In the following section 
I present a more detailed description of the WG analysis, which will permit the 
explanations offered above to be stated more clearly. A full and explicit treatment of 
the three constructions is given in 1.2.5.
1.1.4 Structure of the thesis
In the remainder of this chapter I introduce the properties of WG and the network 
analysis that is so important in the following chapters. I outline the declarative 
network that constitutes WG grammatical structure and introduce structures for 
specific (classes of) words, word meanings and dependencies.
Chapter 2 forms an introduction to lexical semantics. I begin by identifying 
some assumptions common to all approaches to lexical semantics: the notion of 
semantic competence and lexical semantic competence; properties of word meanings 
including sense and reference, semantic relationships like meronymy and hyponymy 
and ambiguity; and properties of compositional meaning including logical 
relationships between compositional structures, the principle of compositionality and 
the linking of syntactic and semantic arguments.
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In 2.2 I identify three different approaches to the study of lexical semantics: 
structural, translational and conceptual approaches. I discuss the characteristics of 
each approach, using examples from a range of frameworks and I go on to compare the 
WG framework with these other approaches. I position the WG framework with 
respect to the three classes and identify some (more or less contentious) issues that 
divide the various frameworks: universality, primitives and discreteness.
In the last three chapters I look more closely at three areas of linguistic 
structure, applying the WG framework and providing a more detailed analysis of a set 
of verbs to illustrate the principles discussed.
In Chapter 3, I explore the details of argument linking in WG. First I 
introduce some of the data that a theory of linking needs to account for; next I discuss 
some existing approaches to argument linking, classified according to whether they 
treat predicate classes or thematic roles as basics of the analysis; then I present a WG 
account that combines the properties of both kinds of approach.
I go on to illustrate the linking mechanism of WG by applying it to the analysis 
of verbs of motion. I show that motion events (the meanings of verbs of motion) are 
defined by their paths and their results, and that some specify also a manner. I examine 
the different linking properties of the various classes of motion verbs and conclude that 
these linking properties are determined both by force-dynamic and by thematic 
properties of motion events.
In chapter 4 I explore the representation of aspect in WG. I introduce Vendler's 
(1967) aspectual classes and consider some refinements of Vendler's classification 
made by Croft (1998b). I present a WG analysis based on individual and identifiable 
semantic properties some of which are also used in the quantification of nouns. The 
diagnostics commonly used to identify the aspectual classes are shown to follow from 
the relevant semantic structures.
I apply the analysis of aspect, particularly of telicity, in an account of 
resultative expressions in English. I consider some existing approaches to the analysis 
of resultative expressions and some conclusions that have been drawn from their 
behaviour (chiefly that English has syntactic unaccusativity). I present the relevant 
WG structures and show how they explain the syntactic and semantic properties of 
resultative expressions with all kinds of verb: those that select resultative expressions
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predicated of the subject or of the object and those that can be used alongside 
unselected resultative expressions. I provide an analysis of the resultative construction 
as a prototype category.
In the final chapter (5) I consider the treatment of ambiguity in WG. I begin by 
looking at some other classifications or treatments of various kinds of linguistic 
ambiguity. I go on to present a WG classification of ambiguity which recognises eight 
structural possibilities some of which would be described as ambiguous; the range of 
possibilities derives from the fact that WG lexical items have three levels of 
representation - formal, syntactic and semantic - and that a single form may be 
associated with more than one set of syntactic properties, or with more than one 
meaning, and so on.
I go on to consider a particular case of ambiguity: the 'causative alternation'. I 
present the relevant data before exploring some analyses of this phenomenon (those of 
Croft (1990), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) and Lemmens (1998)). I finish by 
presenting a WG analysis where the two 'poles' of the alternation are independent 
constructions and the lexical structures of the alternating verbs are compatible with 
both.
1.2 Introduction to Word Grammar
1.2.1 Properties of Word Grammar: dependency, cognitive and construction
grammars; classificatory and associative relationships
This section contains a fairly detailed introduction to the theoretical and analytical 
basis of Word Grammar, the framework applied in the second part of the thesis. Word 
Grammar (WG) is a generative grammar which dates from the early 1980s (see 
Hudson 1984). The theory has undergone some development since then, though the 
basic assumptions remain broadly the same (they are spelt out in Hudson 1990: 10-14). 
A clear and simple description can be found in Hudson (1994, 2000); Hudson and 
Holmes (2000) give an exploration of WG lexical structure and Holmes and Hudson 
(2004) explore how these lexical structures constrain syntactic composition. The WG 
web site at http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/wg.htm contains a great deal of 
downloadable material (including an 'Encyclopedia of Word Grammar and English 
Grammar').
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I proceed with my own description of the theory here for two reasons. First for 
those who are unfamiliar with WG, who if they are to understand the analyses in the 
second part need to be aware of particular features of the theory and its connection 
with other frameworks. Second, it should be of interest to those who already work 
within (or with) WG, since I identify the features of the theory that I use in the later 
part and outline my position with regard to some issues that either are not yet clearly 
resolved or are under explicit contention (I do not intend to go into the details of any 
strictly theory internal controversies).
The present work serves two purposes: to provide a meaningful and 
satisfactory account of the grammatical phenomena discussed in the second part, and 
to recommend the properties of WG. The description of WG in this part provides a 
necessary preface to its use in the descriptive and analytical work in the second part, 
and to some extent determines the success of that part. The analysis itself, to the extent 
that it is successful, provides a demonstration of the value of the theoretical 
mechanisms and assumptions I introduce in the introductory sections.
In this first part of this section I identify three theoretical traditions with which 
WG can be associated, by virtue of shared properties and assumptions. These three 
traditions, Dependency Grammar, Cognitive Linguistics and Construction 
Grammar are described as parents of WG, not in a causal but in a logical sense: WG 
is a Dependency Grammar because it makes use of dependencies, it is a branch of 
Cognitive Linguistics since it views language as a proper part of wider cognition and 
the structures of language as conceptual structures, and it is a Construction Grammar 
in that it sees no formal distinction between lexical and syntactic structures. These 
three inheritance relationships are discussed here, where I also identify their 
consequences for the linguistic descriptions developed in the WG framework. The 
properties identified under these three headings overlap somewhat, as could perhaps 
have been expected, though this does not detract from the usefulness of the division for 
expository purposes.
Word Grammar is a Dependency Grammar (DG). Dependency grammars have 
a long history, particularly in Europe (see Covington (1984), Engel (1992), Erben
(1958), Fraser (1994), Levelt (1974 a, b), Mel'cuk (1988), Owens (1988) and Tesniere
(1959) for details of the development of dependency grammars) and they are
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characterised in that, in a DG, words and the relationships between them 
(dependencies) are the only primitives of linguistic structure. This means, for sentence 
structures, that they do not refer to phrasal categories or other word strings (though 
some dependency grammars do make some use of phrases, and even WG makes use of 
word strings, in coordinated structures), and for lexical and grammatical structures that 
they too only refer to (classes of) words or dependencies.
This first consequence is not as significant as it may seem, since dependency 
structures are logically equivalent to phrase structures, as long as the phrase structure 
is restricted to binary branching. The second consequence (that lexical and 
grammatical structures refer only to classes of words or dependencies) is much more 
significant: it can serve by itself as the premise for the lexicalist position described 
above.
Word Grammar is a branch of Cognitive Linguistics. As noted above, WG can 
be considered a branch of Cognitive Linguistics in that it sees (knowledge of) language 
as a proper subpart of the conceptual structure that constitutes more general knowledge 
('the mind'). This view is shared by many writers working within the broad tradition of 
cognitive linguistics (see eg Dirven and Verspoor 1999, Geeraerts 1990, 1995, 
Langacker 1991, 1998, Taylor 1998, Tomasello 1998a, 1998b). It is also advocated by 
Fillmore and Kay, among the primary exponents of Construction Grammar, as 
described below:
"Among current non-modular approaches to grammar, CG places great 
emphasis on the fact that probably any of the kinds of information that 
have been called 'pragmatic' by linguists may be conventionally associated 
with a particular lexical form and therefore constitute part of a rule 
(construction) of a grammar." (Kay 1997: 123).
In WG this view is intimately bound up with the notion of dependency and of 
network structure. Since the properties of words are exclusively determined by the 
relationships between them and other concepts, those other concepts must themselves 
be of the same formal type: they are nodes in the same conceptual framework (and 
their properties are therefore in turn determined by the relationships they support). 
Since the meanings of words, and their sociolinguistic or connotational properties, 
form part of what language users need to know about their language, these properties
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must also be represented in the conceptual network: words and their meanings are 
concepts of the same kind.
The significance of this view is twofold. First it carries with it the responsibility 
to account for all properties of any phenomenon under investigation, since properties 
cannot be simply assigned to the extralinguistic component if they are not amenable to 
explanation. Second, and more favourably, it allows a wider range of information to be 
used in explaining observed patterns. For example, much of the analysis in the second 
part turns on the application of 'encyclopedic’ (as opposed to purely 'lexical') semantic 
properties of the words involved.
Word Grammar is a Construction Grammar (see eg Fillmore 1988, Fillmore 
and Kay 2000, Goldberg 1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, Kay 1995, 1997, Shibatani and 
Thompson 1996). In Word Grammar, as it is described here, all the regularities of 
language are represented in a network of more or less schematic lexical 
representations, a constructicon (Jurafsky 1992). This view of language is expressed 
by Fillmore, describing Kay's construction grammar as "an approach to language 
according to which there is no sharp distinction between the lexicon and the non- 
lexical parts of grammar" (1997: ix). In the WG framework it follows from the 
dependency principle: relationships between words are described in terms of 
dependencies, and regular patterns in the structures that (classes of) words participate 
in are described in terms of generalisations over dependencies. These (classes of) 
dependencies are represented, as is made clear below, in the same lexical structure as 
words and word classes.
This view, like the other two, is lent support by the demonstration that it 
succeeds in accounting for the observed behaviour of linguistic structures. The claim is 
that, for any linguistic pattern that may be encountered, an account can be developed 
that satisfactorily describes and explains the observed behaviour without departing 
from the monostratal (declarative as opposed to procedural) grammatical structure 
implied by the constructionist view.
2 In talking about the conceptual network and the relationships that define the properties o f concepts in 
what follows, I try to reserve the term dependency (and dependent) for syntactic relationships (the 
directly syntactic properties o f words and word classes), using the more general term association (and 
associate) for those relationships that hold between concepts in other parts o f the network.
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The framework outlined above can be characterised as follows: knowledge of 
language (indeed all conceptual structure) consists of a network of concepts joined by 
(asymmetric and binary) classificatory (isa) relationships, which support default 
inheritance, and associative (including dependency) relationships, these two kinds of 
relationship exhaustively defining the properties of the concepts. This network, which 
is explored in greater detail in the following section, has two important and useful 
consequences. It permits a fine-grained analysis of linguistic structure, which proves 
highly explanatory, and it means that generalisations can be made over linguistic 
categories when appropriate and using the same mechanisms as are used for more 
specific, idiosyncratic linguistic properties.
The statement of generalisations over linguistic types is an important part of the 
lexical structure of WG. The power of the default inheritance mechanism (see 
Briscoe, Copestake and de Paiva 1993, Hudson 2000, Kilgariff and Gazdar 1995) is 
that it allows these generalisations to be stated at the most appropriate level (usually 
this is considered to be the most general level possible). This means that where a 
particular syntactic or semantic property applies to a class of words, it need be 
represented only once in the lexicon, at the level of the appropriate class (for example, 
all verbs may have subjects). It also means that where two properties apply to different 
classes of words, they must be represented separately, each at the appropriate level.
(24) Sam cooked.
(25) Sam cooked an egg.
(26) Sam cooked Edna an egg.
This principle is exemplified in (24)-(26). The relationship between the subject 
and the verb is no different in (26), where it appears alongside a direct and an indirect 
object, from that in (25), which lacks the indirect object, or (24), which lacks both the 
indirect and the direct object. The relationship between the verb and the object is 
similarly independent of the other two dependencies, so both of these relationships 
(subject and object) can be defined without reference to the other two. Furthermore, 
since the classes of verbs that can appear with a subject, an object and an indirect
3 The two kinds o f relationship are discussed in more detail in the following section (1.2.2).
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object differ, the three properties must be associated with different categories. A full 
analysis of all three syntactic relationships follows shortly (1.2.3.3, 1.2.4.2, 1.2.4.3).
In contrast to properties like these that apply to whole classes of lexical words, 
some properties apply only to a particular lexical item. These must, of course, be 
represented at that more specific level. For example, the fact that d e p e n d  takes o n  as 
its complement is specific to that lexical item. Some lexical properties are specific only 
to some instances of lexical items. For example, while p u t  takes a noun object and a 
prepositional complement, there is a special subcase of p u t  (call it PUT/up) which takes 
u p  as a particle and w it h  as a prepositional complement, as well as having specific 
semantics (it refers to an act of tolerating):
(27) Oscar can put up with anything except for irritations.
1.2.2 Structure of the conceptual network: classificatory and associative 
relationships
The properties of linguistic (and other) concepts are defined exclusively by the 
relationships they support. As stated above, those relationships are of two kinds: 
classificatory relationships, which support default inheritance, and associative 
relationships (including syntactic dependencies), which can be thought of as functions 
from one concept to another. The various properties of these two kinds of relationship 
are explored in this section. A preliminary example is given in Figure 1.
Noun Verb
LIKE
V BEERVME
likeI beer
Figure 1 I  like beer.
The diagram shows the two kinds of relationship at work in the field of syntax. 
It shows (somewhat simplified) the syntactic structure of a three word sentence of 
English. The words are linked by isa relationships (shown by the inverted arrow at the
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supercategory joined by a line with the lower category) to the lexemes they instantiate, 
which are in turn linked by isa to word classes. The words are linked to each other by 
the syntactic dependency relationships subject and object (like all associative 
relationships, these are shown by labelled arrows pointing from the parent to the 
associate; the arrows are, in this case, labelled s and o for subject and object 
respectively).
The classification of the words into lexemes supports their other features: like 
isa l ik e , which supports the object relationship; it also isa (tensed) Verb, which 
supports the subject relationship. I  and beer both isa Noun, which makes them good 
candidates for the subject and object of the verb. I  is a particularly good candidate for 
the subject because of its form. For some English speakers (myself included), the form 
{I}4 is used only in subject position. The lexical entry for ME is shown in Figure 2. The 
form of the pronoun is {me}, but some subcases of ME, which are subjects, have the 
form {I}. This is mediated by the default inheritance mechanism: subcategories 
inherit properties from supercategories unless they are overridden by specific 
properties of the subcategory. I also show in the diagram that the referent of m e  is the 
same as its speaker. This provides a further example of the default inheritance 
mechanism, since it overrides the usual means by which a word’s referent is assigned 
(the usual means by which a word's referent is assigned are outlined below (1.2.4)), 
and also provides a good example of the interaction of linguistic and extra-linguistic 
properties.
4 {1} and {me} are morphemes. They are idealisations o f the formal properties o f words. They are 
realised in structured arrangements of letters (writing) and phones (speech).
29
Word
Person
Noun
Pronoun
ref
speaker
ME
V
{me}
ubject-
-form-
{1}
Figure 2 I a n d  ME.
In the case of I and m e , the overriding category is a lexical one (lexical 
structures are discussed in greater depth in the following section), but exceptions can 
also be associated with contextual categories (tokens):
(28) I laik beer.
(29) She liked beer.
The verb in (28) is, unconventionally, spelled laik, but it can still be identified 
as a token of l ik e , since it has enough of the relevant properties.5 The verb in (29) is 
more interesting. It is spelled /liked/, which marks it as the past tense of l ik e : the 
difference in form is regularly associated with a particular semantic property. This is 
mediated in WG by another property of the isa relationship: multiple inheritance (see 
Hudson and Fraser 1992). Creider and Hudson (1999) provide a WG analysis of 
inflectional morphology whereby inflections are themselves word classes and inflected 
word forms inherit both from their lexeme and from the inflectional category. Figure 3 
shows how this works.
5 The assignment of tokens to types is mediated by the principle o f best fit (as is the assignment o f all 
linguistic structure to utterances). This principle prefers the analysis that fits most closely with the 
properties o f existing concepts. The second word in /  kail beer is not likely to be analysed as a token o f 
LIKE (unless o f course I clearly like beer too much).
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form----------- x
Won
base'
time VerbBefore
referenlee y^ /'b a se —parti .part2-
’ast
Figure 3 Past tense verbs.
The form of a verb token (which by default is the same as its base) consists of 
the base plus {ed} when the token is also an example of Past, the class of past tense 
verbs. So, liked in (29) has the form it has because it isa both l ik e  and Past-verb, just 
as it inherits aspects of its meaning from those two categories. In this way, regularly 
inflected forms need not be stored in the lexicon: they simply appear as tokens that 
inherit from two types at once, as shown in Figure 4.6 Verbs with irregular past tenses 
override this principle (Figure 4).
Verb
V
LIKE
form
RUNV"
Past
{run}
d variant
^  form 
{liked}
form
I liked beer. RANX7
A  lr
{ran}
She ran a pub.
Figure 4 Regular and irregular past tenses.
6 It cannot be ruled out that some (or all) high-frequency regular forms are in fact stored in the lexicon. 
There is some evidence that this is indeed the case (Bybee 1995: 450-451). In cases where both regular 
and irregular forms exist (eg d r e a m )  the regular form must be stored.
31
The multiple inheritance mechanism features strongly in what follows, both in the 
online generation of regular categories and in the lexical representations of stored ones. 
It is not only applied in cases of derivational morphology, but also crucially in the 
interaction between verbs and constructions. It is further explored in 5 2 3 A.
The type/token distinction introduced above is an important one in WG and is 
an unavoidable consequence of the network analysis. Since a concept is defined only 
by the relationships it supports, any two concepts that have all the same properties 
(support all the same relationships) must be identical: they can occupy only one node 
in the network. Conversely, any two concepts that differ as to one or more property 
cannot occupy the same node in the network. The relationship between words and their 
lexemes provides a good example of this principle. The word (token) is an event that 
forms part of an utterance. Each lexeme (type) can be used many times in different 
utterances (or even within one utterance), on each occasion with a specific time and 
speaker and (quite possibly) with a divergent form ((28), (29)), valency, meaning etc. 
For this reason the word and its lexeme must be treated as separate concepts.
I turn now to the second primitive of linguistic structure in WG: the associative 
relationship. The four relationships subject, object, form and base that I use above are 
all examples of associative relationships. An association can, as I said above, be 
thought of as a function from one concept to another. For example, in (29) above, She 
is the (unique) subject of liked. This relationship is represented in the diagram by the 
labelled arc shown in Figure 5; alternatively it can be represented in normal prose, as 
in the previous sentence, or as a predicate, as also shown in Figure 5.
Verb
V
Noun
V
\ subject
subject {She, liked)', Noun (She); Verb {liked)
She
liked
Figure 5 The subject relationship.
Notice that the predicate is not the verb but the subject relationship. She liked 
beer is represented as 'subject (She, liked); object (beer, liked)' not as 'liked (She, beer)' 
since the verb and the nouns are elements of the same kind: they are concepts. This 
principle and the flexibility it affords will also be important in the following sections.
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Associations have another two significant properties: they are asymmetric and they 
are classified.
Associative relationships are asymmetric: they are functions from one element 
(the parent) to another (the dependent or associate). The dependent is a property of 
the parent, and varies with it. In many cases, a parent may have more than one 
dependent of the same kind, though the number of parents of any one kind is limited.
This asymmetry is important in the selection and control of some syntactic 
dependents (valents): a valent is always selected by the parent (putting it somewhat 
simply, verbs have subjects, not vice versa). The dependency relationship in turn 
selects the properties of the dependent: subjects are (typically) nouns, they typically 
precede their parents, I  is used instead of me etc.
The asymmetry of dependencies has a second consequence in syntactic 
structure. In grammatical sentences, all the words are connected by one or more 
("upwards") dependency relationships to a single word (the root), which is itself 
independent. In this way a word's parent provides its connection to the rest of syntactic 
structure. This allows an emergent (non-primitive) and informal (grammar external) 
definition of phrases, for word order purposes, as consisting of a word and all its 
subordinates (dependents or subordinates of dependents).
Dependencies are also classified. This is implied in the practice of labelling the 
dependency arcs: to say that /  is the subject of like in (30) and Fish that of can (and 
indeed swim) in (31), or to say as I did of (24)-(26) that the relationship between Sam 
and cooked is the same in all three, is to say that there are significant similarities 
between these relationships that cannot be described in any other (simpler) way.
(30) I like fish.
(31) Fish can swim.
The subject relationship collects together (in a way that is made clear below in 1.2.4.3) 
the various properties associated with subjects: word order, verb agreement, 
obligatoriness (with tensed verbs), merger with object in passive constructions (see 
below), semantic role etc. The fact that these properties should commonly cluster 
together in the way they do is the motivation (for linguists and (English) language
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users alike, is the claim) for recognising the subject relationship as the category whose 
properties they are.
Syntactic dependencies in English can be classified as in Figure 6
dependent
valent adjunct
subject complement
object etc
Figure 6 Classification of dependency types (for English).
Some dependents are selected by the parent. These are valents and they include 
subjects (which appear before the verb) and complements. Complements are further 
subdivided into object and some other complement types. Unselected dependents are 
adjuncts.
I assumed above that all of linguistic (and indeed conceptual) structure is 
constructed out of inheritance and associative relationships. This means that 
associations can also be classified according to whether they are semantic, syntactic, 
lexical, morphological etc. However, like the definition of phrases, this classification 
has no theoretical (grammatical) status, since nothing follows from the classification of 
an association relationship as syntactic, lexical or whatever in this way. Syntactic 
associations (dependencies) can be defined informally as those relationships that hold 
between words, semantic associations as relationships holding between meanings and 
so on but, since this is their only distinguishing feature and it is already represented in 
the grammar, no more need be said.
The same principle holds for linguistic concepts at each level: syntactic 
concepts (words, lexemes, etc) are identifiable by the fact that they support syntactic 
relationships, semantic concepts (events, situations, concrete objects, etc) by the fact 
that they support semantic relationships, and so on, but they share no other significant 
properties. WG structure is quite clearly stratified into broadly traditional levels, but 
does not require the concepts or relationships at different levels to be of different
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formal kinds. Since the only distinguishing feature of concepts at different levels is 
that they typically support different sets of associations, and this is already implicit in 
the structure of the grammar, there is no need for an explicit representation.
The classification of syntactic dependencies is explored further, with examples, 
in the following section, where I deal in rather more detail with the lexical structures of 
WG, showing how they constrain the structures of utterances.
1.2.3 Structures of Word Grammar: words; meanings; dependencies
The structures discussed in this section range over all areas of the grammar. I deal with 
lexical and contextual structures, with morphological, syntactic, semantic and other 
properties of words and of relationships between them. I have divided the section into 
three parts, dealing with grammatical structures in WG under the headings words, 
meanings and dependencies, entirely for ease and clarity of presentation. Again, there 
will necessarily be considerable overlap between these three parts.
In the first part I deal with the structures surrounding words. I discuss lexemes 
(the lexical representations of words) and word classes, word tokens and their 
relationships with other concepts in context, the relationships connecting words and 
their meanings (both lexically and in utterances), and relationships holding between 
lexical words.
In the second part I look more closely at semantic structures. I look at the 
(lexical and contextual) meanings of words and the structure of the semantic network; I 
look at the relationships between syntactic and semantic structures and introduce the 
syntax-semantics principle, the lexical structure underlying semantic composition; 
and I look at the way in which the meanings of the parts of utterances combine to 
determine the semantic properties (logical and discourse functions, aspectual 
properties, etc) of the utterance.
In the third part I show how the properties of dependency classes are 
represented in lexical structures ('constructions') and how these representations serve to 
constrain the combinatorial properties of words.
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1.23.1 Words
The behaviour of words in context is determined by a number of factors. These derive 
in part from the properties of the word and in part from the properties of the context. 
The properties associated with the word, its lexical properties, are attached to it 
through the lexeme it instantiates, or they derive from the properties of other (eg 
inflectional) categories. In most cases, a word's lexeme determines most of its form (at 
least in languages like English) and meaning. It also determines (or at least affects) the 
number and nature of some of the word's dependents. Some of these lexical properties 
(commonly including the form and meaning) are specific to the lexeme; some are 
shared by a class of words.
result
recip
%
Y
e r Giving
sense
addressee
sense 10
Give
>*Having ee
ee \
er
referent
referent
referent
her
complement
A A'
some flowers
GIVE -yr
form
form
V
{give}
IMPERATIVE
Figure 7 Give her some flowers.
Figure 7 shows a partial structure for the sentence Give her some flowers. A 
number of the properties of Give, the first word, are shown: it has an indirect object 
(io in the diagram), her, and an object (o in the diagram), some; it has a form, {give}, 
and a sense, Giving. The form and the sense are the same as the form and sense of the 
lexeme g iv e , which the word token instantiates. As stated above, most English words 
inherit their form and sense directly from their lexeme. Contextual meaning is 
associated with the referent, which instantiates the sense; the relationship between 
sense and referent is explored shortly but here I consider the properties of the sense, 
which need to include those aspects of meaning common to all uses of g iv e .
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Giving must clearly have a result, which isa Having: if I give you something,
' n
the result is that you have it. Furthermore, some of the arguments are shared between 
these two concepts: the 'givee' (the gift, the ee of Giving in the diagram) is the 'havee' 
(the possession, the ee of the Having in the diagram), and the 'haver' is the recipient
o
(recip in the diagram) of the giving. These two semantic arguments are also linked to 
syntactic arguments: they are the referents of the object and indirect object 
respectively. This is all the semantic analysis I provide for Giving at this stage, though 
it must have further semantic properties, since the structure shown would also apply to 
Donating, Bequeathing and many other events. Some of these further semantic 
properties are considered below, where I also look more closely at the result 
relationship.
Giving also has a giver, who must have control over the givee and who is 
responsible for the transfer of possession. In Figure 7, the giver is not linked to a 
syntactic dependent of the verb. Since the verb is imperative, the er of its sense is 
understood to be the same as its addressee (which is also shown in the diagram; this 
very simple integration of different properties of words is one of the strengths of the 
non-modular structure of WG). This property is clearly not specific to g iv e , since it 
applies to all imperative verbs (and all (non-stative) verbs can be imperative). The 
presence of an object and an indirect object, however, as well as the semantic 
relationships between them, are much less general.
(32) and (33) provide some evidence of the difference between subjects on the 
one hand and objects and indirect objects on the other. The anaphoric verb DO (so) 
shares part of its meaning with the preceding verb, referring to an event of the same 
type that differs only as to the time (or place or any other circumstantial property) and 
the giver (in (33) WE is repeated, so that in this case the ers are the same). It is not 
possible to use DO (so) to refer to a Giving event with a different ee or recipient:
(32) a. We gave her a record on Thursday and they did so too.
b. *We gave her a record on Thursday and they did so him (a book).
7 Equally clearly, the result cannot be Having, since that would mean that all Havings result from a 
Giving (that it is impossible to have anything without having been given it).
8 The relationships er and ee are discussed below (3.1.4).
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c. *We gave her a record on Thursday and they did so a book.
(33) a. We gave her a record on Thursday and on Friday we did so again
b. *We gave her a record on Thursday and on Friday we did so him (a book).
c. *We gave her a record on Thursday and on Friday we did so a book.
If this is a semantic constraint it is a strange and stipulative one, since there is no 
apparent reason why two concepts should be forced to differ as to two of their 
arguments. Fortunately, however, there is a ready syntactic explanation: g iv e  takes a 
direct and an indirect object, whereas d o  does not.
This evidence suggests that the direct and indirect objects and the semantic 
structure that comes with them are lexically associated with g iv e  (they are valents). 
However, there are also compelling reasons for wanting to treat the indirect object 
relationship (as well as the object relationship) as a construction independent of the 
lexical structures of these verbs: the large number of verbs to which it applies, its 
productivity and the regularity of its use even in highly irregular contexts to name but 
three. Some of these are discussed above, where I argue for a construction-based 
account of the indirect object and, later, where I look more closely at classes of verbs 
sharing the same valency and further develop the construction-based account.
For now it is clear that the lexical properties of words derive from categories at 
various levels of generality: some properties are common to all words, some to all 
verbs or to another of the major word classes, some to a subset of verbs or of some 
other word class, and some to particular words.
subject
^  Noun
Verb * ----------- V
X7
object
Transitive
indffect object
Giving
Ditransitive
^7
sense GIV£
Figure 8 Some lexical properties of g iv e .
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Figure 8 gives a rather simplified sketch of this position, showing that the 
subject is a property of all verbs (this is, of course, a simplification since some verbs 
do not have subjects, and indeed some non-verbs do) and that the object is a property 
of some verbs (the transitives), also that some of these have indirect objects and that 
g iv e  is such a ditransitive verb. This position is refined shortly (1.2.3.3).
Also included in the lexical properties of a word are its relationships with other 
lexemes. For example, the meanings of the nouns g iv e r  and g if t  are related to that of 
the verb g iv e  already discussed. The senses of these two nouns fill respectively the er 
and ee roles of a giving event, as shown in Figure 9.
er ee
}r
Giver
sense
GIVER
Giving
sense
er-nom ee-nom
Gift
V
sense
GIFT
GIVE
Figure 9 g iv e r , g iv e , g if t .
The figure also shows a lexical relationship between g iv e r  and the verb, which 
I have labelled er-nom, for er-nominal, and one between the verb and g if t , which I 
have labelled ee-nom. The first of these lexical relationships must form a part of the 
grammar, since the pattern it represents is both general and productive (many verbs 
support an exactly comparable relationship, even novel ones). The pattern involves the 
semantic relationship identified, which is paired with a regular formal relationship: the 
form of the er-nominal consists of the base of the verb, followed by {er}. These 
properties are shown in Figure 10.
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er Noun
V’Verb ,
sense sense
er-nom
base form
^  parti part2
Figure 10 The er-nominal relationship.
The ee-nominal relationship is less obviously a necessary part of the grammar since, 
though there is evidently some relationship between the forms, the pattern is not 
productive.
Notice that just as there is irregular inflectional morphology (see Figure 4), so 
there is also irregular derivational morphology. For example, v e n d o r  is (arguably) 
more natural than s e l l e r  as the er-nominal of s e l l .
1.2.3.2 Meanings
The link between words and their meanings is mediated by the sense relationship. It 
connects a word, a concept that functions as the locus for a set of syntactic properties, 
and its sense, a concept that functions as the locus for a set of semantic properties. In 
this way it is a symbolic relationship: the word is symbolic for the sense and the rich 
network of semantic properties that surrounds it. I show below that syntactic 
dependencies can also take part in symbolic relationships, and so control the 
integration of the semantic structures associated with words in context.
The semantic properties of the sense are, as I have said, represented by a 
network of relationships which is formally similar to the network of syntactic 
relationships. As I also say above, there is no restriction on the kinds of information 
that are associated with the lexical sense of a word. Since it is the only locus of 
information about the word's meaning, anything that language users know about that 
meaning must be represented here. For example, both donating and bequeathing are 
kinds of giving, as mentioned above. However, they differ in a number of properties
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from general giving, as represented in the semantic structure provided in Figure 8 
above.
First, Donating is special because the recipient is some sort of charitable 
organisation. There is also a strong implication that the gift is money, to the extent that 
when the verb is used without an object, it is understood as referring to the gift of a 
sum of money. Bequeathing is different in that the time of the result is separate from 
the time of the bequeathing, coming as it does after the death of the bequeather. These 
properties are shown in Figure 11.
Before
sense
GIVE Giving
er H A  ^  Having
Ntoiey Charity time result . time
time ^
^e
nating
A
Donating j  Bequeathing
recipient sense _
sense • -< er
BEQUEATH
DONATE
Dying
Figure 11 Giving, Donating, Bequeathing.
Furthermore, if I know that Donnie has donated five pounds to the donkey sanctuary or 
that elderly ladies often bequeath money to cats homes, then that information must also 
be represented here (associated with sub cases of the senses shown).
The isa relationship, and the type/token distinction it supports, have an 
important consequence for the linguistic semantic structure of complex constructions. 
While the sense represents the lexical meaning of a word, its contextual meaning is 
represented by the referent, which instantiates the sense. The verbs in (32) and (33) 
above each refer to an act of giving, distinguished from other, similar, events by its 
time and place and other circumstantial properties, and by the identity of some of the 
participants. This is how contextual meaning is usually determined, though there are 
exceptions to this principle: most pronouns have no sense, for example, and find their
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referent in the context (as show n above (1 .2 .2 ) the referent o f  m e , a deictic personal 
pronoun, is the sam e as its speaker).
The specialisations of the sense that determine the properties of the referent are 
typically introduced by the meanings of other words in the context, as mediated by the 
syntax semantics principle (SSP) (Hudson 1990: 132). This is represented 
schematically in Figure 12, and given in prose in (34). The SSP, as shown here, 
corresponds to the bijection principle of Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1982) 
and to the projection principles and 0-criterion of GB (Chomsky 1981: 36, 38).
A
/  v
sense referent
A
•  •
Word
Figure 12 The syntax-semantics principle.
(34) Syntax Semantics Principle (SSP): a word’s dependent refers to an associate of 
its sense.
I argue below (1.2.4, 1.2.5, 2.2.2) that this principle needs to be revised to the extent 
that it applies reliably only to valents (selected dependents). Adjuncts often refer to 
parents of the sense of their own parents, reversing the SSP (as in Figure 13, whose 
structure I discuss below). The syntactic dependencies are from cup to on {on is the 
adjunct of cup) and from on to the {the is the complement of on), yet it is the meaning 
of the preposition that acts as the parent of the other two meanings in the semantic 
structure: the referent of the is the ee (for second argument) of oris sense, and the 
sense of cup is the er (first argument) of its referent (compare the semantic structure of
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cup which is on the table, where which corefers with cup and is the subject of the 
predicate in the relative clause).
Supporting 
The-cup-on-the-table •
ee
er
er On-the-table
ee A >1
ref ref The-table
Cup ^  - f  T"
V On
ref V
sense
f  refref / \
sense Table
c A  -V C -V c A. sense
the cup on the table
Figure 13 the cup on the table.
Other adjuncts may refer to associates of their parent’s sense, conforming to the SSP. 
For example, a temporal adverbial like one day refers to the time of its parent's sense, 
so this case conforms to the same pattern as that that applies to valents. Others are 
more complex. For example, the adjective in (35) appears to modify the sense of its 
parent's parent's parent (Sally did not date someone who was occasionally a sailor, but 
occasionally she dated someone who was a sailor).
(35) Sally dated the occasional sailor.9
There is a further possibility, which is that a word and its dependent corefer. 
This possibility is found with both valents (the cup as shown above) and adjuncts (boy 
who). Other cases where a word and its dependent corefer include apposition and some 
prepositional constructions (eg City o f  Glasgow) and some auxiliary verbs (You did 
come) and 'light' verbs (We had a smoke). These (and other) exceptions 
notwithstanding, the default for valents is that they conform to the SSP, which can 
therefore be revised as in (36).
9 This example is due to Joe Hilferty (www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/wordgrammar.html). Dick Hudson 
argues (convincingly) in the same place that occasional depends not on sailor, as I have assumed here, 
but directly on the. The point remains the same.
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(36) Revised syntax-semantics principle (RSSP): a word's valent refers to an 
associate of its sense.
Notice, also, that the adjunct relationship between cup and on preserves part of the 
SSP, in that the semantic relationship is still one between the sense of the syntactic 
parent and the referent of the dependent. The parent is the profile determinant in the 
relationship (Langacker 1991, van Hoek 1995). In this way semantic structures are 
constructed in stages, each containing more specific semantic information, which often 
correspond to the phrasal nodes of a phrase structure analysis. This stepwise 
construction of semantic structure, semantic phrasing, is discussed in Hudson (1990: 
146-151).
The lexical semantic properties of words also constrain the nature of the words 
that they can appear with. Words select the semantic properties of their valents (37), 
(38) and, in the case of adjuncts, of their parents (39), (40).10
(37) Donny/*the doorbell donated £500.
(38) *1 ate the projection principle.
(39) Sally saw a pregnant cow/*bull.
(40) Sally saw the cook/*rat-poison who killed the cat.
The aspectual properties of verbs can also constrain the kinds of structure they can 
appear in. Vendler (1967) distinguishes three aspectual classes of verbs: states, 
activities and events (further classified into achievements and accomplishments), 
which are identified by their ability to appear in a range of constructions. For example, 
g iv e  profiles an achievement, in Vendler's terms, as can be seen from the examples in
(41), which contrast with those in (42).
10 I use the * notation for all kinds o f infelicity. Since semantic, syntactic and other linguistic 
information is encoded in the same formal network, there is no clear way of distinguishing unsemantic 
from unsyntactic or otherwise ungrammatical sentences. For example, John wants cycling can be 
construed as syntactically anomalous, since the complement of want should be to, or as semantically 
anomalous, since it means that John needs to be cycled (cf John's bike wants cleaning).
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(41) a. Gaby gave her a bunch of flowers at midnight.
b. Gaby is giving her a bunch of flowers, [future reference]
c. Gaby gave her a bunch of flowers for five minutes, [duration of result, not
event]
d. ?*Gaby gave her the flowers in five minutes.
(42) a. * Barry basked at midnight.
b. Barry is basking, [present reference]
c. Barry basked for five minutes, [duration of event]
d. ?*Barry basked in five minutes.
These examples, and their significance, are discussed at greater length below 
(2.2.1.3, 3.1, 4.1). For now it is enough to say that the proposed presence of a result in 
the semantic structure associated with Giving is the defining feature of felicity, which 
is a property of achievements. Elsewhere (4.1.2) I show in more detail how the 
presence of a result causes the behaviour seen in (41), but a brief summary can be 
given here: the punctual time expression in the (a) examples specifies the time of an 
event, of the Giving in this case, and for this reason it cannot be used with verbs (like 
b a s k ) that profile activities, since activities do not have punctual profiles; the present 
progressive is used to refer to currently true states (as in (42)b), which in the case of 
eventive verbs usually means it must refer to a state of being about to happen, or 
scheduled to happen, as in (41)b; FOR can be used to refer to a duration, a property of a 
state, which in the case of telic verbs must be the state resulting from the event profiled 
by the verb as in (41)c; finally, IN, as used in the (d) examples, profiles a relationship 
between two times, generally the time of initiating an action and that of successfully 
concluding it, which means that it is really only suitable with verbs that can profile 
accomplishments (which differ from achievements in that the action and its result have 
different times); when used with verbs profiling activities or achievements, to the 
extent that this is possible, this in  usually refers to the relationship between some 
reference point and the initiation of the action (what Croft calls "run-up achievements" 
(1998b: 76)).
The above discussion has given a flavour of the structure of the semantic 
network, and shown how its properties can affect the syntactic (combinatorial)
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behaviour of words. In the following section I look at the relationships that define 
syntactic structure and at the semantic structures that correspond with them. I consider, 
among other things, the extent to which certain valency relationships can be considered 
lexical properties of individual words.
1.233 Dependencies
Figure 14 shows some of the syntactic and semantic structure that needs to be 
associated lexically with g i v e :  the verb has a subject (s in the diagram), an object (o in 
the diagram) and an indirect object (io in the diagram), all of which are nouns. The 
sense of the verb, Giving, is an event with an er (the referent of the subject), an ee (the 
referent of the object), a recipient (the referent of the indirect object) and a result, an 
example of Having which shares its arguments with its parent. The giver has agentive 
control over the event, being in possession of the givee beforehand and willing the 
transfer of possession. The givee and the recipient are more passive participants: the 
former undergoes a change of possession, but nothing else, the latter simply takes 
possession of the givee. Being a haver presupposes other properties (centrally 
humanity), but those are not shown here.
Willing .■V Having
V
resulter
v , .
" f  CT ee  -^Giving
• K . . er 1
ee
ref
recip —
^  '  V  re f
Controlling sense
■ ~ ref
io
X  '  ' V
GIVE A .
Verb
Noun
Figure 14 g i v e .
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Clearly, not all this information is specific to GIVE. Volitional involvement, 
control and instigation are semantic properties associated with many other subject 
relationships, even those of verbs that have no (indirect) objects; the passive role and 
affectedness of the object also apply in many other cases; and many other verbs can 
appear with indirect objects, with similar semantic properties. Levin provides the 
following two groups of verbs permitting indirect objects (1993: 45-49), distinguished 
from each other by semantic properties (those in (43) alternate, according to Levin's 
analysis, with constructions with the preposition TO, those in (44) with constructions 
with FOR).11
(43) ADVANCE, ALLOCATE, ALLOT, ASK, ASSIGN, AWARD, BARGE, BASH, BAT, 
BEQUEATH, BOUNCE, BRING, BUNT, BUS, CABLE, CARRY, CART, CATAPULT, CEDE, 
CHUCK, CITE, CONCEDE, DRAG, DRIVE, E-MAIL, EXTEND, FAX, FEED, FERRY, FLICK, 
FLING, FLIP, FLOAT, FLY, FORWARD, GIVE, GRANT, GUARANTEE, HAND, HAUL, 
HEAVE, HEFT, HIT, HOIST, HURL, ISSUE, KICK, LEASE, LEAVE, LEND, LOAN, LOB, 
LUG, MAIL, MODEM, NETMAIL, OFFER, OWE, PASS, PAY, PEDDLE, PHONE, PITCH, 
POSE, POST, PREACH, PROMISE, PULL, PUNT, PUSH, QUOTE, RADIO, READ, REFUND, 
RELAY, RENDER, RENT, REPAY, ROLL, ROW, SATELLITE, SCHLEP, SELL, 
SEMAPHORE, SEND, SERVE, SHIP, SHOOT, SHOVE, SHOW, SHUTTLE, SIGN, SIGNAL, 
SLAM, SLAP, SLIDE, SLING, SLIP, SMUGGLE, SNEAK, TAKE, TEACH, TELECAST, 
TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, TELEX, TELL, THROW, TIP, TOSS, TOTE, TOW, TRADE, 
TRUCK, TUG, VOTE, WHEEL, WILL, WIRE, WIRELESS, WRITE, YIELD.
(44) ARRANGE, ASSEMBLE, BAKE, BLEND, BLOW, BOIL, BOOK, BREW, BUILD, BUY, 
CALL, CARVE, CASH, CAST, CATCH, CHARTER, CHISEL, CHOOSE, CHURN, CLEAN, 
CLEAR, COMPILE, COOK, CROCHET, CUT, DANCE, DESIGN, DEVELOP, DIG, DRAW, 
EARN, EMBROIDER, FASHION, FETCH, FIND, FIX, FOLD, FORGE, FRY, GAIN, GATHER, 
GET, GRILL, GRIND, GROW, HACK, HAMMER, HARDBOIL, HATCH, HIRE, HUM, IRON, 
KEEP, KNIT, LEASE, LEAVE, LIGHT, MAKE, MINT, MIX, MOLD, ORDER, PAINT, 
PHONE, PICK, PLAY, PLUCK, POACH, POUND, POUR, PREPARE, PROCURE, PULL, 
REACH, RECITE, RENT, RESERVE, ROAST, ROLL, RUN, SAVE, SCRAMBLE, SCULPT,
11 The question o f alternation, as well as the difference between the two groups, is dealt with shortly.
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SECURE, SET, SEW, SHAPE, SHOOT, SING, SLAUGHTER, SOFTBOIL, SPIN, STEAL, 
STITCH, TOAST, TOSS, VOTE, WASH, WEAVE, WHISTLE, WHITTLE, WIN, WRITE.
The set of verbs that can take an indirect object, of either kind, is in principle 
unlimited in size, since it is possible to extend it in one of two ways. First, membership 
is open to new verbs which refer to appropriate activities:
(45) We radioed/phoned/faxed/emailed/texted/SMSed them the news.
Tli
(46) We posted/mailed/couriered/FedExed them the manuscript.
(47) Boil/coddle/microwave/Breville™ me an egg.
Second, and even more tellingly, existing verbs can be used with indirect objects, with 
novel meanings contributed by the semantics of the indirect object:
(48) The colonel waggled her his bid with his ears.
(49) Dust me the chops with flour.
Examples like (48) and (49) are acceptable to the extent that the actions they profile 
can be construed as having the appropriate semantic properties. For example a bottle of 
beer can be construed as having been prepared for someone if it has been opened for 
them to drink from, but a door is not construed as prepared when it has been opened 
for someone to pass through:
(50) Open me a bottle of pils/*the door.
It is clear from this, and from the fact, noted by Levin (ibid: 4-5) with respect 
to the middle construction, that speakers make robust judgments about the meanings of 
unfamiliar verbs in constructions on the basis of the construction’s meaning (see also
(51)), that the meaning of the construction must be represented in a schematic form in 
the mind of the language user.
(51) Flense me a whale.
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This schematic representation must pair the semantic properties of the 
construction with its syntactic and formal (phonological/graphological) properties. 
Goldberg (2002) provides a powerful further argument for treating constructions as 
symbolic units in this way. This argument, which she traces to Chomsky (1970) and to 
Williams (1991) (where it is called the ’’target syntax argument"), holds that where the 
properties of supposedly derived structures (here the creative indirect objects) match 
those of non-derived ones (here the lexically selected indirect objects), the 
generalisation over the two sorts of structure is most effectively treated as an argument 
structure construction in its own right.
In English, which does not have a rich inflectional morphology, the formal 
properties of the indirect object relationship are limited to the fact that personal 
pronouns in the indirect object position appear in their default form (see Figure 2 
above), which is also true of direct objects. Other languages show more variation,
marking the presence of an indirect object in the form of the verb, as in (52) from
Indonesian (Shibatani 1996: 171), or assigning different case to nouns in indirect 
object position than those functioning as direct objects, as in German (53).
(52) Suya membunuh-kan Ana lipas.
I  kill BEN [name] centipede
I killed a centipede for Ana.
(53) a. Gib ihr/*sieBlumen.
give her flowers
Give her flowers, 
b. Klip *ihr/sie.
kiss her
Kiss her.
Some syntactic properties of the indirect object (in English) are given by 
Hudson (1992). These include the possibility of merger with subject in passive 
constructions (54), the obligatoriness of direct objects in indirect object constructions
(55) and its position immediately following the verb (56).
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(54) She was given some flowers.
(55) We gave (her) *(some flowers).
(56) a. We gave her some flowers/*some flowers her.
b. We sent her some flowers over/her over some flowers/* some flowers her 
over/*over her some flowers.
The semantic property common to all indirect objects is that they refer to 
havers: in the case of the verbs taking 'dative' indirect objects in (43), the result of the 
verb's sense is that the referent of the indirect object comes into possession of 
something; in the case of those taking 'benefactive' indirect objects in (44), the verb 
profiles an act of creating or preparing something intended to be given to the referent 
of the indirect object.
Verb
V
Transitive ee
sense
io
i
Ditransitive
recip — •
k
o ref
ref
"A...- A
Noun
Figure 15 Some verbs have indirect objects.
Figure 15 shows the various properties associated with indirect objects. First, the 
diagram shows that indirect objects are nouns, and that it is verbs, and more 
particularly verbs with objects, that have indirect objects: Ditransitive, the category of 
verbs with indirect objects, isa Transitive, the category of verbs with direct objects. 
This is enough by itself to represent the fact that the direct object is obligatory with 
indirect objects (55), but the object relationship is nevertheless also shown in the 
ditransitive structure, since it appears in the word order rule (indirect objects precede 
objects). The referent of the object also appears in the semantic structure, along with
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that of the indirect object, since without it the semantic structure can not be interpreted. 
I show the two referents as coarguments of the result of the verb's sense, though the 
semantics is worked out more clearly in the discussion of Figure 16. The fact that 
indirect objects can merge with subjects in passive constructions is dealt with in the 
following section.
Indirect objects may have one of two slightly different semantic structures, 
each associated with a separate category of ditransitive verbs. In both, the referents of 
the two dependents are er and ee of a Having, but the role of that Having differs 
somewhat between the two. The two structures are given in Figure 16.
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Figure 16 Two kinds of indirect object. 
Ditransitive/1 is exemplified in (57):
(57) We baked her a cake.
The sense of the verb isa Making, and its result (therefore) isa Being (is a state) and the 
argument of that Being is the referent of the direct object: baking a cake results in that 
cake's existence, baking a potato results in that potato's being ready. The Having that
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connects the referents of the two arguments is the purpose of the verb's sense: the 
purpose of the baking of the cake is that it should belong to her (the referent of the 
indirect object). This concept is connected to the sense of the verb by the beneficiary 
relationship (labelled ben/fy). Ditransitive/2 (58) has as its sense a Giving event, which 
straightforwardly has as its result the Having that connects the referents of the two 
arguments. The referent of the indirect object is connected to the sense of the verb by 
the recipient relationship.
(58) We passed her a parcel.
Once these two semantic structures are established, they can be used in the 
treatment of the relationship between the indirect object construction and constructions 
with the prepositions t o  and f o r . Simply, t o  has the same sense as Ditransitive/2 and 
FOR the same as Ditransitive/1 (with some differences: see (59)). This synonymy can, 
though it need not, be treated as a chance occurrence: no explanation is necessary for 
the relationship between constructions with indirect objects and those with TO. The 
case of f o r  and the difference seen in (59) certainly support the idea that the two 
constructions converge on a single meaning by chance, since the two meanings are in 
fact different. The use of the indirect object to refer to the beneficiary of an act of 
preparation is only possible where the prepared item is prepared so it can be owned (or 
consumed) by the beneficiary; this constraint does not apply to beneficiary FOR.
(59) a. Open a bottle of pils/the door for me.
b. Open me a bottle of pils/*the door.
The pattern in Figure 15 (and Figure 16) represents a symbolic relationship. 
Lexical structures include specifications of the meanings of individual lexemes and of 
classes of lexemes defined by common properties of all sorts. A lexeme has a form and 
a range of syntactic properties which identify the syntactic pole of the symbolic 
relationship; it also has a sense, which provides the connection to a range of semantic 
properties. Similarly, inflectional and other classes of lexemes share formal, syntactic 
and semantic properties. And similarly, syntactic dependencies are associated with a
52
range of formal and syntactic properties (chiefly constraints on the elements at either 
end of the dependency) and semantic properties (represented in the semantic 
relationship between the meanings of the two elements). Figure 17 shows, by way of 
an example, partial lexical structures for the lexeme o p e n , the inflectional category 
Past and the indirect object relationship.
BeforeV
Open
result time recipient
OpeningT
VerbN7
sense
\
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base
k{open}
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referent
Past
form
time
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time
part2 A
referent
A
time 
ee A  A
parti
Figure 17 Schematic representation of OPEN, Past, indirect object.
The pattern in Figure 15 (and Figure 16) is a generalisation over verbs taking 
indirect objects. A verb appearing in a construction with an indirect object instantiates 
the more general model. The model represents the properties of the construction in the 
same way as a lexeme represents the properties of a particular word. In the case of a 
novel use of the construction (60), the fact that the sentence conforms to the formal 
properties entails that it also conforms to the semantic properties of the construction. In 
fact the construction can also be used to constrain the set of verbs that may take an 
indirect object, since only those verbs that can conform to the properties of the 
construction can appear in it: * Skate me a half-pipe/* Run me a mile, etc.
(60) Waggle me your bid.
Examples like (60) represent cases of multiple inheritance: the verb instantiates 
both WAGGLE (from which it gets its form and much of its meaning) and Ditransitive 
(from which it gets the indirect object and concomitant semantic properties). Notice
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that this is the same mechanism that was introduced above for verbal inflection: the 
past tense of a verb inherits from the verb's lexeme and from the category Past at the 
same time.
Because of this possibility, it is not necessary to include all of the structure in 
the diagrams in the lexical specification even of a verb like g iv e , since (when it is used 
ditransitively) the relevant properties follow from the general properties of ditransitive 
verbs. These verbs, whose use with an indirect object seems unexceptional compared 
to those like (60), probably are lexically associated with the indirect object 
construction, g iv e , for example, might be separated into two sub-types, one of which 
isa Ditransitive, and the other of which takes TO as a complement. By contrast, a verb 
like a c c o r d , that never appears without an indirect object, inherits all the properties of 
Ditransitive.
Figure 18 shows a part of the lexical structure of a c c o r d  and g iv e . All cases 
of ACCORD have indirect objects, so the whole category is subsumed under 
Ditransitive, g iv e , by contrast, is divided into two subcategories: one which isa 
Ditransitive, and one which isn't (this category has TO as a complement). The diagram 
also shows that creative use of the indirect object as in (60) can be mediated by a 
contextual (= non-lexical) specialisation of the relevant lexeme, that inherits also from 
the 'inflectional' category Ditransitive.
Verb
Ditransitive
WAGGLE
GIVE
Waggle me your bid.complement
ACCORD GIVE/1 GIVE/2
A
TO
Figure 18 a c c o r d , g iv e , Waggle me your bid.
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Some of the features of the ditransitive model are nevertheless often repeated 
or overridden in the structures associated with verbs that are specialisations of it. For 
example, Lending and Loaning are special in that their result is temporary, Donating 
because the recipient is a charitable organisation, and Denying in that the intention is 
that the recipient should not receive the givee. These specialisations of/divergences 
from the model must be represented in the individual lexical structures of the verbs 
concerned.
A classification hierarchy consisting of classes defined by properties that 
distinguish them from other categories is a commonplace in many approaches to 
knowledge representation (and elsewhere). In linguistics the idea is found in the work 
of structuralist semanticists (see 2.2.1), among others.
The theory of lexical structure and linking outlined here is developed in greater 
depth in later sections. In the following section I make a case for exactly similar lexical 
constructional representations of the subject and object relationships. The lexical 
model for objects will include the formal and syntactic properties ({me} not {I}, is a 
noun, permits merger with subject, heavy NP shift, does not tolerate adverbs between 
it and its parent, can be extracted, etc) and the semantic ones (refers to the ee of the 
sense), and similarly for subjects. A fuller list of relevant properties for each dependent 
is worked out below.
1.2.4 Compositionality: sentence structures and lexical structures
1.2.4.1 Compositionality and coercion
The approach to linguistic analysis outlined here and used in the three data chapters is 
characterised in that it views linguistic structure as composed of words and classes of 
words and dependency relationships and classes of dependency relationships. Lexical 
structure, which exhaustively defines linguistic competence, consists of a (relatively) 
stable network of such words and relationships whose properties are defined at varying 
levels of generality.
The RSSP links syntactic valent relationships to semantic ones, as described 
above (1.2.3.2). The RSSP represents a specialisation of a more general principle, that 
words which are related syntactically are also related semantically. This principle and 
the fact that the semantic structures of words are fully integrated with the rest of
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cognitive structure combine to provide a powerful analytical tool. For example, the 
preposition TO is often used in constructions profiling movement towards a destination 
(61), (62), (63). Generally, the parent of the preposition, be it a verb as in (61) and (62) 
or a noun as in (63), refers to the movement and its complement to the destination (in 
the broader sense of the term that includes recipients).
(61) The queen went to Queensland.
(62) I sent a letter to the queen.
(63) We enjoyed our trip to Queensland.
(64) A letter to the queen stood in the toast rack.
(65) An invitation to a garden party stood in the toast rack.
Note, however, that while (64) does not refer to a movement, the preposition 
clearly still profiles a destination. Furthermore, it clearly profiles the destination of the 
sense of the noun letter; indeed the preposition is selected (both semantically and 
syntactically) by the noun. In order for this to make sense, the semantic structure of the 
noun must include a destination (in the broader sense): letter to the queen means what 
it does by virtue of the fact that letters commonly have addressees, just as invitation 
to a garden party means what it does by virtue of the (slightly more 'purely linguistic') 
fact that people are commonly invited to go to parties.
The same mechanism can be applied to the phenomenon dealt with by 
Pustejovsky and Bouillon (1996) under the label coercion.
(66) Charlie started the cheese.
(67) Bertie started the book.
The difference in the meanings of the verbs in (66) and (67) derives from properties of 
the referents of their objects: cheeses are typically eaten and books read (or, less 
commonly, written).
Perhaps more significantly, the RSSP and specialisations of it are what control 
composition and linking in WG linguistic structures. The linking rule for indirect 
objects given in Figure 16 above, which is a generalisation over dependencies with
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particular properties, also amounts to a specialisation of the RSSP: the indirect object 
of a verb refers to the recipient of its sense. Similar regularities govern the composition 
of structures with prepositions like those discussed above ((61)-(65)), and others 
govern the linking of subject and object relationships. These, the lexical structures of 
the subject and object relationships, gather together their syntactic and semantic 
properties in the same way as the lexical structure of the indirect object relationship 
gathers together the syntactic and semantic properties of indirect objects.
1.2.4.2 Objects
Biber et al. (1999: 126-128) give a number of syntactic properties for English objects, 
as follows:12
a. found with transitive verbs only
b. is characteristically an NP, but may be a nominal clause
c. is in accusative case (when a pronoun)
d. typically follows immediately after the VP (though there may be an intervening
1 ^indirect object)
e. may correspond to the subject in passive paraphrases
> The first two syntactic properties refer to the classes of the words at either end of
the object relationship: some verbs (the transitive verbs) lexically select an object;
the objects themselves are generally nouns.
> The third property concerns the form of the object: when it is a pronoun, it takes 
the 'accusative' form (what I have above called the default form).
> The fourth property concerns its relative position in the sentence: objects generally 
follow their parents, and only a limited set of other dependents of the parent may 
intervene (any number of predependents of the object may intervene) (68). Biber
12 The properties in this section are used as the defining properties o f objects, and a WG account is 
sketched that shows how these properties are associated with the object relationship. It may be felt that 
objects have other properties that are not represented here, or that one or other o f the properties is 
incorrectly ascribed to objects. In a sense this does not matter, since the present section is concerned 
with providing a model for the WG characterisation of linguistic structure. The full range o f properties 
of objects is explored in other parts o f the thesis.
13 Note that in Biber et al. the VP category subsumes the 'verbal complex' (main verb and any 
auxiliaries), but not any complements or other postdependents of the verb.
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et al. note that indirect objects may come between the object and the parent (69); 
this possibility is also open to particles (70).
(68) Philly filleted (*skilfully) the fish.
(69) We gave her a new knife.
(70) She threw away the old one.
> The final syntactic property refers to passive constructions. Under the WG 
analysis (see Hudson 1990: 336-353), the subject of a passive verb is at the same 
time its object (71) (or indirect object (72)), the merger of dependents being 
licensed by the passive construction itself.
(71) The camel hair coat was given to Cathy.
(72) Cathy was given the camel hair coat.
Figure 19 shows how these syntactic properties can be represented in a lexical
structure.
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Figure 19 Syntactic properties of objects.
The parent in an object relationship isa Verb and the dependent isa Noun. In this way, 
the object relationship defines a class of transitive verbs (verbs that have objects).14 
Verbs that only appear in transitive constructions inherit all properties from this class 
(d e v o u r  isa Transitive, just as a c c o r d  isa Ditransitive). The word order properties 
are represented by the next relationship: the form of the dependent is the next of that 
of the parent. The diagram also shows the category Ditransitive (see Figure 16), where 
the word order properties are somewhat different (the form of the object is the next of 
that of the indirect object). Also represented in the diagram is the class of passive verbs 
(the category Passive). These verbs are defined by their formal properties: the form of 
a passive verb consists of its base plus a suitable ending (not shown). There are two 
classes of passive verb: one, which also isa Transitive, in which the subject is merged
14 Indeed it also defines a class o f nouns that are objects. Just as d in e  cannot be a transitive verb, so I 
cannot be an object.
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with the object, and one, which also isa Ditransitive, in which the subject is merged 
with the indirect object.
The full lexical structure of the object relationship must also include its 
semantic properties. In line with the approach outlined above for indirect objects, the 
semantic properties of the object are related to its syntax through a specialisation of the 
RSSP. Biber et al. (1999: 126-128) also identify a range of possible semantic 
relationships that correspond with the object relationship (see a-g), and the lexical 
semantic representation of the object relationship should be general over all of these.
a. affected (bake a potato)
b. resultant {bake a cake)
c. locative {swim the Ohio)
d. instrumental {kick your feet)
e. measure {weigh 100 tons)
f. cognate object {laugh a sincere laugh)
g. eventive {have a snooze)
Properties a, b and d can be quite straightforwardly collected under a general 
treatment, in terms of their force-dynamic properties: in each case, the sense of the 
verb has a result which is a further event having the referent of the object as an 
argument (when you bake a potato, the potato becomes soft and edible; when you bake 
a cake, the cake comes into existence; when you kick your feet, the feet move). This is 
represented in Figure 20: a verb's object refers to the er of the result of the verb's sense. 
This two-stage relationship is further represented in a direct relationship between the 
verb's sense and the referent of its object, labelled ee.
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Figure 20 Affected/effected objects.
Notice that a similar conflation of a two-stage relationship into a direct one was 
used above in the semantic structure of indirect objects. In fact, when a verb has an 
indirect object, the recipient relationship overrides the ee relationship in being assigned 
to the er of the result, in much the same way as the word order properties of the 
indirect object override those of the object. This is determined in the semantics by the 
nature of the resulting state: where this state isa Being, its er is the ee of the verb's 
sense; where it isa Having, its er is the recipient of the verb's sense, rather than its ee, 
and the ee of the verb's sense is the same as the ee of the result (see Figure 16 above; 
also chapter 3).
'Locational' objects, as in c, do not refer to affected arguments, but to parts of a 
path. The example in c defines the beginning and end of the path (on opposite sides of 
the river), but other examples may profile the beginning ((73)a), middle ((73)b) or end 
((73)c) of the path.
(73) a. The express jumped the rails, (from Biber et al. (ibid: 127))
b. Vinny vaulted the horse.
c. Elly entered the room.
The set of verbs that can appear with an object of this kind is (naturally) limited to 
those that can refer to a motion event and in this sense the 'locative' object is lexically 
selected by its parent. Notice also that the verb (often) determines which part or parts
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of the path may be profiled by such an object. Because of this, these arguments must 
appear in the lexical structures of quite specific categories (at the level of the lexeme or 
just above). The relevant categories are subsumed under Transitive, since the syntactic 
properties are the same as those of the affected/effected objects, but it is arguable 
whether they need to be collected under a category 'locative object verb'. This category 
is justified to the extent that generalisations can be made over the relevant 
constructions.
There seems to be little semantically in common between locative objects and 
affected/effected objects, though there is some relationship. For example, Dowty's 
(1991) incremental theme is a property of both kinds of object: the event in both 
cases is bounded by the theme:15
(74) a. Barry baked a potato/*potatoes in five minutes,
b. Sammy swam the Ohio/*rivers in five minutes.
When the sense of the verb is an unbounded event, a measure expression can be used 
to define a bounded path: Sammy swam five miles. It is not entirely clear that 
arguments of this sort are indeed objects. Some certainly are not; in (75) the object of 
pushed is the (pea) and not the measure expression.
(75) Evans pushed the pea five miles with his nose.
The 'measure' objects are also confined to a limited class of verbs, by which 
they are semantically selected (weigh five tons, measure five furlongs). They also have 
little in common semantically with the other types of object, since their semantics is so 
heavily constrained by the verb.
'Cognate' objects ((76), (77)) are also associated with a very small class of 
verbs (Levin gives 47 (1993: 95-96), out of a total of 3107 verbs). They have 
something in common semantically with effected objects, but the semantics is
15 The relationship between the boundedness o f the event (telicity) and temporal IN is discussed above 
(1.2.3.2) and below (3.2.2,4.1.2).
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constrained by the verb, which may also go so far as to select a particular lexeme. 
Levin notes:
"Most verbs that take cognate objects do not take a wide range of objects.
Often they only permit a cognate object, although some verbs will take as 
object anything that is a hyponym of a cognate object." (1991: 96)
The verb and its object refer jointly to a performance of some kind.
(76) She sang a sweet song.
(77) Deirdre died a slow and painful death.
'Eventive' objects are confined to an even smaller class, the 'light' verbs. In 
these cases the event structure is determined by the verb, but the details of the 
semantics are supplied by the noun. In light verb constructions with h a v e , the object 
refers to an event {have a bath/meal/billiards match); light DO, in contrast, refers to an 
affective/effective event, the precise nature of which is determined by the semantics of 
the (affected) object:
(78) a. I'll do the beds, ['dig them/make them up']
b. I'll do the potatoes, ['peel them']
c. I'll do the cake. ['bake it']
Figure 21 collects together the various semantic properties of objects. The 
category Transitive is the same as appeared in Figure 19: it is the locus of the syntactic 
properties of objects (these are represented schematically here).
> The majority of objects are subsumed under the affective/effective category. In the 
diagram this is represented by the semantic concept Making.
> I show two subcategories. Making' (as in The cold made our lips blue) and 
Creating are schematic for the senses of the affective object verbs and the effective 
object verbs respectively.
> Making is schematic for all affective/effective events, and as such provides a sense 
for 'light' DO (shown as d o / l i g h t  in the diagram). 'Light' have  is shown as a simple 
transitive verb that corefers with its object (the shared referent being an event).
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> The set of verbs taking 'locative' objects is represented by a class having Moving' 
as its sense. This concept, which is a subcategory of ordinary Moving, subsumes 
cases of moving with respect to some landmark. The landmark appears in the 
semantic structure (labelled lm).
> The types of Moving' are classified here according to whether the landmark is 
construed as the middle of a path (Passing), an obstacle (Traversing), an end point 
(Entering) or a source (Leaving).
> Finally, the diagram shows that some nouns which are objects refer to 
Measurements, and they define a property of the er of their parent's sense.
Event Measurement
Noun
measure •
X
ibject'ref
HAVE ref refT ransitive sense
HAVE/light
DO Moving WEIGH
COST
Makin; ref
loving1sense
(/light
"Leavingsense
Creating EnteringMaking1
T raversing
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Figure 21 Semantic properties of objects.
The lexical structure given in Figure 21 integrates the syntactic properties 
identified above (Figure 19) with the semantic properties of the various types of object. 
Figure 21 is schematic for all 'transitive constructions' in that verbs with objects inherit 
(some of) their properties from the category Transitive (usually by way of one of the 
subclasses) and nouns that are objects inherit some of their properties from the 
category that fills the relevant slot in the structure (perhaps also by way of one of its 
subclasses: the diagram does not show inheritance relationships between the object 
noun in the most general case and those in the subcases, but these relationships are 
nevertheless implicit in the inheritance structure).
64
1.2.4.3 Subjects
Biber et al. (1999: 123-125) give a number of syntactic properties for English subjects,
as fo llow s:16
a. found with all types of verbs
b. is characteristically an NP, but may be a nominal clause
c. is in nom inative case (w hen a pronoun and in a finite clause)
d. characteristically precedes the VP, except in questions where it follows, except 
where the subject is a Wh word itself
e. determines the form o f  present tense verbs (and o f  past tense BE)
f. may correspond to a by phrase in passive paraphrases
> Again, the first two syntactic properties concern the classes of words that 
participate in the relationship: verbs have subjects, which are generally nouns. 
Any verb may have a subject, so the class of'subject verbs' is less constrained than 
the class of transitive verbs. It is perhaps for this reason that the semantic roles 
played by subjects are so much more diverse (see below). All tensed verbs have 
subjects, so the class Tensed is shown as a subset of the subject verbs, (see Figure 
22.)
> The 'nominative' form of personal pronouns consists of the five words I, SHE, HE, 
WE and they , which are subcases of the relevant pronouns that are used only in 
subject position, as outlined above, (see Figure 22.)
16 The comments in note 12 apply, mutatis mutandis, here too.
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Figure 22 Some syntactic properties of subjects.
> The word order properties of subjects are slightly more complicated. Generally the 
subject precedes its parent, but some subjects follow their parents and in many of 
these cases the referent of the verb is questioned (the construction forms a yes/no 
question); these cases are represented in the subclass of subject verbs Inverted. 
The word order properties of Wh questions are determined in part by the lexical 
properties of the category Wh (schematic over Wh words). This category is always 
the extractee (x< in the diagram) of its parent and so precedes it. Where the Wh 
word is not the subject of the verb, the verb and subject are also inverted (the 
complement of Wh isa Inverted).
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complement
Figure 23 Word order properties of subjects.
> Subject-verb agreement is a property of the categories participating in the subject 
relationship. Present verbs (Present is a subcase of Tensed) must have the same 
agreement value as their subjects. Those with the agreement singular have a form 
consisting of their base plus an {s}. Notice that this requires that the pronouns I 
and YOU have agreement plural (or have no agreement value) (/ like/she likes). 
Subject-verb agreement is dealt with at length by Hudson (1999).
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ubject.
time
referent
Tensed
time
.agreement-ubject-
Present
agreemem
agreemenl•basi
singular
parti form
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Figure 24 Subject-verb agreement.
> The final syntactic property is more properly semantic in WG: just as there is
overlap between the semantics of the indirect object relationship and that of the
preposition TO, so there is considerable overlap between the semantics of the 
subject relationship and that of the preposition b y .
The semantic properties of subjects are explored more fully in the following 
chapter (and in the three data chapters), but some general remarks can be made here. 
Biber et al (ibid: 123-125) give the following possible semantic roles for subjects:
a. agent/willful initiator {She kicked a bottle cap at him)
b. external causer {The wind blew the plane o ff course)
c. instrument {Tactics can win you these games)
d. with stative verbs:
* recipient (/ know it, She could smell petrol)
■ source {You smell funny)
■ positioner {She sat against a wall)
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e. affected {It broke, An escapee drowned)
f. local {The first floor contains sculptures)
g. eventive {A post mortem examination will take place)
h. empty {It rained)
> The first three roles (a-c) can be collected together by virtue of the force-dynamic 
properties they share: agents, causes and instruments all precede the event in the 
force-dynamic chain.
> I argue below (3.1.4) that affected subjects (e) are similarly controlled by the 
force-dynamic structures of the verbs that take them.
> The semantic roles played by the subjects of stative verbs are chiefly determined 
by the lexical (semantic) structure of the individual lexeme, though some semantic 
classification is possible (see 3.1.4.3)
> ’Local’ and 'eventive' subjects are controlled by the lexical structures of the verbs 
that take them.
> Since every verb can have a subject, the number of different semantic roles open 
to the referents of subjects is limited only by the number of different event types 
denoted by verbs. This can be seen particularly clearly in the case of 'dummy' 
subjects (h).
Figure 25 collects together the possible semantic roles associated with the 
subject relationship, and relates them symbolically to the syntactic properties identified 
above (given schematically in the diagram). The various semantic types of subject are 
glossed by the er relationship introduced above. A full account of this relationship and 
of the ee relationship linked with objects is provided in the following chapter. Four 
kinds of stative predicate are shown, covering the three possibilities under (d) and the 
'local' subjects in (f). Some of these semantic classes are dealt with in more detail in 
following chapters; each makes different requirements of its er. A class of 'eventive 
verbs' is also included; these corefer with their subjects.
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Figure 25 Semantic properties of subjects.
1.2.4.4 Summary
In this chapter I have outlined an approach to linguistic analysis whereby the 
grammatical structure of sentences is expressed in terms of the lexical requirements of 
the grammatical categories involved. These categories range from the highly specific 
(individual lexemes) to the highly general (word classes, properties common to all 
words); they are semantic (defined by aspects of their meaning), syntactic (defined by 
their relationships with other words in the sentence), lexical (defined by their 
relationships with other lexemes), formal (defined by properties of the word’s 
pronunciation or spelling) or some combination of the above; they consist of classes of 
concepts and of classes of relationships between concepts (defined in terms of the 
properties of the concepts at either end).
In using this approach, the challenge of linguistic analysis is to identify the 
appropriate classes, and the ways in which they interact in grammatical structures. In
70
the three data chapters, the details of the WG approach are fleshed out in the areas of 
linking, aspect and ambiguity and the framework is applied to data from three 
overlapping areas of the lexicon: verbs of motion, resultative expressions and 
causatives and the causative alternation. In chapter 2 the WG approach is compared 
with some other approaches to lexical semantic analysis and some significant issues 
are identified. To conclude this chapter, I give a full analysis of the Levin (1993) data 
discussed above (1.1.3).
1.2.5 Those Levin examples again
TOUCH HIT CUT BREAK
conative no yes yes no
body-part possessor ascension yes yes yes no
middle no no yes yes
Table 2. Four verbs and three constructions.
Table 2 duplicates Table 1 from above. In 1.1.3 I give an informal account of the 
pattern in the table, identifying properties of the verbs and constructions that explain 
their compatibility or incompatibility with each other. In this section I briefly present 
specific lexical structures that include the properties adduced above (most of the 
lexical concepts and relationships introduced here are discussed at great length in the 
following chapters). I begin with the verbs:
>  t o u c h :
At the heart of the lexical semantic structure of TOUCH is a state of being in contact. 
This is represented in the diagram by the concept Touching. It has two arguments, 
whose roles in the touching are, objectively, indistinguishable (the two alternatives in 
(79) are truth-conditionally identical; also t o u c h  permits what Levin (1993: 36-37) 
calls "understood reciprocal object alternation" (80)). However, the verb's lexical 
structure imposes a distinction on them: one is accorded special prominence over the 
other (the sort of prominence that underlies Langacker's (1991) distinction between 
trajector and landmark); this distinction accounts for the contrast in (81).
(79) The anode must not touch the cathode./The cathode must not touch the anode.
(80) The anode and the cathode must not touch.
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(81) You must not touch the screen./?The screen must not touch you.
In order to distinguish between the two arguments, I label one (the most 
prominent) er and the other ee. The arguments are further related to each other in that 
parts of each (parts of the surface of each) share a place. TOUCH can also be used to 
refer to an event resulting in this stative touching. This event appears in the diagram as 
Touching/r (r for resultative). Both Touching and Touching/r are shown in the diagram 
as the sense of the lexeme TOUCH. This issue is dealt with at great length in chapter 5 
(5.2.3.3).
Event
ouchingTouching/r
sense
TOUCH 
Figure 26 t o u c h .
>  HIT
A state of being in contact also forms part of the semantic structure of h it . It is the end 
result of the event profiled by the verb. Like t o u c h , h it  can be used with one of two 
senses: the primary cause of the touching event is a moving event where the toucher 
moves with the result that it touches the touchee (82); this event may be the result of a 
further event of instrumental hitting, labelled Hitting/i in the diagram (Figure 27), 
where the hitter acts on some other participant, causing it to move towards the 
touching event (83). The moving event has a path and a speed, which will both be 
significant in the later discussion (these, among many other details, are not shown).
(82) A bird hit the window.
(83) Ginger hit the cymbal (with a brush).
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instrument
Touching
e r er.
-resuh- -resuK-
Hitting
,ee
sense sense
HIT
Figure 27 h i t .
>  C U T
The lexical semantic structure of CU T includes a structure exactly similar to that in 
Figure 27. With C U T, however, there is an additional state, resulting from the 
Touching: a "separation in the material integrity" (Hale and Keyser 1987) of the cuttee. 
The instrument used in cutting must have an edge.
The sense of the verb in (84) is Cutting (an argument moves towards contact 
with another resulting in a separation in its material integrity); the sense of the verb in 
(85) is Cutting/i (an agent causes another argument to move towards contact with a 
third, resulting in a separation in its material integrity. (86) shows one reason why the 
moving event must have a path (this is the referent of the preposition).
(84) The axe cut the door in half.
(85) Jack cut the door in half (with an axe).
(86) The axe cut deep into the wood.
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Edge State
Moving
>artinstrument
Touching
,er er„
er-
-result- result-
Cutting/i Cutting Cut
resuh-
eeee.
sense sense
CUT
Figure 28 CUT.
>  BREAK
The lexical semantic structure of break  includes two result relationships. These form 
a simple force-dynamic chain whereby the breaker acts on the breakee causing it to 
undergo a process resulting in its being broken. The case of break  is discussed at great 
length in chapter 5, with particular emphasis on the fact that the verb can be used to 
refer to either of these two events: the change in the affected argument itself, labelled 
Breaking/u (u for unaccusative), or the event causing it, labelled Breaking/c (c for 
causative). Breaking/c has an er and an ee; Breaking/u has just an er, which is also the 
argument of its result.
er-
er. er -resuh-•resuh-
BrokenBreaking/c
sensesense
BREAK
Figure 29 br eak .
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Next the constructions:
> transitive
The structures given for the four verbs above all support transitive uses. The structures 
assigned to the subject and object relationships above link them to the er and ee 
relationships respectively, so that the concepts in the lexical structures of the four 
verbs that have both these arguments are suitable to act as the sense of a transitive 
verb. The diagram shows a simplified structure for Janet broke the vase. Transitive 
constructions with the other verbs will be similar in structure.
Breaking/c
referentreferent
sense
*bject-
ubject-
the vasebrokeJanet
I
BREAK
Figure 30 Janet broke the vase.
Janet is the subject of the verb, the its object. The referent of the subject is the 
er o f th e  sense and that of the object is the ee of the sense. Since this requires the sense 
to have two arguments, the causative sense Breaking/c must be used.
> conative
The conative construction is structured by the lexical properties of the preposition a t . 
at , a s  used in a sentence like Carla threw a brick at Bill, supplies the goal of its 
paren t’s sense (Figure 31 shows a partial representation).
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Moving
>athT'
end
'er—
referentreferent
'omplement.■object-
threwCarla a brick Billat
THROW
Figure 31 Carla threw a brick at Bill.
The relationship goal is a gloss for the end of a path. The parent of AT in this use must 
have suitable path in its lexical semantic structure. Figure 32 shows (some of) the 
structure of Carla hit at the door.
Moving
^  I
. Hitting/i
f  \
result- __
itti /i Hitting
end
referent
referent sense
-subject
Carla
* \
referent
adjunc \^ c om plem ent^
at the door
HIT
Figure 32 Carla hit at the door.
In conative constructions, the goal is construed as an intended effect: while the motion 
follows a path (roughly) directed towards the named end point, the final contact is 
explicitly cancelled (it is presumably for this reason that a t  is used with LOOK, where 
no physical contact is possible). The structure of the construction requires that the
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event profiled by the verb be one o f  m otion  along a path, and it is for this reason that it 
is incom patible with the lexical sem antics o f  touch  and br e a k .
> body-part possessor ascension (BPA)
Just as the conative construction is structured by the lexical semantics of a t , so  the 
BPA construction is structured by the lexical properties of the preposition O N . This is 
not to say that similar constructions are not possible with other prepositions:
(87) Peter poked Paul in the eye/between the shoulder blades/under the armpit.
The senses of spatial prepositions have two arguments, er and ee. The place of 
the er is the same as that of a part of the ee, the particular kind of part depending on the 
preposition. Figure 33 shows the structures of ON and IN. In the former case, the er is 
placed on the surface of the ee; in the latter, it is placed in the interior. The figure also 
shows that On is the converse of Supporting (if a is on b, b supports a) and In that of 
Containing.
Supporting Contain ini
er ee
,lace^’^ ptacf.
er
rsuriace
"place'
er-
referentOn referent
complement sensesense
complement-
INON
Noun
Figure 33 ON and IN.
Whether the preposition appears as the adjunct of a noun (book on the shelf), or 
of a verb (sleep on the floor), the parent’s sense fills the er slot in the structure of the
77
preposition (when the preposition is a complement, the relationship between it and its 
parent is determined by the parent).
When the parent is a verb, the event that it profiles is the element that is located; 
however, it is usually inferred that any participants in that event are also located in the 
place specified. Note, though, that this is not guaranteed, but is dependent on the 
context: (88) is three ways ambiguous. In other constructions, where the verb is 
transitive and refers to a motion event, the preposition refers to the place that the 
referent of the object moves to (89).
(88) I saw you in the swimming pool.
(89) Peter poked his finger in the pie/between the bars/under the strap.
In BPA constructions, part of the semantics of the preposition is able to merge 
with the semantics of the verb. The complement of the preposition refers to a part of 
the ee of the verb’s sense (the referent of the object); this part merges with the part role 
in the structure of Touching (Figure 26); because of the structure of On, a further part 
of this element (specifically its surface) defines the place of the Touching; because of 
the structure of Touching, it also defines the place of the relevant part of the toucher. 
Clearly this is only possible with verbs whose lexical semantic structure contains a
sense referent
Y ^ d j u n c . ^ comPleme%  )
book on the shelf
referent
X ^^adjuncU ^^^^com plernent^y/
Figure 34 book on the shelf and sleep on the floor.
78
touching event and it is for this reason that BPA constructions are ruled out with 
BREAK.
■place place.
i lace
surface
►art On
Touching -part'
■ee
referent referent
referent sense referent
-adjunct-
complement
>bject-ubject-
the shouldertouched Bill onTerry
Figure 35 Terry touched Bill on the shoulder.
> middle
Middle constructions are structured by the inflectional category Middle, as shown in 
Figure 36. Notice that this represents an alternative subject linking arrangement that 
must be added to the collection above (Figure 25). The lexical specifications of the 
middle construction are as follows: the sense of the middle has a patient (it is therefore
1 7an affective dynamic event) , which is supplied by the referent of the subject; the 
referent of the middle is, exceptionally, a state predicated of the referent of the subject 
which takes a further state predicated of the dynamic event as its second argument (ee).
17 Patient is a thematic role associated with a class o f events. Some o f these also have agents (including 
causative events); in this case, the patient is the ee. See 3.1.4 for further details.
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referent
referent sense
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Figure 36 Middle.
Verbs in middle constructions inherit properties from their own lexical 
structure and from that of the construction, by multiple inheritance. Compare the case 
of past tense verbs, which inherit their stem and sense (and any syntactic properties) 
from their lexeme and properties of their referent and form from the inflectional 
category Past (see 1.2.2).
This double inheritance is possible in the case of middles when the lexical 
structure of the verb contains (as a sense of the verb) an event that can instantiate the 
dynamic event in the structure of the construction. This is possible when the lexical 
structure of the verb contains an event that elaborates the causing event in the structure 
of the construction and it is for this reason that middle constructions are excluded with 
both touch and hit: in both cases, the er of the final state is the same as the er of the 
event that causes it (see Figure 26, Figure 27), so that to conform to the semantics of 
the middle construction, these verbs would have to have both subjects and objects,
1 51which would clash with the syntax of the construction. Figure 37 shows the structure 
of The bread cuts easily. The sentence refers to a state which has the ease of the
18 Alternatively, it could be argued that the middle construction does not specify that the verb must be 
intransitive. In this case, middles formed with TOUCH or HIT would be indistinguishable from simple 
generic constructions with the same verb: Birds hit windows with alarming frequency at this time o f 
year.
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cutting event as its ee. The cutting event is the er of Easy (as determined by the normal 
lexical structure of e a s il y ).
State
Person
er,
-ee
Cutting/i Easy
referentpatient-
referent sense referent
-subject- -adjunct-
cutsThe bread easily
Verb
Figure 37 The bread cuts easily.
The construction itself specifies the kind of event that is involved, thus ruling 
out its appearance with verbs profiling states (for those speakers for whom this is ruled 
out). The use of the verb’s sense (and the exceptional way of assigning a referent to 
utterances containing middles) account for the genericity with which the event is 
construed, as explained above. The presence of the modal element is not required by 
the syntax of the construction: a middle verb can be the dependent of the modal 
element (90), or its parent (91), and in certain circumstances the modal element may be 
absent (92). It is, however, required by the lexical semantics of the class of middle 
verbs: the second argument of the referent of a middle verb must be specified in the 
context. In the most commonly quoted examples it is a word in the sentence that 
supplies the relevant state, but in examples like (92) it is supplied pragmatically.
(90) Eddie’s bread won’t cut.
(91) Neal’s bread cuts smoothly.
(92) Boy, this bread cuts!
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1.3 Summary
13.1 The properties of WG
In this chapter I have sketched a lexical structure within the WG framework, 
emphasising certain properties of this structure, as listed in (93). I have also 
demonstrated the use of the framework in the analysis of a small set of examples. In 
this concluding section, I identify those parts of the analysis that particularly depend 
on the properties in (93), and also serve to illustrate them.
(93) a. Linguistic structure is represented in a network of conceptual categories linked 
by asymmetric binary relationships; both concepts and relationships are 
classified in an inheritance hierarchy.
b. Lexical and grammatical structures consist of generalisations over classes of 
concepts or relationships; the relevant properties are assigned to a single 
category.
c. No distinction is made between linguistic and extra-linguistic conceptual 
structure (knowledge of language is a proper subpart of knowledge in general).
13.2 Network structure
The structures of the individual lexical items (the verbs and prepositions) shown in the 
previous section specify the properties of all tokens of these classes. They specify form 
and syntactic behaviour and all relevant semantic properties, including where relevant 
the role played in the semantic structure by the meanings of other (syntactically 
related) words. In this way the lexical structure constrains the possibilities of particular 
combinations of words.
For example, the ‘conative construction’ resides in a particular use (a 
subcategory) of AT. This makes particular semantic demands of its parent, which must 
be satisfied if a successful (licit) conative construction is to be used. Compare the 
temporal use of AT, which makes much less specific demands of its parent (the parent 
must have an event as its sense: Janet broke at 6 o ’clock, the meeting at 4, *the door at 
2pm). The two uses of AT have much in common, including their form and some 
syntactic properties, which they can inherit from a more general class.
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The constructions (Transitive and Middle are given above) are lexical 
structures of just the same sort. They differ only in that they are more schematic: the 
form is unspecified and the relevant category is a class of words (of lexemes) defined 
by other properties, including syntactic and semantic argument-taking properties as 
specified by the construction itself. These properties constrain the set of possible 
members of the class, thereby constraining the set of words that may appear in the 
relevant construction.
1.3.3 The inheritance hierarchy
The inheritance hierarchy allows properties from more general categories to be 
inherited by their subcategories. For example, the referent of the subject in the middle 
construction is the er of that of the verb. This is the default linking arrangement for 
subjects, so that it need not be specified in the lexical representation of the middle 
construction. Furthermore, since the referent of the middle is a state, some force- 
dynamic and other semantic properties of its er (the referent of the subject) are the 
same as those of other ers of states (indeed of other ers generally).
It is frequently noted that the referent of the subject in a middle construction 
bears primary responsibility for the ease (or otherwise) of the event defined by the 
verb’s sense. Rosta (1995) proposes a force-dynamic relationship archagonist to 
capture this semantic property. However, under the current analysis, the content of this 
proposed relationship derives from more general properties of states and their 
arguments. The state is often construed as an inherent property of the er, and part of 
the saliency of ers over ees (see above) is that the er carries primary responsibility for 
the state predicated of it. For example, if I fear spiders (or I am frightened of spiders) 
that is a property of mine and I bear responsibility for it; by contrast if US presidents 
frighten me then that is an inherent property of US presidents, and the responsibility 
lies with them.
1.3.4 Non-modularity
It is often claimed that the influence of lexical semantic properties on syntactic 
behaviour is limited to certain kinds of semantic property (see Croft 1990: 53, 
Jackendoff 1990, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1992, Levin and Rappaport Hovav
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1995: 9 and references there: Dowty 1991, Pinker 1989, Pustejovsky 1992, Tenny
1987, van Valin 1990). Typically, it is the force-dynamic properties that are held to be
relevant and various thematic properties that are excluded from influencing syntax.
The following quotation from Jackendoff illustrates the relevant view:
“Still, it turns out that only limited aspects of conceptual structure interact 
with syntax. [...] For example, various syntactic processes make use of the 
singular/plural distinction, but none (so far as I know) ever make use of the 
red/orange distinction.” (1990: 49)
Jackendoff s lexical conceptual structures consist (as do those of other writers) of 
event structure templates, representing force-dynamic and other syntactically relevant 
properties. The argument positions in these templates are filled by constants, which 
represent the other (not syntactically relevant) semantic properties. An example is 
given in (94), which gives a lexical structure for p o c k e t ; this structure is different only 
from that for p u t  by virtue of the constant, p o c k e t , in the final argument position.
(94) POCKET: [ Event CAUSEtfxhing ],[Event GO([rhing ],[path TO([piace POCKET])])])]
The case of middles provides counterevidence to this view, since it is only by 
appealing to non-force-dynamic properties that the difference in (95) can be explained.
(95) a. * Bogey doesn’t hit too good at this time in the morning,
b. Bogey doesn’t slap too good at this time in the morning.
Hitting and Slapping (the senses of h it  and s l a p ) must have the same force-dynamic 
properties, since one is a hyponym of the other. However, the two verbs differ as to 
their ability to appear in middle constructions. This difference can only be explained 
by appealing to highly ‘encyclopedic’ properties of Slapping, which license the 
construction in this case.
The slap in (95)b is a socially (and indeed sexually) charged form of hitting in 
which the slappee accepts the slap (which must land on his face) with some good
grace, perhaps recognising that it was justified. Notice that (95)b does not mean that 
Bogey cannot be hit, rather that he cannot be relied upon to respond appropriately to a
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slap of this sort. Only by the inclusion of ‘extra-linguistic’ information can the 
difference between the two examples be teased out.
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2. Lexical Semantics
This thesis focuses on the lexical semantics of English words (chiefly verbs) and the 
compositional properties of the structures that represent word meaning. For this 
reason, I devote the current chapter to a discussion of some of the frameworks used in 
the analysis of lexical semantics and some of the issues that arise in the comparison of 
the frameworks.
In the first part (2.1), I introduce the motivations and common assumptions that 
underlie work on lexical semantics in all (or most) frameworks and show how these 
are represented in the WG formalism introduced above. I define semantic competence 
in terms of knowledge of word meaning and knowledge of the meanings of 
compositional structures. In the discussion of word meaning I introduce the distinction 
between sense and reference, I discuss some semantic relationships that hold between 
word meanings and I make some preliminary comments about ambiguity. In the 
discussion of compositional meaning I introduce the notion of compositionality, I 
discuss some semantic (logical) relationships among propositions (compositional 
structures) and I make some preliminary comments about the linking of the syntactic 
and semantic properties of words in compositional structures.
In the second part (2.2), I explore some of the differences between the various 
frameworks and some of the empirical and theoretical issues that underlie or follow 
from these differences. I deal with existing frameworks under the three headings 
structural, translational and conceptual approaches, comparing them with each 
other and with WG as outlined in the preceding chapter. Structural approaches are 
characterised in that they see lexical semantics as a structured semantic space where all 
the elements are defined by their relationships with other elements; WG lexical 
semantics shares this property of structural approaches. Translational approaches are 
characterised in that lexical semantics (indeed all meaning) is represented in an 
external formal system (usually a variety of predicate logic); the WG approach does 
not follow this assumption. Conceptual approaches are characterised in that they 
understand meaning in psychological (subjective) rather than logical (objective) terms 
- the elements of linguistic semantics are concepts in the minds of language users 
which are also used in more general areas of thought; the WG approach shares this 
view of linguistic semantics.
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I go on to summarise the points of contrast and similarity between the various 
approaches and identify some serious theoretical issues on which there is disagreement 
or controversy (universality, primitives and circularity, discreteness). I consider some 
of the consequences of taking one or other view on these issues and some empirical 
means of addressing them. I finish by introducing the three areas of lexical semantic 
research that are explored in the following chapters: linking, aspect and ambiguity.
2.1 Common assumptions: semantic competence; lexical meaning; 
compositional meaning
2.1.1 Lexical and compositional meaning
The study of linguistic semantics must be seen as an attempt to define the semantic 
competence of language users. Goddard puts this study at the heart of the linguistic 
enterprise: ’’semantic competence is a crucial part of overall linguistic competence” 
(1998: 1), and while this is by no means uncontroversial (some researchers place 
semantic considerations outside the domain of linguistic investigation), it forms the 
basis of many research programmes.
Semantic competence can easily be defined as everything that language users 
need to know about the meanings of linguistic expressions, and lexical semantic 
competence as everything that language users need to know about the meanings of 
lexical items. I show below that this definition itself raises two contentious issues: just 
how much of what language users know about meaning is linguistically relevant, and 
exactly what is meant by the term lexical item (clearly the WG framework outlined in 
chapter 1 defines the term more broadly than some other frameworks, to include 
symbolic relationships involving classes of dependencies).
Leaving these issues aside for now, it is clear from the definition that there are 
two parts to semantic competence: word (lexical) meaning and compositional 
(structural/contextual) meaning. Different frameworks assign different degrees of 
emphasis to these two aspects of semantic competence, according to the kinds of 
structural representation they permit. However, there are assumptions that are common 
to (almost) all approaches, and without which semantic research cannot proceed. These 
are outlined here.
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2.1.2 Lexical meaning: sense and reference; semantic relationships; ambiguity
An important distinction in word meanings is that between sense and reference. In the 
discussion of WG above I described the distinction as the difference between lexical 
and contextual meaning. However, it also represents a contrast between intensional 
and extensional meaning. Goddard (ibid: 4) quotes an example from Allan (1986), as 
follows. The complex expressions the man who invented parking meters and the man 
who invented the yo-yo share the same extension (they apparently refer to the same 
individual)19, yet they are intensionally separate (they have distinct senses). Just the 
same argument can be found in Frege's (1923) treatment of (96), which is tautologous 
(to any one who knows that it is so).
(96) The morning star is the evening star.
Pronouns provide further motivation for separating sense and reference. 
Personal pronouns (like I and YOU) and other deictic expressions receive their meaning 
(referent) from the context. They can be said to have no sense (no lexical meaning). 
Other pronouns/words (identity of sense anaphora like ONE, DO (so ))  receive even their 
sense from the context. In (97) the pronoun one refers to a doughnut: an instance of the 
sense it derives from its antecedent. Note that while the sense is shared the referent is 
not: (97) involves two explicitly separate doughnuts.
(97) Jane had a doughnut, so I had one too.
A second feature that is common to all analyses of word meaning is the idea 
that there exist relationships between word meanings. The particular battery of 
semantic relationships differs according to the framework, but all frameworks 
recognise some logical or meaning relationships between semantic elements. Common 
lexical relationships are meronomy (part-whole relation), hyponymy, synonymy and 
various kinds of antonymy. These and other relationships play different roles in
19 In point o f fact, though both parking meters and yo-yos were marketed by a Donald F. Duncan in the 
US during the '20s and '30s, Mr Duncan certainly did not invent the yo-yo, which had according to some 
sources already been around for some thousands o f years. Mr Duncan first saw the yo-yo being 
demonstrated at a toys and hobbies fair in Los Angeles in 1928.
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different frameworks but all appear to agree that at least some of them must be 
included in semantic representations, either because they constitute an integral part of 
word meaning or because of the effect they have on the logical relationships 
(entailment, contradiction etc) holding between complex expressions (which are 
discussed in the following section).
I showed above that WG recognises a number of different semantic
70relationships, which include part (meronym) and isa (hyponym) . It is not likely that 
WG lexical structures will make use of a single relationship of antonymy, because of 
the lack of any single property that obviously connects the various different kinds of 
oppositeness (antonymy is generally categorised into complementarity, gradable (or 
true) antonymy and converseness).
Not all of these relationships are of the same kind: meronymy and the others 
are purely semantic relationships, whereas synonymy and its converse homonymy/ 
polysemy (like some kinds of antonymy) involve sense relationships, relationships 
between semantic and syntactic elements. Because these kinds of relationship both 
involve unusual linking patterns, they are obviously of great significance in the 
treatment of the relationship between syntactic and semantic structures. Homonymy 
and polysemy particularly have been studied in depth by many researchers in lexical 
semantics, often under the broader heading of ambiguity, which subsumes both 
homonymy and polysemy as well as structural ambiguities.
Ambiguity is dealt with at length in chapter 5. For now I note two generally 
accepted properties of ambiguity: first that it can be classified, and second that it is 
closely interrelated with context. Lexically ambiguous words may be disambiguated 
by their contexts, or the context may coerce ambiguous words into particular 
interpretations, even to the extent where they license interpretations that are not 
lexically associated with the word, as in (98), where the noun m o l e , which usually 
refers to a countable object is interpreted as referring to a mass, this interpretation 
being forced by the absence of an article.
(98) In Mali they eat marinated mole.
20 O f course, isa is not an exclusively semantic relationship since it holds between concepts o f all kinds.
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The simplest classification of ambiguity is a division into homonymy, or 
chance ambiguity, where the two meanings are not related, and polysemy, or motivated 
ambiguity, where some semantic relationship holds between the two meanings. This 
simple classification is often extended into a 3 or more point scale (see for example 
Croft 1998a), with some writers noting the difficulty of classifying some cases on such 
a scale, as well as of distinguishing ambiguity from vagueness. Some of these scales 
are inspected below (5.1.2), where I also develop a classification of ambiguity (or non­
monotonic linking) on two dimensions: according to whether the ambiguity is 
motivated or unmotivated, and according to where in the linguistic structure the 
ambiguity lies.
2.1.3 Compositional meaning: logical relationships; compositionality; linking
Just as most frameworks recognise some semantic/logical relationships obtaining 
between the meanings of lexical items, so they also accept that any account of 
semantic competence must be able to describe the semantic/logical relationships 
obtaining between the meanings of complex expressions. For example, one proposition 
may entail another (99)/(100), or contradict another (99)/(101), or the two may be 
synonymous (99)/(102).
(99) Sam is Liz's son.
(100) Sam is Liz's child.
(101) Sam is Liz's daughter.
(102) Sam is Liz's male child.
As I show below, the various semantic frameworks differ as to which of these 
two kinds of logical relationship (lexical or propositional) is assigned priority. Under 
the analyses making use of meaning postulates, the meanings of lexical items ('son', 
'daughter', 'child', 'male', etc) are defined in terms of the logical relationships between 
expressions containing them (eg (99)-(102)). In structural analyses, by contrast, the 
meanings of lexical items are defined by the logical relationships that hold between 
them ('son' is a hyponym of 'child' and an antonym of 'daughter', and so on) and it is
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these lexical relationships that determine the logical relationships between complex 
propositions like (99)-(102).
Despite this difference in priority, both kinds of approach recognise that both 
kinds of relationship must be represented in the analytical framework. Furthermore, 
both kinds of approach recognise a direct correspondence between the two kinds of 
relationship. The meaning of a complex expression is directly determined by (and/or 
directly determines) the meanings of the individual elements within it.21
Thus any account of (conceptual) semantics must be able to analyse complex 
structures in terms of the individual meaning elements that make them up. 
Furthermore, any account of linguistic semantics must be able to describe the way in 
which words and their meanings combine in sentences. Linguistic semantic structures 
are said to exhibit compositionality, in that the meaning of a complex structure is a 
function of the meanings of its parts. This idea can be traced back at least as far as 
Frege (1923), and informs the work of a variety of researchers in lexical semantics. For 
example, Montague (1974) assumes a homomorphism between syntax and semantics: 
the rules of semantic composition directly reflect the rules of syntactic composition so 
the meaning of a syntactically complex expression is a direct function of the meanings 
of its (syntactic) parts.
Many frameworks recognise that this principle has an important consequence 
for syntactic, as well as semantic, analysis. Since the meanings of linguistic elements 
determine the structures of complex expressions, they can also act as constraints on the 
combinatorial (syntactic) properties of the elements themselves. This possibility is 
represented in the Projection Principle and 0-criterion of GB (Chomsky 1981: 36, 38), 
as the Bijection Principle in Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1982) and in the 
predicate argument structure of Rappaport and Levin (1988) among others. 
Correspondence between syntactic and semantic relationships is mediated in WG by 
the syntax-semantics principle as described above (1.2.3.2).
Considerations of parsimony have led many writers to propose that lexical 
semantic structure may be wholly responsible for linking: if syntactic composition can
21 This is generally taken as the definition o f the boundary between semantics and pragmatics: whatever 
properties of meaning follow compositionally from the parts o f the utterance are semantic. Not all 
frameworks place this boundary in the same place.
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be controlled by lexical semantic structures, then an adequate semantic specification 
for all lexical items may obviate the need for syntactic valency or rules of syntactic 
composition. For example, as noted above (1.1.2), the basis for Levin's research 
programme is that verb behaviour can be used "to probe for linguistically relevant 
pertinent aspects of verb meaning" (1993: 1), and that these linguistically relevant 
aspects of verb meaning constrain the kinds of construction in which a verb may 
appear.
This presupposes an account of the regular relationships between syntactic and 
(conceptual) semantic structures. Once furnished, an account of this kind can work in 
one (or both) of two directions: by describing the projection of semantic onto syntactic 
structure, a linking theory allows the prediction of syntactic behaviour from conceptual 
properties, and the explanation of the semantic selection of arguments; by describing 
the projection of syntactic structure into semantic structure, it allows the observable 
syntactic relationships between words to be used to determine their compositional 
meaning (see my comments in 1.1.2).
Many theories of linguistic semantics develop such an account and though the 
theories differ as to whether the focus is on the projection of semantic onto syntactic 
properties or vice versa, the accounts have much in common. Most accounts see 
linking as a relationship between two sets of structures, syntactic and semantic, both 
defined by function/argument relationships, the major differences involving how the 
functions are represented, and how the mapping between the two structures is 
achieved. It should be noted, however, that in some frameworks, such as Cognitive 
Grammar (CG), linking regularities are not required in the grammar: in CG, the rules 
of linguistic structure refer only to semantic functions, so these need not be linked to 
syntactic structures (indeed there are no syntactic structures or categories for them to 
be linked to) (see Langacker 1987).
Approaches to linking can be divided into two categories: those based on 
semantic classes and those based on thematic roles. In the former, the senses of 
words are classified, according to semantic features including aspectual or force- 
dynamic properties, into predicate and argument types, which determine the linking 
properties of the words; in the latter, the senses of words support argument positions 
which are linked to syntactic role types according to the thematic roles they carry.
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I have already stated in the introduction that this thesis concerns itself with the 
question of how much syntactic compositionality can be determined by lexical 
semantic structure. Since these structures must exist in order to allow language users to 
grasp the meanings of words, it seems like a good idea to get them to do as much 
syntactic work as possible. These questions are explored more fully in 3.1.
2.2 Approaches to lexical semantics: structural, translational and conceptual 
approaches; WG; issues 
2.2.1 Structural, translational and conceptual approaches
There is a wide variety of approaches to lexical and linguistic semantics, some of 
which are explored in this section. I identify three main trends in the representation and 
analysis of meaning: structural, translational and conceptual approaches. I consider 
each of these in turn, describing and exemplifying the salient features of each approach 
and outlining their consequences for the treatment of compositional meaning and 
argument linking. While the three headings serve as a helpful framework for the 
discussion of the alternative approaches, they are not to be taken as mutually exclusive. 
In fact, there is as usual considerable overlap, many writers combining features of 
more than one of the headings. Furthermore, there are in some cases important 
differences between the frameworks dealt with under each heading. Some of these 
differences are explored here.
2.2.1.1 Structural approaches
Structuralism is one of the earliest approaches to word meaning. Geeraerts (1994) 
traces it back to Weisgerber (1927) and Trier (1931). At its strongest, the structuralist 
approach assumes that word meanings exist in an exhaustively structured semantic 
space, where all the elements are defined solely by their relationships with other 
elements. The relevant semantic relationships include those identified in 2.1.2 above. 
So, for example, 'man' and 'woman' are defined as hyponyms of 'human' and antonyms 
of each other, distinguished by their sex. Similarly, 'boy' and 'girl' are distinguished 
from each other by their sex and from 'man' and 'woman' by their age, or maturity. In 
this way, the conceptual category 'human' is exhaustively divided into four sub­
categories which together define a semantic field. This semantic field is defined by
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further oppositions in a larger field (say ’mammal'). Between them, the semantic fields 
exclusively and exhaustively define semantic space.
A number of objections to this kind of approach have been raised by various 
writers. Not least of these is the difficulty of assigning individuals conclusively to one 
or other class (is a 16 year old male who works for a living and supports a wife and 
child a man or a boy?). Another objection concerns the treatment of other words like 
for example president , whose meaning certainly belongs in the ’human’ field, but is 
defined by neither age nor gender. Further, though the category 'human' can be divided 
into men, women, boys and girls by simple binary features (+/-(fe)male, +/-adult), the 
larger category 'mammal' is not so simple. To define the class of humans in terms of 
binary oppositions with other mammals, it is necessary to classify them as -cat, - 
rodent, -horse, -marsupial, etc. Later I argue that the first of these objections actually 
identifies a strength of feature-based analysis, in that the same uncertainties apply to 
many related concepts (see 2.2.1.2); the second and third objections do represent 
problems with feature-based structural accounts of lexical semantics.
Whatever the status of these objections, there exist many highly convincing 
accounts of linguistic semantics that can be called structural in that they define 
meaning in terms of the relationships that hold among semantic elements. Cruse 
(1986) develops a complex system of relationships between lexical semantic elements, 
in which compositional meaning is mediated by (minimal) semantic constituents which 
consist of pairings of syntactic forms and semantic principles to yield a complex 
sentence with a global (complex) meaning (ibid: 24).
An alternative approach to lexical semantic representation that conforms to the 
structuralist trend is that of componential analysis. In componential analyses, word 
meanings are defined by semantic features, in much the same way as phonological 
features can be used to define the phonemes of a language. Componential analyses do 
not suffer from the problems outlined above, since these derive from the contrastive 
nature of the structural definitions: in relational structural analyses a concept is defined 
in terms of what it is not; in componential analysis, concepts can be defined in terms of 
what they are (their components or properties) and so it is not necessary to 
exhaustively define the entire semantic field. Many writers have applied this technique 
to the meanings of verbs.
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One property of this kind of approach which I discuss below (3.2.3, chapter 5) 
is that the meanings of words (particularly verbs) are often formed out of two parts: on 
the one hand a predicate argument structure giving the class of the word's meaning and 
other properties that determine its combinatorial behaviour, all of which may be shared 
with other meanings, and on the other a constant identifying its idiosyncratic 
properties. For example the meanings of the verbs break  and die might be 
decomposed as in (103) and (104), where they share the same predicate which 
accounts for the common aspectual and other combinatorial properties, but differ as to 
the constant that represents the result in each case. I argue below that this only partly 
satisfies the demands made on lexical semantics identified above, since it stops short 
of describing what it is that language users know about the particular meanings of 
words.
(103) br ea k : become (x, br o k en )
(104) die: becom e (.x, d e a d )
Jackendoff s conceptual structure (1983, 1990) provides a good example of the 
decomposition of the meanings of verbal predicates into more basic predicates. For 
Jackendoff, Putting is defined in terms of Causing and Going, and Going can be 
further defined in terms of Becoming and Being (or Being-located). This allows a 
classification of events into event-types, represented by the basic predicates. In 
JackendofFs framework, lexical items are specified as to their form 
(spelling/pronunciation), (syntactic) word class and lexical conceptual structure (LCS). 
The LCS determines both the compositional properties of the lexical item (by the 
unification of suitable elements with the arguments of complex predicates) and the 
linking to syntactic structure (by a general linking principle that makes use of a 
thematic and syntactic role hierarchy). JackendofFs framework is discussed at greater 
length below (in 3.1.2 and in chapter 5), but I present a brief analysis here, adapted 
from Jackendoff (1990).
(105) a. put
V
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[Event C A U SE ([ ['hing a ]?[Event G O ([rhing A]»[path TO([piace a ] ) ] ) ] ) ]
b. Jimi 
N
[Thing JIMI]
c. guitar 
N
[Thing GUITAR]
d. on 
P
[place ON([Thing a ] ) ]
e. shelf 
N
[Thing SHELF]
(105) gives the lexical entries for p u t , j i m i , g u i t a r , o n  and s h e l f . The three parts of 
each entry correspond to the form, the syntactic word class and the lexical conceptual 
structure (LCS) respectively. The LCSs of these lexical items can be combined to 
make the complex conceptual structure in (106).
(106) [Event CAUSE([Thing JIMI A ^E v en t GO([yhing GUITAR A]?[path TO([piace GN([xhjng 
S H E L F ])])])])]
This structure contains three arguments to be linked to syntactic roles (marked with 
subscript A). The linking principle links these to subject, object and prepositional 
complement roles respectively, yielding the syntactic structure in (107) (I do not 
analyse the internal structure of the shelf nor that of the guitar).
(107) [Jimi [put [the guitar] [on [the shelf]]]]
Levin's (1993) approach to word meaning is similarly decompositional. She 
identifies 49 major classes of verbs in English, distinguished on the basis of particular 
semantic features such as causation, contact and motion and further divided according
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to their argument-taking properties. While Levin does not deal with the compositional 
properties of semantic representations, it is clear that this proceeds in much the same 
way as in Jackendoffs analysis, yielding a complex argument structure. Projection 
onto syntactic structure is also, as in Jackendoffs analysis, the product of a 
derivational process. Rappaport and Levin (1988) argue for a level of predicate- 
argument structure (PAS), derived by correspondence rules from the semantic 
structure, which in turn defines (deep) syntactic structure by means of further 
correspondence rules.
Other decompositional approaches handle the projection of semantic onto 
syntactic structure by means of transformations. In Generative Semantics, for example 
(see Katz 1972, Katz and Postal 1964, Lakoff 1969, McCawley 1976), the complex 
semantic structure of a causative verb like k il l , shown in (108), is transformed by 
semantic rules into the simple predicate structure shown in (109), which in turn 
supports the syntactic structure of sentences like (110).
(108) x cause (y die)
(109) x kill y
(110) Biddy killed the chicken.
Some of the frameworks I discuss below (2.2.1.3) under the heading of 
conceptual approaches make use of similar predicate argument structures which 
provide a schema defining the relationships between the words in a sentence. 
Furthermore some of the approaches dealt with in this section could be considered 
conceptual, since they make the claim of psychological reality (for example, 
Jackendoffs (1990) syntax of thought representations and Wierzbicka's (1996) 
Universal Semantic Metalanguage are both claimed to be innate properties of human 
cognition).
2.2.1.2 Translational approaches
In addition to the objections identified above, which can perhaps be addressed by 
refining our class of semantic relationships, the structuralist approach to word meaning
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has been subjected to a more serious charge on theoretical grounds: that it necessarily 
leads either to circularity or to infinite regress.
This line of argument is followed by Wierzbicka (1996) and Goddard (1998: 
49-50), among others, who reason as follows. If 'mother' and 'father' (for example) are 
to be defined in terms of 'parent' (and the feature 'sex'), then 'parent' itself ought to be 
more perspicuous than either 'mother' or 'father', or at least it must itself have a 
definition. Leaving aside the question of whether 'parent' really is more basic than 
either 'father' or 'mother', this raises the question of how 'parent' is to be defined. Either 
it must be defined in terms of further, putatively more basic, concepts or it must be 
defined as the disjunction of'mother' and 'father'.
The first of these alternatives is claimed to lead to infinite regress: what are the 
primitive terms of the system which need no definition? The second alternative is 
circular: we cannot claim to have defined two concepts if we have done nothing more 
than to have described the way they relate to each other. Remember that in WG, this 
circularity of lexical semantic definition is considered a strength, rather than a 
weakness; see 2.2.2.
This argument, that the definitions of semantic concepts cannot be given in
terms of other semantic concepts, leads to the conclusion that they must be given
instead in terms of some external system or reality. Goddard argues for such a
semantic metalanguage:
"For all intents and purposes, it is impossible to analyse or describe 
meanings except in terms of some other language" (1998: 11).
The tools of symbolic or formal logic have been adopted with some enthusiasm 
in the expression of linguistic meaning. Formal logic provides for the unambiguous 
expression of propositions, which in turn allows a clear understanding of inferential 
relationships between them. This facility apparently makes formal logic a good 
candidate for a semantic metalanguage and much work has been done in Formal 
Semantics translating natural language expressions into logical formulae (see for 
example Montague 1974, Heim and Kratzer 1998).
A number of features of predicate logic have proved particularly helpful in 
constructing these translations: predicate argument structure closely models the 
relationships between verbs (and other relational lexemes) and nouns (at least in
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languages like English); the use of variables in argument structure is useful in the 
treatment of relative pronouns and other natural language terms that have context- 
dependent meaning; a sophisticated quantifier system permits the investigation of 
indeterminacies of scope and other features of expressions involving quantification.
Formal Semantics has two goals: to explain the concept of meaning and 
through that explanation to explain the role of language in information processing 
(both individual deductive reasoning and collective communication) (v.Eijck 1994: 
1276). Both of these goals can be met by the properties of symbolic logic.
In this approach, meaning is equated with truth: to know the meaning of an 
expression is to know the conditions under which it is true (which in turn determine its 
logical relations with other expressions). For example, the expression Snow is white is 
true if and only if snow is white. The difficulty with this conception of meaning is that 
propositions like these seem vacuous: the truth conditions of an expression amount to a 
simple restating of it. If the truth conditions are to have any useful meaning, they must 
be stated objectively in a distinct formalism. This is the role of symbolic logic in the 
explanation of linguistic meaning. The statement of truth conditions can then be 
expressed, less trivially, as in (111).
(111) Snow is white is true iff Vx (snow(x) -» white(x)).
The second goal of Formal Semantics (to explain the role of language in 
information processing) is achieved using the deductive mechanisms of logic. Formal 
logic defines the kinds of valid inferences that can be made between propositions, 
accounting for the way in which language users process the information content of 
utterances and for the logical/semantic relationships between propositions identified 
above (2.1.3).
In 2.1.3 I also introduced Frege’s principle of compositionality. This is relevant 
to Formal Semantics in different ways for different researchers. In Montague's (1974) 
treatment of natural language expressions, linguistic constituents are combined 
according to syntactic principles (Categorial Grammar), which determine how their 
meanings are combined into expressions of truth conditions like (111). However, Heim
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and Kratzer argue (1998) that Frege views compositionality as an integration of
semantic (=logical) structures:
"it is a natural conjecture that logical combination of parts into a whole is 
always a matter of saturating something unsaturated" (Frege 1923: 51).
That is to say that semantic composition consists of the unification of semantic 
elements with the unfilled argument positions of predicates, which can proceed 
independently of syntactic composition. It follows from this that there is no need for 
interpretation rules linking specific syntactic constructions to specific semantic 
structures:
"It should be sufficient to specify the denotations [=senses] of the lexical 
items, and the rest should follow automatically" (ibid: 43).
Despite its proficiency in describing compositional meaning, it is less clear
how Formal Semantics accounts for word meaning:
"Formal Semantics has little or nothing to say about the interpretation of 
semantic atoms" (v. Eijck 1994: 1276).
One approach to word meaning within a logical translational model is that of meaning 
postulates. A meaning postulate is a logical formula, one that constitutes an analytic 
statement. That is to say, it is an expression in the semantic metalanguage about the 
meaning of a linguistic expression that is true in all world contexts. While a meaning 
postulate (as a redundancy rule) expresses a necessary truth, it does not express a 
logical truth (a tautology), since it relates natural language terms to terms of the formal 
metalanguage.
For example, instead of being decomposed into the complex structure 'cause to 
become not alive' as in some decompositional approaches, the predicate 'kill' can be 
defined by meaning postulates as in (112).
(112) a. If (kill (xj>)) then (die (y))
b. If (die (x) then - ’(alive (x))
In this formulation, the bracketed parts represent the natural language elements that are 
being defined, the rest of the formula being expressed in the formal metalanguage. The
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functions ’kill', 'die' and 'alive' are unanalysed atoms of linguistic semantics and the 
meaning postulates in (112) describe the logical relationships among them.
In this way, the meaning postulates approach has something in common with 
relational approaches to structural semantics like those discussed above: both permit 
the analysis of semantic structure as a relational network with unanalysed lexical 
concepts as nodes. The only difference is that, under the meaning postulates approach, 
the relationships that define the network are logical statements like those in (112).
This logic is, for Fodor (1975, 1994), to be seen as a language of thought, 
which embodies intensional mental states. It is by hypothesis both universal and 
primitive. All mental (or higher cognitive) processes are held to be (embodied in) 
computational operations over language of thought representations. This leads to a 
further similarity with one of the structural approaches discussed above. Jackendoffs 
conceptual (semantic) structures are expressions of what he calls a syntax of thought 
(1990: 10). However, there is an important difference between these two notions. For 
Jackendoff, the syntax of thought is a set of principles for combining semantic 
elements (atoms) into complex structures. These structures are the semantic 
representations of natural language expressions. For Fodor, however, the semantic 
representations of natural language expressions are simply atoms, which stand in 
particular (lexical) relationships with representations in the language of thought.
Wierzbicka (1972, 1996) also makes use of a metalanguage to give definitions 
of semantic atoms. Unlike Fodor's metalanguage, however, Wierzbicka's consists of a 
(by hypothesis universal) set of around 60 primitive elements (see (113), from 
Wierzbicka 1998: 114-115), which combine into expressions in much the same way as 
the elements of natural language (English). These expressions are used in reductive 
paraphrase analyses (RPAs), which are decompositional accounts of the 
semantic/logical entailments of natural language predicates. (114) gives an example of 
an RPA for mother.
(113) Proposed universal semantic primes.
Substantives: i, y o u , s o m e o n e ( p e r s o n ) ,  s o m e t h i n g ( t h i n g ) ,  p e o p l e , b o d y .
Determiners: t h i s , t h e  s a m e , o t h e r .
Quantifiers: o n e , t w o , s o m e , m a n y / m u c h , a l l .
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Attributes: g o o d , b a d , b i g , s m a l l .
Mental predicates: t h i n k , k n o w , w a n t , f e e l , s e e , h e a r .
Speech: s a y , w o r d , t r u e .
Actions, events and movement: D O , h a p p e n , m o v e .
Existence and possession: t h e r e  i s , h a v e .
Life and death: l i v e , d i e .
Logical concepts: n o t , m a y b e , c a n , b e c a u s e , i f .
Time: w h e n ( t i m e ) ,  n o w , b e f o r e , a f t e r , a  l o n g  t i m e , a  s h o r t  t i m e , f o r  s o m e
TIME.
Space: w h e r e ( p l a c e ) ,  h e r e , a b o v e , b e l o w , f a r , n e a r , s i d e , i n s i d e .
Intensifier, augmentor: v e r y , m o r e .
Taxonomy, partonomy: k i n d  o f , p a r t  o f .
Similarity: l i k e .
(1 \4)Xis  Y's mother-
at some time before now, Y was very small
at this time, Y was inside X's body, Y was like a part of X
because of this, people can say something like this:
X wants to do good things for Y 
X doesn't want bad things to happen to Y
Wierzbicka presents RPAs for lexical items like mother (114), or bicycle 
(1985: 104-123), relational terms (including the meanings of verbs) being handled by 
variables as in (114). However, the universal semantic metalanguage (USM) can also 
be used to assign meanings to constructions, as in (115) (Wierzbicka 1998: 125), the 
RPA for examples like those in (116).
(115) Person X  ’Verbed' person Y into doing Z=
a. X wanted Y to do Z
b. Y didn't want to do Z
c. X didn't say to Y: "I want you to do Z"
d. X thought that if X said this Y wouldn't do Z
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e. because of this X did something else
f. because of this after this Y did Z
g. Y didn't do it because Y wanted to do it
h. Y did it because X wanted Y to do it
i. Y wouldn't have done it if X had not done this
(116) a. She talked him into going by car.
b. She tricked him into going by car.
c. She manoeuvred him into going by car.
d. She pushed him into going by car.
USM approaches to linguistic semantics have been attacked for a number of 
reasons. Specifically, Hudson and Holmes argue that definitions cannot be given in 
terms of primitives alone (2000: 4-6). Wierzbicka's definition of bicycle refers at 
several points to the pedals. However, since p e d a l  is not part of the USM, it cannot be 
used as a term in the definition and the pedals are referred to variously as "the parts 
that stick out at the side", "the parts for the feet" etc. Hudson and Holmes argue that, 
given that these parts are the same in each case (they are represented by the same 
concept), this must be recognised in the analysis by using the same term each time. Of 
course, Wierzbicka can define p e d a l  separately and use it in the relevant places, or 
otherwise coindex the terms referring to the pedals. However, whatever the means of 
coindexing, this still admits non-primitive terms into the analysis, which Wierzbicka 
rules out on principle.
A further objection to USM accounts, which treat senses as atoms, concerns the 
pairs 'child' and 'adult', 'boy' and 'man' and 'girl' and 'woman' which I have already 
discussed. In 2.2.1.1,1 noted that these concepts are often used in arguments against a 
feature-based analysis of lexical semantics. These arguments turn on the difficulty in 
assigning particular instances (particular people) clearly to one of the categories. 
However, one characteristic of these concepts that supports the idea of semantic 
features is that the same uncertainties apply to all three pairs: just the same uncertainty 
as to the boundary between 'child' and 'adult' applies between 'boy' and 'man' and 
between 'girl' and 'woman', affected by just the same considerations. Under a feature-
103
based approach, the uncertainty can be explained as deriving from the difficulty of 
assigning the feature [adult]. Under the USM approach, where there are no features, 
the fact that the uncertainty applies to more than one pair can only be seen as a 
coincidence, which is a serious shortcoming in the explanatory power of such 
approaches, especially since patterns of this kind are very common in many areas of 
the lexicon.
2.2.1.3 Conceptual approaches
The third trend in lexical semantics to be presented is the conceptual approach. The 
essential difference between conceptual and translational approaches is that, in the 
former, meaning is understood in psychological (subjective) rather than logical 
(objective) terms. That is to say that linguistic structures are understood in terms of 
their cognitive function: reference. There is no semantic metalanguage, since meaning 
is embodied in the cognitive (semantic) structures associated with words. Under this 
analysis there is no question of translational equivalence, such as links kill with cause 
to die in other analyses: while Mark killed a mouse may be objectively (intensionally) 
equivalent to Mark caused a mouse to die, the two differ in subjective interpretation 
and so must have different conceptual representations. Similarly, the expressions half 
full and half empty offer different construals of the same objective situation.
The case of verbs like LOAD is highly relevant to the question of construal: load 
the cart with beer and load the beer onto the cart differ subjectively according to 
whether the vehicle or the load is perceived as affected. As is well known, this 
difference in construal affects the acceptability of the two expressions in different 
objective situations (their truth conditions): the second expression is incompatible with 
a situation where some but not all of the beer is loaded onto the cart. Furthermore, as I 
show below, a convincing case can be made that the difference in the construals of the 
two constructions also affects the abilities of particular verbs to appear in each 
construction, f i l l , for example, necessarily profiles a process affecting the container, 
and while it can appear in constructions similar to the first pattern above, it cannot 
appear in constructions similar to the second (117). p o u r , which profiles a means of 
affecting the contents (it selects physical properties of the contents), shows the 
opposite pattern (118).
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(117) a. Phyllis filled the fridge with fish.
b. *Phyllis filled the fish into the fridge.
(118) a. *Paulene poured the pond with the paw paws,
b. Paulene poured the paw paws into the pond.
It is not the case, however, that the contrast between the logical and 
psychological views of meaning corresponds to that between axiomatic (translational) 
and conceptual approaches. For example, Wierzbicka's axiomatic analysis is 
essentially conceptual, in that the USM is held to be psychologically real: it is the 
(innate) "irreducible core of all languages, reflecting the irreducible core of human 
thought" (1998: 113). Jackendoffs componential analysis is also (as I note above) 
based on a psychological view of meaning. His mental representations consist of 
conceptual structures in a universal syntax of thought and his view is that natural 
language semantics "must be concerned with how language users are constructed to 
understand and schematize the world" (1991: 9).
By far the strongest tradition in the conceptual approach is represented, 
however, by Cognitive Linguistics (see for example Croft 1991b, Fillmore 1982, 
Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Langacker 1987). These approaches are 
characterised by a number of features. First, as I have already said, Cognitive 
Linguistics sees meaning and other aspects of linguistic structure as psychological 
phenomena. The representations applied are representations of cognitive structure and 
not logical (mathematical) formulae.
Second, writers in Cognitive Linguistics do not subscribe to the autonomy of 
syntax thesis. Tomasello (1998: ix-x) argues that this thesis is a corollary of the 
mathematical formalism of Generative Grammar, which requires that syntactic 
structures be analysed in an objective logical framework. This entails that those aspects 
of linguistic structure that are not susceptible to objective analysis (including 
subjective aspects of meaning such as those sketched above) must be excluded from 
the domain of syntax.
Further, a number of other distinctions that are commonly made by researchers 
in other traditions are not recognised in Cognitive Linguistics. For example, the
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distinction between semantics and pragmatics, that between lexical and compositional 
structures and that between lexical and encylopedic knowledge each are denied by at 
least some cognitive linguists. In a framework where the meaning of an expression is 
understood in terms of its subjective construal by language users, it is not possible to 
exclude in principle anything of what language users know from linguistic structure. 
Under this analysis, linguistic structure consists of a network of interconnected 
schemas or cognitive models which represent what language users know. As I show 
below, these models have an internal structure of their own.
One consequence of the non-modular position for lexical semantics is that 
word meanings, like other linguistic categories, must be of the same type as other 
conceptual categories. A great deal of work has been carried out in many disciplines 
that shows that conceptual categories must have internal structure. Wittgenstein (1953) 
famously argued for a structured representation of the concept 'game', consisting of a 
number of related sub-concepts. Austin (1961) also explored this idea, applying it 
explicitly to the meanings of words. Rosch (1978), working in cognitive psychology, 
devised a number of experiments to show that the categories that language users 
employ exhibit both centrality and membership gradience. Taylor (1995) develops a 
sophisticated model of prototype structures for linguistic categories of all sorts, 
including word meanings and other, more fundamental, categories like noun and verb, 
subject and object. Taylor's categories consist of structured networks of elements 
connected by semantic relationships such as metaphor, metonymy, and shared 
semantic features (family resemblance).
Lakoff (1987) develops a structured conceptual representation for the meaning 
of o v e r , based on Brugman's earlier ( 1 9 8 1 )  work on the preposition. In this analysis, 
the meaning of o v e r  is represented by six interrelated schemas. The schemas 
themselves form family resemblance categories (of the kind introduced by 
Wittgenstein), with up to nine sub-senses, defined by a number of semantic features 
shared by some, but not necessarily all, sub-senses.
The notion of schemas is an important one in Cognitive Linguistics, and one 
that gives rise to a certain amount of confusion. This confusion comes about through 
the use of the same word to apply to two (apparently) different phenomena and 
through the use of different words by different writers to refer to the same
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phenomenon. Lakoff uses the term schema for the general cognitive structure against 
which the meaning of a word is understood. Langacker, however, explicitly uses the 
term only to refer to a generalisation over the various meanings of a word and uses 
domain for the former sense. Domain, in this sense, overlaps considerably with what 
other writers have called frames (Fillmore 1985), scripts (Rosch 1978), scenes, and 
idealized cognitive models (Lakoff 1987).
The essential idea is that the meaning of a word is understood against a specific 
conceptual background. For example, 'Monday' is understood against the background 
of the domain of the days of the week, 'lid' against the background of the domain of 
containers, and so on. There is a sense in which these two notions (generalisations over 
linguistic models and the conceptual background against which they are understood) 
are simply different aspects of the same phenomenon: if 'lid' is to be defined in general 
terms as a device permitting closure of a container, the generalised (schematic) 
conceptual structure representing that meaning must involve a schema for containers. 
In a sense, a schema (under Langacker's use) is a domain viewed from without and a 
domain is a schema viewed from within.
Langacker (1987, 1998) develops a complex conceptual analysis of linguistic 
structure including linguistic semantics: Cognitive Grammar (CG). In CG, words and 
other linguistic structures are signs: pairings of formal (=phonetic) and conceptual 
(=semantic) representations. These structures combine with each other according to 
general principles which refer to their internal structure. The conceptual structures are 
defined by their content (schema/domain), profile (sense) and construal (focal 
prominence). For example, as Figure 38 (from Langacker 1998: 10) shows, advise, 
advisor and advisee have the same conceptual content, but differ as to their profile.
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advise
0—0
tr Im
_____________ advisee____________________
Q O
Figure 38 advise, advisor, advisee.
The content in each case is a complex relationship between two individuals that 
is understood against a background of verbal and social interaction, summarised in the 
diagrams by the arrow connecting the two participants. In the case of the verb, this 
whole relationship is profiled, as well as the two participants (labelled tr  and lm, for 
trajector and landmark, to distinguish their roles). However, in the cases of the two 
nouns, only one participant is profiled. Figure 39 (ibid: 11) shows the conceptual 
structures of above and below, which have the same content and profile but differ as to 
their construal. In the case of above, the position of the higher participant is understood 
with reference to that of the lower; in the case of below, the reverse is true. This 
difference is represented in the different assignment of the trajector and landmark 
relationships.
above below
Figure 39 above, below.
____________ advisor______________
o  o
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In order to illustrate how CG deals with complex expressions and 
compositionality, I briefly present an analysis of the phrase the cup on the table 
adapted from van Hoek (1995: 317-320). A number of features will be made clear, 
including just what is meant by content, profile and construal, the differences 
between head-modifier and head-complement relationships and the nature of the 
structures representing grammatical rules.
Van Hoek's account begins with the analysis of the prepositional phrase on the 
table, which is represented in Figure 40.
on the table
(the) tableon
Figure 40 on the table.
This figure gives a schematic representation of the semantic pole of the phrase. At the 
lower level, there are two semantic structures, on and (the) table (throughout this 
analysis, the contributions of the articles are ignored), which combine to yield the 
structure for the phrase at the higher level. This combination is controlled by the model 
for on. on profiles a relationship between two objects such that one (the trajector) is 
higher than the other (the landmark) and also in contact with it. This is shown 
iconically by the two circles. The landmark is connected to the model of table by an 
arrow which stands for the elaboration relationship: the schematic landmark in on is
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elaborated (made more specific) by the model of table. The landmark is shaded (as part 
of the lexical specification of the preposition) to indicate that it requires elaboration. 
The broken line connecting the landmark with the profile of table shows the 
correspondence between them: they are to be taken as different conceptualisations of 
the same entity. The box surrounding the model of the preposition is marked in bold 
lines, to indicate that it is the profile determinant of the construction (the combined 
structure at the higher level profiles a relationship, not a thing).
cup on the table
on the table
Figure 41 cup on the table.
Figure 41 shows the semantic structure of the phrase cup on the table. Here the 
profile determiner cup elaborates the trajector of the prepositional phrase. In the 
composite structure the on relationship appears as the schema but the profile is only 
the trajector in this relationship (the cup).
These two diagrams show an important asymmetry between head-complement 
and head-modifier relationships, which has already been discussed above (1.2.3.2, 
1.2.4, 1.2.5). In Figure 40, the complement elaborates a salient part of the schema of its 
head (the profile determinant); in Figure 41, by contrast, the head elaborates a salient
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part of the schema of its modifier. This contrast is represented schematically in Figure 
42.
Head-complement structure Head-modifier structure
Figure 42 Head-complement and head-modifier relationships.
The contrast between complements and modifiers represented in Figure 42 has 
two parts. First, complements differ from modifiers in that the former fill argument 
positions in the schemas of their heads, while the latter provide schemas whose 
argument positions are filled by the profile of the head. Second, head-complement and 
head-modifier constructions have a common property: that in both cases the profile of 
the composite structure is determined by the head. This pattern is common to many 
frameworks. For example, Cruse (1986: 103-105) shows that while modifiers are 
always optional (119), complements are always either obligatory or, if optional, then 
present latently when omitted (ie semantically obligatory) (120).
(119) a. We drank (red) wine.
b. Arthur slept (soundly).
c. She is (very) tall.
(120) a. Arthur stroked *(the cat).
b. John is watching. ['John is watching something'].
I l l
He also shows that the semantic properties of complements are selected by the parent 
(121), whereas adjuncts select the semantic properties of their parents (122).
(121) a. Arthur drinks beer/*cheese.
b. Arthur drank what she made him [—» She made him a drink]
(122) a. Her pregnant sister/*brother came round.
b. Her pregnant cousin came round. [—> A female cousin came round]
These contrasts can be explained by appealing to Figure 42, where the 
complement takes a role determined by the parent and the modifier determines the role 
to be played by the parent. Cruse also shows that head-complement and head-modifier 
constructions have a common property: that the meaning of the head can encapsulate 
that of the complement or modifier. (123) and (124) are pleonastic, according to Cruse, 
because the dependent adds nothing to the composite meaning. This can also be 
explained by appealing to Figure 42, where it is always the head that determines the 
profile of the composite structure. In WG, this surfaces in the principle of semantic 
phrasing: the referent of the composite structure is a specialisation of the sense of its 
head.
(123) ?Arthur drank liquid.
(124) ?My male uncle came round.
The schematic representation in Figure 42 amounts to a generalisation across
linguistic structures. In this way, grammatical rules can be represented using the same
formalism as that for individual lexical items. So Langacker's framework recognises
complex categories as lexical items. In fact, he explicitly denies a clear distinction
between lexical and non-lexical structures:
"A lexical item is ’fixed' in the sense of being both learned by individual 
speakers and conventional within a certain speech community. Because 
both are a matter of degree, there is no strict boundary between lexical 
items and 'novel' elements." (1997: 12).
112
Goldberg (1995, 1998, 2002) also recognises complex constructions as lexical 
items. In the Construction Grammar framework (for references see 1.2.1), the grammar 
consists of a constructicon (Jurafsky 1992) which includes lexical entries for specific 
words and for more schematic constructions. A construction is defined as "a form- 
function pair such that some aspect of the form or some aspect of the function is not 
strictly predictable from [its] component parts" (Goldberg 1998: 205). See 
Verschueren (1981) for a similar idea. For Goldberg, as for Verschueren, this notion 
helps preserve strict compositionality in the grammar: the schematic relationships 
encoded by constructions function as the component parts in larger structures that 
otherwise would not be compositional.
For Goldberg, as for Langacker, linguistic structures are form-function pairs 
that link more or less schematic semantic models with more or less schematic 
syntactic/phonological patterns. She proposes constructions for such general syntactic 
patterns as double objects (125), caused motion (126), resultatives (127), intransitive 
motion (128) and transitives (129) (1998: 206).
(125) Pat faxed Bill the contract.
(126) Pat sneezed the foam off the cappuccino.
(127) She kissed him unconscious.
(128) The fly buzzed into the room.
(129) Pat cubed the meat.
Significantly, Goldberg argues against positing a new verb sense for every 
syntactic frame a given verb participates in. The possibility of occurring in a given 
construction can be predicted from the properties of the construction and the lexical 
properties of the verb. Considering examples like (126), she argues that it would be 
"implausible and ad hoc" (ibid: 205) to assign a caused motion sense to the verb. This 
argument is obviously consonant with my own claims in the previous chapter and it is 
an idea to which I return in the following chapter.
113
2.2.2 Word Grammar lexical semantics in context
I have discussed the (lexical) semantic structures of WG in the previous chapter. I 
return to them here so that they can be compared with the various frameworks 
discussed in the preceding sections. WG is like the conceptual frameworks in that 
meaning is understood psychologically: the relational network defines all of cognitive 
structure and the meanings of words are fully integrated with it.
However, WG differs from most frameworks in cognitive linguistics in that its 
semantic structure does not make use of frames, consisting instead of a classified 
associative network (see Hudson and Holmes 2000 for a detailed discussion of this 
issue). As described above, a word's lexical meaning is represented by its sense, which 
is defined by the semantic relationships that it supports. So, for example, the 
relationship between a d v is e , a d v is o r  and a d v is e e  is as shown in Figure 43 (those 
who, like me, feel uncomfortable with the implication that a d v is e e  is a word of 
English could try thinking of it as the result of a productive lexical (morphological) 
rule of the sort discussed above (1.2.3.1), and below (chapter 5)).
-ee-
Ad vising
Advisor A Advisee
f
sense
ADVISOR
sense
 ADVISE
er-nom   ee-nom
ADVISEE
Figure 43 a d v is o r , a d v is e , a d v is e e .
As in CG (see Figure 38), the WG structure for the verb provides (some of) the 
framework on which the composite structure is to be arranged. The difference is that, 
since WG does not make use of frames, the meanings of the dependents correspond not 
to parts of the meaning of the head but to associated concepts. The significance of this 
difference will become clear in the data chapters, where I give examples of dependents 
whose lexical semantic structures radically restructure the semantic network 
surrounding the sense of the parent (for example, non-selected resultative expressions 
(chapter 4)). This is made possible in the WG framework by the fact that this semantic
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network consists of independent concepts and associations, and is not a subpart of the 
structure of the parent word.
A further consequence is that, as I showed in 1.2.3 above, since the lexical 
structures of words are not self-contained schemas, but rather simply subparts of the 
wider conceptual network, the meanings of the three lexical items in Figure 43 
effectively contain each other: the background against which they are understood is the 
same.
This difference aside, the correspondences between WG and CG semantic 
structures are close. The head-complement relationship shown in Figure 42 
corresponds to the (revised) syntax-semantics principle introduced above (1.2.3), and 
repeated here.
(130) Revised syntax-semantics principle (RSSP): a word's valent refers to a 
dependent of its sense.
As I noted above, the relationship between words and their adjuncts (= 
modifiers) in WG is more complex than that shown in Figure 42. The limiting case for 
adjuncts is as shown in that diagram. For example, in the case of a bare relative (eg the 
book I  bought) the sense of the noun depends on the referent of the verb that depends 
on it (the sense of the noun is the buy-ee). In the case of a spatial preposition, however, 
the referent of the preposition and the sense of its parent are mutually dependent. As I 
show in Figure 44, the preposition defines the place of the sense of the noun, while the 
noun provides the er of the referent of the preposition (it is the thing located). Other 
relational terms that appear as adjuncts also follow this pattern. Finally, in the case of a 
temporal adverbial like one day, the adjunct refers to the time of the sense of its parent, 
so this case conforms to the same pattern as applies to valents. As also noted above, 
there is in fact a further possibility, that a word and its dependent are coreferential. 
This possibility is found with both valents (this book) and adjuncts (boy who).
WG (as described above), like CG, recognises constructions as lexical items. 
The RSSP is an example of a generalisation over linguistic structures, as are the 
various linking regularities proposed above (the subject, object and indirect object 
linking rules in 1.2.4.3, 1.2.4.2 and 1.2.3.3 respectively), and fleshed out in chapter 3.
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WG semantic analysis is structural, in that semantic elements are defined solely 
in terms of the relationships they support. It is not componential, in the sense used for 
Jackendoffs approach among others, since the concepts in a network structure are 
atoms: they can have no internal structure. However, it does incorporate some of the 
insights of predicate argument structure. The 'arguments' of a relational predicate are 
represented by its dependents. This provides WG with a more sophisticated battery of 
semantic relationships than the traditional structural accounts. Finally, WG semantic 
structures also make use of meaning postulates in a certain sense.22 For example, the 
semantics I assign to ON in Figure 44 shows that the ee of On is the er of a supporting 
relationship whose ee is the er of On. This is tantamount to a meaning postulate to the 
effect that 'if on(x, y) then support(y, jc)'.
function
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Figure 44 the cup on the table.
Figure 44 shows the composite structure of the cup on the table. The referent of 
on isa Location, so its two arguments are a trajector (er) and a landmark (ee) (see 
above (1.2.4.2, 1.2.4.3), below (chapter 3). The landmark is the referent of the 
complement (this is part of the lexical structure of ON, or of prepositions in general)
I owe this insight to Richard Horsey (pc).
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and the trajector is the sense of cup, its parent. On (the sense of ON) is also lexically 
associated with an example of Supporting connecting its er and ee (this is part of the 
meaning of o n ). The (lexical) semantic structures for Table and Cup (which are 
intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive) show that they have parts (Legs, 
Handles etc), that they are examples of Artefacts (by way of Furniture and Crockery 
respectively), from which they inherit the function relationship. Conveniently, the 
function of Table isa Supporting.
In this part I have looked back at the properties of WG semantic analysis 
showing how it shares some of the properties and mechanisms of other frameworks. In 
the following part I summarise some of the (more or less controversial) theoretical 
issues and assumptions in lexical semantics and consider the WG position with respect 
to each of them.
2.2.3 Issues in lexical semantics: universality; primitives and circularity;
discreteness
In the preceding sections I have identified some existing approaches to lexical 
semantics. In this part I identify some of the contentious issues raised in the analysis of 
semantics (and other aspects of linguistic structure). I also note the position with 
respect to these parameters of each of the frameworks discussed, particularly that of 
the WG framework that I use in the following analyses.
For the most part, structural theories of meaning explicitly or implicitly assume 
the universality of semantic categories, though Generative Semantics does not. 
Jackendoff makes an explicit claim of universality, as do Wierzbicka and the 
researchers working in translational frameworks. In Cognitive Linguistics and in WG, 
no explicit claims of universality are made. On the contrary, the only elements of 
linguistic structure that are universal are the general organisational principles. In 
Cognitive Linguistics these include schemas and instantiation, profiling, construal etc. 
In WG they are the isa and dependency relationships.
Universality is, or would appear to be, a necessary property of a framework that 
makes use of primitives (these primitives must be external to the language system and 
thus either unlearnt or leamable from other evidence than the language to which one is 
exposed). In WG, where linguistic structure and meaning are construed subjectively
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and where the rules even of syntax are integrated in the general conceptual network, 
language learning proceeds according to the same mechanisms as more general 
learning and so there need be no universal properties inherent in language per se.
Conversely, it is only in an analysis that lays claim to universality that it makes 
sense to ask what are the primitives of semantic structure. The structural theories of 
linguistic semantics that have universal categories also have primitives, as do the 
translational approaches. For this reason also, primitives are not used in WG 
semantics. However there is another, more principled reason for excluding primitives. 
Recall that Wierzbicka argues for the use of primitives in semantic analysis by saying 
that without them the definitions of word meanings suffer from circularity or lead to 
infinite regress.
This argument is frequently taken for granted in works on semantics. Saeed, for 
example sees circularity as one of the three chief challenges in semantic analysis. He 
poses the question:
"can we ever step outside language in order to describe it, or are we forever 
involved in circular definitions?" (1997: 6)
and later:
"These three issues: circularity; the question of whether linguistic 
knowledge is different from general knowledge; and the problem of the 
contribution of context to meaning, show that our definitions theory is too 
simple to do the job we want." (ibid: 7).
In a network structure like that of WG, however, circularity is seen as an 
analytical strength and not a weakness. In a relational network all the elements are 
defined in terms of their relationships with other elements. In this way, the definition 
of Supporting (for example) supports that of Table, and vice versa. It is part of the 
definition of Table that its function (or one of its functions) isa Supporting and also 
part of the definition of Supporting that the function of Table is one example of it. This 
is the principle of recycling and it is described in detail in Hudson and Holmes (2000).
The analytical strength of this interdependence is that it permits the semantic 
structures to be used in explaining the ability of words to co-occur. For example, the 
close relationship between Table and Supporting can be used in explaining why TABLE 
appears more naturally with o n  than with in : the cup on/*in the table. Under an 
analysis where the meanings of words are defined in terms of language external
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concepts, this sort of interdependence between words can only be described by 
duplicating all semantic concepts and the relationships between them internally to the 
linguistic system either in a system of 'linguistic semantic' properties or in semantic 
features attached to syntactic expressions. Both alternatives rather beg the question.
Many frameworks of linguistic analysis recognise the discreteness of 
particular levels of analysis. Relevant boundaries include those between: syntax and 
semantics, various levels of syntactic analysis, lexical and encyclopedic knowledge 
and lexical and grammatical knowledge.
All theories recognise the syntax/semantics distinction to some extent (except 
for CG, where there are no rules that refer to syntactic categories), if only in as much 
as there are specifically syntactic and specifically semantic categories and relationships 
and rules that operate over them. In WG the lexeme is the locus of syntactic 
information and its sense the locus of semantic information. While there are 
regularities that involve both syntactic and semantic categories, there are also those 
that involve only syntactic or only semantic categories. This form of weak modularity 
was discussed above (1.2.2).
One important difference must be recognised between the weak modularity of 
WG and the approaches of other frameworks (like Levin's approach or that of Formal 
Semantics). As I noted above (1.2.2), the fact that WG linguistic information is 
represented in a network of dependency relationships means that the different levels of 
analysis cannot be formally different: syntactic and semantic structures are represented 
in the same kinds of structure. By contrast, in Levin's approach, for example, semantic 
and syntactic information is represented in two formally distinct codes, with different 
properties. This means that there are differences in the kinds of structure and 
relationships that can hold between them at the different levels of representation. It 
also leads to the introduction of intermediate levels that translate relationships of one 
kind into relationships of another, as I show in the following section.
Many of the approaches discussed above have little or nothing to say about 
syntactic analysis. Rappaport and Levin (1988) make this assumption explicitly. They 
also argue for a further level of structure, predicate argument structure (PAS) that 
mediates between semantic and syntactic representations. Both Cognitive Linguistics 
and WG explicitly deny the presence of any formally distinct intermediate levels of
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representation, either between syntax and semantics (in WG this interface is mediated
by the sense and referent relationships) or internal to syntax:
"WG is mono-stratalist because it generates only one syntactic structure 
per reading." (Hudson 1990: 10, emphasis in original).
WG (like the conceptual approaches) explicitly denies the distinction between 
lexical and encyclopedic knowledge about semantic categories. Because linguistic 
information is represented in a network structure, different kinds of knowledge about 
the same concept can be simply represented in different kinds of relationship supported 
by it (see Hudson and Holmes 2000). Furthermore, as argued above, the psychological 
view of meaning makes it impossible to exclude, in principle, any information from 
having an effect on linguistic structure. Most other writers make this distinction 
explicitly, or else assume it implicitly. It has been taken for granted in so much work 
on linguistic semantics that it is almost impossible to question it in most frameworks 
(see again Saeed 1997: 6-7)). I argue throughout this thesis that the proper 
characterisation of many linguistic phenomena requires the analyst to rethink this 
assumption.
The distinction between lexicon and grammar is made explicit in Levin's work:
"a verb's behaviour arises from the interaction of its meaning and general 
principles of grammar." (1993: 11).
This work follows from the suggestion of Bloomfield (1933) that the lexicon is the
repository of idiosyncratic information about words and their behaviour, grammatical
generalities being stated in some other formal system. This view derives partly from
the use of logical languages in linguistic analysis: a logic consists of a vocabulary of
terms (variables and relationships) and a formal syntax that controls their combination.
However, the view is challenged by many of the writers discussed above. As noted,
constructions appear as lexical items in the frameworks of Jackendoff, Wierzbicka and
the Cognitive Linguists, as well as in WG. Hudson makes this quite clear:
"WG is holist because no distinction is recognised between the grammar 
'proper' and the lexicon. The grammar includes facts at all levels of 
generality, all of which are handled in the same way." (1990: 10, emphasis 
in original).
The consequences of this holism for the syntax/semantics distinction have 
already been discussed.
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2.3 Linking, aspect and ambiguity
In this chapter I have introduced some of the basic principles of research in lexical 
semantics. I have also looked at some approaches to this research, and compared them 
with the WG framework. In the following chapters I look more closely at three areas of 
lexical semantic research: linking, aspect and ambiguity.
Theories of lexical semantics must be concerned with the mechanisms involved 
in linking, since these mediate the process whereby semantic arguments are projected 
onto syntactic structure (or syntactic structures are interpreted in semantics). This is 
important in the determination of the semantic structures of individual words (what 
must they be like given that they project onto syntax in the way that they do? why do 
some words behave in apparently contradictory ways?), and in the understanding of 
compositionality (how do the lexical structures of words combine in sentences?). In 
the chapter on linking (chapter 3) I examine some existing approaches to linking, and 
present a WG account. In the discussion I focus on the way in which event structure, as 
represented in chiefly verbal semantics, corresponds with syntactic structure and the 
way in which the wide range of semantic roles corresponds with the relatively narrow 
range of syntactic dependencies.
Aspect is a (semantic) property of sentences, a compositional property 
determined by specific properties of the elements of the sentence. Lexical semantics 
must be able to explain how the meanings of words (and constructions) combine to 
give specific interpretations. It is also well known that some words or constructions are 
diagnostic of aspectual properties, in that they may only be used in expressions of one 
or other aspectual class, and that in certain cases, these diagnostic words can 
themselves constrain the aspectual interpretations of sentences. Lexical semantics must 
be able to explain how this coercion works. In the chapter on aspect (chapter 4) I 
consider the range of aspectual classes identified by Vendler (1967) and extended by 
Croft (1998b) and give them WG semantic structures; I also show how these semantic 
structures are linked to syntactic structures in a way that explains the various 
diagnostics used by Vendler and Croft.
Ambiguity presents an obvious challenge to theories of lexical semantics. The 
phenomenon I investigate in chapter 5 includes cases where particular lexical items are
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used with (apparently) varying interpretations and aspectual and linking properties. 
Lexical semantics must be able to account for these cases, and also for the way in 
which those lexical items can be disambiguated by other elements in the sentence, in a 
process of coercion like that that applies in the aspectual examples. In chapter 5 I 
consider some ways of classifying and identifying ambiguity and present WG analyses 
for some kinds of ambiguity.
In the chapter on linking I also introduce some data about verbs of motion, and 
show how the WG linking structures introduced in the first part of the chapter can be 
used to describe and explain the behaviour of the various verbs of motion. In the 
following chapter I introduce some data about resultative expressions, and use them to 
probe the notion of telicity introduced in the first part of that chapter. I also provide 
WG analyses for three classes of resultative expression. In the chapter on ambiguity, I 
also introduce some data involving verbs with both causative (7 broke the window) and 
unaccusative (The window broke) uses. I show how the WG treatment of ambiguity is 
applied in these cases, and compare it with some alternative approaches.
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3. Linking and Verbs of Motion
3.1 Linking
3.1.1 Linking and compositionality: argument structure; semantic selection; 
role> and class-based approaches
I state above (2.1.3, 2.3) that any description of linguistic semantics must be able to
account for the way in which words and their meanings combine in sentences. Clearly
(except in CG) this presupposes an account of the regular relationships between
syntactic and semantic structures: a description of the mechanisms involved in linking.
The search for an adequate account of linking has two further motivations: it
makes it possible to explain the syntactic argument-taking properties of words (and
therefore obviates the need for valency lists or other stipulative representations of
subcategorisation facts); and it provides a framework for dealing with words whose
argument-taking properties vary regularly with the word's meaning (many such cases
are treated below and in the work of other writers in the field of lexical semantics
including Copestake and Briscoe 1996, Croft 1990, Goldberg 1995, Lemmens 1998,
Levin 1993, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995, Pustejovsky 1995 and Pustejovsky and
Boguraev 1996a).
Levin and Rappaport Hovav provide yet another reason to seek an account of
argument linking: that it is an intrinsic part of the structure of language. In their
introduction, they make the following claim:
"To the extent that the semantic role of an argument is determined by the 
meaning of the verb selecting it, the existence of linking regularities 
supports the idea that verb meaning is a factor in determining the syntactic 
structure of sentences. The striking similarities in the linking 
regularities across languages suggest that they are part of the 
architecture of language." (1995: 1, my emphasis)
As I make plain shortly, it is not the meanings of verbs alone that are relevant in 
determining semantic structure. It should also be clear that I do not share Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav's conviction of the similarities across languages in the details of 
argument linking. However, I accept readily that the fact of argument linking, and the 
mechanism that controls it, must be shared across languages.
The linking regularities that we seek are generalisations over correspondences 
between syntactic and semantic relationships. In the WG framework described in the 
previous chapter, they take the form of specialisations or refinements of the Revised
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Syntax Semantics Principle (RSSP) (1.2.3.2). In the previous chapter, I provided 
linking rules for the syntactic relationships subject, object and indirect object (1.2.4.3, 
1.2.4.2, 1.2.3.3 respectively), albeit somewhat schematically in the case of the former 
two. In the course of the present section, I address the outstanding issues, providing 
more detailed linking rules for subjects and objects, and for the parents and 
complements of prepositions.
The data to be considered is of two kinds: the successful linking rules will 
explain how specific syntactic relationships are interpreted in semantic structure 
(giving an account of compositionality) and also explain how specific semantic 
relationships are projected into syntactic structure (giving an account of the semantic 
selection of dependents). Much work has been done in the field of lexical semantics 
(see for example the list of names above), much of it focussed on the argument-taking 
properties of verbs. However, if the account is to provide a full explanation of 
grammatical structure we must also consider the properties of other argument-taking 
words, including prepositions and nouns with relational semantics, and, given the 
different behaviour of valents and adjuncts discussed in 1.2.3.2 above, also those of 
words that function as adjuncts.
The sentences in (131)-(136) exemplify some of the relevant data:
(131) a. The gazelle choked to death.
b. The hyena choked the gazelle to death.
(132) a. The hyena laughed.
b. *The gazelle laughed the hyena.
(133) a. The great white hunter drove on the river bed. 
b. The great white hunter drove onto the river bed.
(134) a. The great white hunter went on the river bed. 
b. The great white hunter went onto the river bed.
(135) a. The medicine man gave the hunter a charm, 
b. The medicine man made the hunter a charm.
(136) a. The medicine man made the hunter (into) a god.
b. The medicine man made the lion's claw *(into) a charm.
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A properly developed theory of linking will explain, among other things, how the 
referents of the dependents of the verbs in (131 )a and b are assigned their semantic 
roles, including how both refer to the death of a gazelle; it will also explain the 
difference between the roles of the referents of the subjects in (131) and (132)a, and 
explain the unacceptability of (132)b; it will explain why the two sentences in (133) 
receive different interpretations, and why those in (134) do not; it will explain the 
similarities and differences between the sentences in (135); and it will explain why the 
preposition is obligatory in (136)b, but not in (136)a.
All these questions are addressed in this and the following chapters, except the 
last. The two sentences in (136) appear to involve different meanings of the verb. The 
first case has a performative flavour: the hunter becomes a god in the medicine man's 
act of making; other verbs with similar meanings are CROW N (The archbishop crowned 
him king) and ELECT (They elected her president); this construction is discussed in 
Verspoor (1997). The second case has a slightly different interpretation: the medicine 
man performed some (unspecified) act which caused the transformation of the claw 
into a charm (the two events are separate). I return to these examples at the end of this 
part of the chapter (3.1.5).
In the remainder of this section I discuss some approaches to linking in the 
lexical semantic literature and go on to compare these to the WG approach detailed in 
chapter 1. In the last part of the section I also elaborate on the subject and object 
linking rules given in the previous chapter.
I divide the approaches to linking into role-based and class-based approaches. 
In the former, linking regularities are stated in terms of the roles played by the 
arguments, generally consisting of regularities linking semantic (thematic) roles (such 
as agent, causer, theme and patient) to syntactic arguments (subject, object, oblique, 
etc) or argument positions (external, internal, etc); some of these approaches are 
discussed in the following section (3.1.2). In the latter, linking regularities are 
properties of classes of predicates, which define the number and type of arguments and 
determine the interpretation of the composite structure; some of these approaches are 
discussed in 3.1.3. The difference is, in some cases, more one of emphasis than of 
substance, particularly since it is often the case in both kinds of approach that 
predicates are classified according to the kinds of role that they support.
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Nevertheless, the classification is a helpful one in as much as there are 
identifiable properties that distinguish the two classes, as will become clear. For 
example, in a role-based account linking regularities are necessarily represented in 
categories of a different kind from the lexical entries for particular words, but in a 
class-based account it is possible (though not obligatory) to treat linking regularities as 
simply more general cases of these individual lexical structures. Furthermore, since in 
many role-based approaches assignment of role is fully deterministic (like arguments 
always being assigned to like roles), the linking regularities themselves must be made 
flexible in these approaches; in class-based approaches the flexibility can be 
introduced at the level of role assignment.
3.1.2 Role-based approaches to linking: thematic roles; proto-roles; projection 
rules
Role- or relation-based approaches to argument linking can be found in Case Grammar 
(Fillmore 1966, 1968), in GB (Chomsky 1981), and in the work of Gruber (1965) and 
Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990) among others.
In a role-based approach, the lexical semantic structure of a word that selects 
syntactic complements consists of a predicate with a number of arguments. These 
arguments represent thematic roles or role types (theta-roles) and their number and 
nature is determined by the predicate. These roles are projected onto syntactic 
argument positions in a regular (though not necessarily monotonic) way.
Commonly, the thematic roles associated with a predicate are simply listed in 
its lexical specification. However, in some approaches, they are derived from specific 
properties of the word's meaning. For example, Jackendoff (1987, 1990), as detailed in 
chapter 2, proposes a syntax of thought into which the meanings of words can be 
decomposed. Lexical conceptual structures (LCSs) written in this syntax of thought 
consist of predicate argument structures. These structures, which represent the 
semantics of the word, have indices to show which structural positions are to be linked 
to syntactic arguments and the relevant thematic roles are determined by the structural 
position of each indexed argument.
The LCS is formed from a set of primitive categories which classify all 
conceptual entities. Jackendoff does not supply a definitive list, but the salient
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categories include Thing, Event, Action, State, Place and Path. Thematic roles are 
assigned by sub-classes of these basic conceptual categories. For example, the Agent 
role is defined as the first argument of the Event category c a u s e ; Theme is defined, 
among other things, as the first argument of the Event categories GO and STAY and of 
the State categories b e , o r ie n t  and e x t  (=Extending). Source and Goal roles are 
defined by the Path categories f r o m  and TO respectively, and so on (Jackendoff 1990: 
249).
(137) and (138) show LCSs for EAT and ENTER ((137) is taken from Jackendoff 
(ibid: 253)). (137) has two indexed arguments, marked by subscript A. The first of 
these is an Agent, the second a Theme (the angled brackets around the subscript in this 
case indicate its optionality). These two arguments are linked to the subject and object 
respectively. (138) demonstrates a problem with this approach in that it has a single 
argument (a Theme), which must, unlike the Theme in (137), be linked to the subject.
(137) EAT: [CAUSE ( [ r h in g  ] ° A ,  [G O ([T h in g ]<A>, [TO[lN[M OUTH-OF[a]]]])])]
( m )  ENTER: [G O ([rh ing ] a , [TO [iN [Thing ]< a > ] ] ) ]
The non-monotonicity exemplified in (137) and (138) has long been recognised 
in theories of linking. A common solution to this problem in role-based approaches 
involves the ranking of thematic roles in a hierarchy. Jackendoffs approach 
exemplifies this. Thematic and syntactic roles (though they are not primitive) are 
chosen from a finite and ordered list. Again there is no definitive list, or definitive 
ordering, but both can in principle be determined empirically. The linking principle is 
as appears in (139) (ibid: 249).
(139) Hierarchical Argument Linking:
Following the thematic hierarchy, order the dominant theta roles in the LCS of a 
verb V from 1st to nth. To derive the syntactic argument structure of V, map this 
ordering of theta roles onto the 1st through nth roles in the syntactic hierarchy.
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Since Agent precedes Theme in the theta role hierarchy and subject precedes object in 
the syntactic role hierarchy, the Agent is linked to subject and the Theme to object in
(137), whereas in (138), where there is no Agent, the Theme is linked to subject.
Notice that this principle refers to the "dominant theta roles". This is important 
since Jackendoff, unlike other writers (for example, this is ruled out by the projection 
principle and theta criterion of GB: Chomsky 1981: 36, 38), allows a given element to 
be assigned more than one thematic role (for example the Agent of LIKE is also its 
Experiencer). The dominant theta role of a given element is the earliest in the 
hierarchy.
An alternative approach to non-monotonic linking is proposed in Dowty 
(1991), who rejects the notion of thematic role hierarchies. Among the problems 
associated with this idea that Dowty identifies are the fact that no definitive list of 
thematic roles has been provided, with new roles being proposed all the time, and the 
frequency of disagreements about the specifics of list ordering. Dowty's solution is to 
recognise just two roles, the "cluster-concepts" P r o t o -A g e n t  and P r o t o -P a t ie n t . 
These roles collect together the various semantic properties of agents and patients, and 
assignment to each role is on a case-by-case basis, and by best fit, so that a semantic 
argument with the same conceptual properties may be assigned to a different proto-role 
according to the other properties of the predicate.
Dowty’s protoroles consist of " a  s e t  o f  e n t a i l m e n t s  o f  a  g r o u p  o f  
PREDICATES WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE A RGUM ENTS OF EACH " (ibid: 552, caps in 
original). The relevant entailments identified in the paper are given in (140) and (141) 
(ibid: 572), though Dowty allows for the possibility that these lists are open to 
improvement on the basis of empirical considerations.
(140) Contributing properties for the Agent Proto-role:
a. volitional involvement in the event or state
b. sentience (and/or perception)
c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
(e. exists independently of the event named by the verb)
(141) Contributing properties for the Patient Proto-role:
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a. undergoes change of state
b. incremental theme
c. causally affected by another participant
d. stationary relative to movement of another participant 
(e. does not exist independently, or not at all)
These proto-roles are referred to in the argument selection principle given in 
(142) along with its two corollaries (ibid: 576). Notice that the argument selection 
principle applies only to predicates with two or more arguments. In the case of a 
predicate with only one argument, that argument for Dowty automatically links to the 
subject relationship (ibid: 605ff). The corollaries provide for marginal cases, those 
which tolerate variation in their linking arrangements, and for ditransitives and other 
three-argument predicates (some of which, like s p r a y  and LOAD, are also marginal).
(142) A r g u m e n t  S e l e c t io n  P r in c ip l e : In predicates with grammatical subject and 
object, the argument for which the predicate entails the greatest number of Proto- 
Agent properties will be lexicalised as the subject of the predicate; the argument 
having the greatest number of Proto-Patient entailments will be lexicalised as the 
object.
(143) C o r o l l a r y  1: If two arguments of a relation have (approximately) equal 
numbers of entailed Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient properties, then either or both 
may be lexicalised as the subject (and similarly for objects).
(1 4 4 )  C o r o l l a r y  2 : With a three-place predicate, the nonsubject argument having the 
greater number of entailed Proto-Patient properties will be lexicalised as the 
direct object and the nonsubject argument having fewer entailed Proto-Patient 
properties will be lexicalised as an oblique or prepositional object (and if two 
nonsubject arguments have approximately equal numbers of entailed Proto- 
Patient properties, either or both may be lexicalised as direct object).
A third approach to non-monotonicity is provided by Rappaport and Levin 
(1988) and elaborated in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995). Under this approach, the 
relationship between general conceptual properties and syntactic roles, as defined by
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structural position, is monotonic, but transformations can intervene between deep and 
surface syntactic representations, so that, for example, structural objects appear as 
surface subjects. Levin and Rappaport Hovav introduce syntactic data to support their 
claim that unergative structures like (145) and unaccusative structures like (146) differ 
structurally (ie in deep syntax). This data is considered in this and the following 
chapters.
(145) The lady coughed.
(146) The lady vanished.
Linking, in Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s approach, is mediated by linking 
rules that refer to conceptual/thematic roles and project them onto structural argument 
positions. The three structural argument positions external argument, (direct) internal 
argument and indirect internal argument correspond to the (deep) syntactic roles 
subject, object and indirect object respectively. The four linking rules used in Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav (1995) are given here:
(147) Immediate Cause Linking Rule
The argument of a verb that denotes the immediate cause of the eventuality 
described by that verb is its external argument, (ibid: 135)
(148) Directed Change Linking Rule
The argument of a verb that corresponds to the entity undergoing the directed 
change described by that verb is its direct internal argument, (ibid: 146)
(149) Existence Linking Rule (revised)
The argument of a verb whose existence is asserted or denied is its direct internal 
argument, (ibid: 153)
(150) Default Linking Rule
An argument of a verb that does not fall under the scope of any of the other 
linking rules is its direct internal argument, (ibid: 154)
Under Levin and Rappaport Hovav's analysis, verbs can be classified according 
to the number and nature of their arguments: causative transitive verbs have one
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argument denoting an immediate cause and one denoting an entity undergoing a 
directed change, unergative verbs have a single argument denoting an immediate cause 
and unaccusative verbs have a single argument denoting an entity undergoing a 
directed change.23 Levin and Rappaport Hovav also speak of classes of verbs defined 
by their thematic properties ("verbs of appearance" (ibid: 19), "verbs of emission" 
(ibid: 91-92), "verbs of existence" (ibid: 19), "verbs of manner of motion" (ibid: 147- 
148) etc); as well as sharing the relevant thematic properties, the members of each of 
these classes are also held to belong to the same event class.
For example, COUGH (145), like other "verbs of bodily process" (ibid: 116), 
refers to an internally caused event, so the cougher is construed as an immediate cause 
and linked by the Immediate Cause Linking Rule to the external argument position 
(and from there to the surface subject). This linking gives CO U G H , and the other bodily 
process verbs, an unergative structure, v a n i s h  (146), like other "verbs of 
disappearance" (ibid: 153), refers to a change undergone by the single argument, which 
is therefore linked by the Directed Change Linking Rule to the internal argument 
position (and from there to the deep object and on to the surface subject). This linking 
gives v a n i s h , and the other disappearance verbs, an unaccusative structure.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav's linking mechanism is dealt with in detail in 
chapter 5.
3.1.3 Class-based approaches to linking: objections to role-based approaches;
verb types and constructions; event types
Some writers argue that role-based approaches to argument linking are inherently 
flawed, and that the basic categories of grammar are classes of predicates, rather than 
the relationships they support. Croft argues for a model of grammar in which 
"constructions are the basic units of syntactic representation, and categories [including 
grammatical relationships] are derived from the constructions in which they appear." 
(2001:4).
23 For this reason, the analysis appears, superficially, to be a class-based approach. Notice, however, that 
the linking rules refer to thematic roles, rather than to event classes, event class itself being an argument 
structure configuration defined by the thematic structure of the verb. Levin and Rappaport Hovav say, 
for example, “The Immediate Cause Linking Rule will also classify verbs such as cough, [...] as 
unergative” (1995: 137).
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Davis and Koenig advance two kinds of argument against role-based 
approaches (2000: 57-60). First they identify empirical problems with such 
approaches. In languages that have analytical causative morphology (Davis and 
Koenig provide examples (151) and (152) from Finnish and Chamorro respectively 
(ibid: 57-58)), causatives can be made from verbs that already have an agent, leading 
to possible conflict of priority between the two agents. However, there is never any 
confusion and in all relevant languages the causer is construed as the primary agent, 
and linked to the subject position.
(151) Vitsi naura-tt-i nais-i-a.
joke laugh-CAUS-PST woman-PL-PART
’The joke made the women laugh.'
(152) Hu na'-kanta si Pedro.
1SG CAUS-sing Pedro
'I made Pedro sing.'
Other empirical problems involve pairs of verbs with apparently converse mappings. 
Davis and Koenig provide the examples in (153)-(l55) (ibid: 58) to show that verbs 
that share the same thematic roles can link them to subject and object in opposite ways.
(153) a. Mary owns many books.
b. This book belongs to Mary.
(154) a. We missed the meaning of what he said.
b. The meaning of what he said escaped/eluded us.
(155) a. Oak trees plague/grace/dot the hillsides,
b. The hillsides boast/sport/feature oak trees.
Next, they identify two theoretical objections to role-based theories of linking. 
These are that there are certain thematic role combinations that do not appear in any 
language and that there are no rules that refer to thematic roles by their relative 
position in the hierarchy (only rules referring to specific thematic roles). Both these 
considerations support the view that predicator classes are ontologically more basic
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than the thematic grids they support. Davis and Koenig go on to develop a hierarchical 
lexicon of word classes, defined in part by their argument-taking properties. Figure 45 
shows a portion of such a hierarchy (adapted from ibid: 79). Notice that it makes use of 
multiple inheritance (Davis and Koenig refer the reader to Carpenter 1992).
vb
active-vb
passive-vb act-vb und-vb
act-und-vb
eaten
die
ate bask
Figure 45 A simple hierarchy of verb types.
The verb classes in the hierarchy define the (syntactic and semantic) argument-taking 
properties of their members by means of HPSG-style attribute value matrices (Pollard 
and Sag 1987, 1994). The verbs in the diagram are cross-classified by the argument 
structure categories act-vb (actor verb = verb with an actor) and und-vb (undergoer 
verb = verb with an undergoer) and by the inflectional categories active-vb and 
passive-vb.
Similar lexical hierarchies are found in Construction Grammar. Fillmore and
Kay (Fillmore and Kay 2000, Fillmore 1997, Kay 1997) also make use of HPSG
attribute value matrices, organised into a structured lexicon:
"The mechanism for shaping sentences is an interconnected repertory of 
grammatical constructions." (Fillmore 1997: ix).
Goldberg, working in a similar framework, identifies constructions with argument 
structure templates independent of the lexical structures of individual words. Figure 46 
shows the template for indirect object constructions (1995: 142).
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Ditmnsirivc Constmction
Sera
R:mstance,
means
CAUSE-RECEIVE < agt
I*
PRED <
ret* pat >
i
Syn V SUBJ OBJ OBJ>
Figure 6. [
Figure 46 Goldberg's ditransitive template.
The construction has three levels of representation: a semantic level consisting 
of a predicate with three arguments, an array of participant roles provided by the verb, 
and a syntactic array consisting of a word class specification with three arguments. The 
agent and patient roles are obligatorily fused with participant roles of the verb in the 
middle layer, whereas the recipient may be supplied by the construction; this is shown 
by the broken line connecting rec in the top layer with the second layer (note that this 
is a specific (ie lexical) property of ditransitives, and is not necessarily general). This is 
an important property of Goldberg's framework: the argument structures of constructs 
(sentences) are determined in part by the lexical structures of the words in the sentence 
and in part by those of the constructions invoked.
This separation of verbal and constructional semantic structures is a
characteristic of Construction Grammars generally. For Goldberg and for Kay, as for
Croft (1990, 2001), the constructional schemas are representations of grammatical
structure: they constitute the syntactico-semantic resources of a given language and
provide a framework into which the words are inserted:
"Processes such as those linking grammatical functions with semantic roles 
are represented as templatic lexical constructions which unify with 
minimal lexical entries." (Kay 1997: 125)
This view (which I discuss more fully in 3.1.4.3) is particularly important in the 
treatment of polyvalence, as discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5.
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In other frameworks, however, the constructional schema forms part of the 
lexical specification of the individual word. In Halliday's Functional Grammar, for 
example, the inventory of constructions encodes "the different types of process that are 
built into the grammar of English, and the participant roles associated with each" 
(1985: 107), and each verb instantiates a particular process type. In the work of 
Pustejovsky, and others (Briscoe et al. 1993, Pustejovsky 1995, 2001, Pustejovsky and 
Boguraev 1996a), a predicate has a "deep semantic type", which is associated with a 
particular argument structure, and it is this argument structure that determines the 
number and type of the arguments.
Halliday identifies six overlapping process types (1985: 106-108): m a t e r i a l , 
e x i s t e n t i a l , r e l a t i o n a l , v e r b a l , m e n t a l  and b e h a v i o u r a l . The process types are 
defined conceptually: in terms of the thematic properties both of the process itself and 
of the participants. Material processes, for example, involve a (typically animate) 
ACTOR (linked to the subject relationship) who 'does something directed at' an 
inanimate g o a l  (linked to the object relationship). Material processes are further 
classified as d i s p o s i t i v e  ('changing') and c r e a t i v e  ('creating').
The core examples of material processes involve human agents acting on solid 
objects, but Halliday notes that the process may be highly abstract {resign, dissolve), 
and that the more abstract the process is, the harder it is to draw the distinction 
between actor and goal. Halliday also notes that even with some concrete processes it 
can be difficult to distinguish actors and goals (ibid: 111). The actor in (156) is 
involuntary, and so in some respects like a goal.
(156) The tourist collapsed.
Lemmens (1998) develops a model of grammar based on the Functional 
Grammar that Davidse (1991, 1992) derives from Halliday's framework. Davidse adds 
to Halliday's transitive process types a further set of ergative processes, which are also 
claimed to be relevant to the grammar of English. In this framework, examples like
(156) are structured by the ergative paradigm, which accounts for the difficulty of 
fitting them into transitive structures.
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In Lemmens's model, as in the Construction Grammar accounts discussed 
above, the constructions have meanings independent of the lexical items that 
instantiate them. Nevertheless, the event structure of the relevant process type still 
appears in the lexical specification of an individual word. Figure 47 shows Lemmens's 
lexical structure for a b o r t . Meanings conforming to the transitive model are shown on 
the right hand side, meanings conforming to the ergative model on the left. The large 
number (11) of models for the meaning of the verb is necessary under Lemmens's 
account since, under this account, if a verb is to appear in a particular construction the 
verb's semantics must be able to unify with the semantics of the construction, so for 
every construction that a verb can appear there must be a separate sense (model).
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Hip ortBdls^swHiiffii,t
Figure 47 Schematic network of the meanings of abort (Lemmens 1998: 217).
Lemmens’s framework is discussed at greater length in chapter 5, in particular the 
transitive and ergative models.
3.1.4 Linking in WG: the framework; event types; roles and relations
3.1.4.1 The framework
In chapter 1 (1.2.4), I described a linking mechanism within the WG framework, based 
on generalisations over grammatical relations (specialisations of the (Revised) Syntax 
Semantics Principle). Some of the details were only sketched there, and these are
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fleshed out in this section. In this section I also take steps towards placing the WG 
linking mechanism in the context of the other approaches discussed above.
The linking regularities presented above consist of symbolic structures which 
link specific syntactic relationships (subject, object, indirect object, etc) with specific 
semantic relationships (er, ee, recipient, etc). The syntactic relationships are identified 
by a set of word-level (syntactic, morphological, phonological, etc) properties which, 
by default, are inherited by all cases of the dependency: unless otherwise specified, 
subjects precede their parents and determine their form, objects follow and permit no 
intervening codependents, and so on. The semantic relationships are identified by a set 
of concept-level (thematic, force-dynamic, etc) properties, which likewise constitute 
the default model for the relationship. The syntactic and semantic properties taken 
together constitute the lexical structure of the relevant relationship, and can be seen as 
a gestalt.
Semantic relationships like recipient and result are quite straightforwardly 
understood in terms of more complex semantic structures: for example, if a concept C 
has a result which is an example of Having, then that result's first argument is the 
recipient of C (note that this property forms part of the definition of both result and 
recipient). The relationships er and ee, however, which are linked to subject and object 
respectively, are less straightforward. An account is provided here in which the 
properties of ers and ees are defined by a hierarchy of event types (notice that an event 
type (Having) played a role in the definition of result and recipient).
Since most of these event types are defined by a single exceptional argument 
relationship, and since the linking regularities are still stated in terms of single roles, 
the WG approach outlined here combines the properties of role-based and class-based 
approaches. The linking regularities presented in 1.2 are generalisations over the 
linking properties of all subjects, objects etc. While each syntactic dependency always 
maps onto the same semantic argument, the exact nature of the role played by that 
argument is determined by the wider conceptual structure associated with the parent's 
sense (as represented partly by its event type). The distinction between words and 
constructions is an emergent property of the network structure.
The categories in the event type hierarchy are defined by their semantic 
(conceptual) properties, including force-dynamic properties (but not including
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aspectual properties, which are dealt with in the following chapter). Many of the event 
types function as the senses of words, though some do not. The categories support a 
number of associations (more at the more specific levels), including those mentioned 
in the linking regularities. The roles of those arguments are defined by the rest of the 
conceptual structure associated with the lexical category.
3.1.4.2 Event types
Figure 48 shows the event type hierarchy. The various types are shown, but most of 
their properties are not (they are given in the following diagrams). The category at the 
top of the hierarchy is labelled Predicate; this is not an entirely satisfactory name for 
this concept, but it has the benefit of subsuming both states and events. The names of 
the concepts in the hierarchy are intended to be the senses of lexical words, and for this 
reason it is perhaps surprising that no readily useable term exists for the highest 
category, though it might be argued that this concept does not have much use as an 
element in the normal use of language. The event type hierarchy should more properly 
be called the predicate type hierarchy.
Predicates are divided into states (State) and events (Event), the latter 
consisting of a series of (more or less) transient states. The most general category, 
Predicate, is shown with a single argument, labelled er, and this association is 
inherited (implicitly) by the two subclasses. The states are divided into Being and 
Having; the latter and some of the former have a second argument, labelled ee. Further 
properties of these categories are explored shortly. The events include processes like 
Laughing and Yawning as well as the further categories Becoming and Affecting. The 
first of these is telic (it has a result which is a state); the second has an ee as well as an 
er. Affecting includes transitive processes like Pushing and Beating ('hitting1 not 
'defeating') as well as the category Making which subsumes two further categories, 
Creating, which is telic since its result is an example of Being (or Existing), and 
Making', which is telic in that its result isa Becoming and the result of this second 
event is a state (I introduced both these categories in 1.2.4.2).
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^.resulU^ Affecting
Becoming
Having Making
.-result'^
K  \ Making'Creating
Figure 48 Predicate type hierarchy.
Figure 49 shows in more detail the properties of the states. Being defines a 
property of its er. For example, Big functions as the size of its er (Drunk is also shown 
as an example of the way in which the semantic network represents all aspects of 
meaning). Other subcases of Being include Feeling, which subsumes psychological 
states (see Figure 50), and At, which subsumes locations (see Figure 51). The inclusion 
of the traditional semantic roles theme and actor pre-empts the discussion of the 
difference between Being and Having in Figure 52 and of the relationship between the 
argument positions and traditional semantic roles in 3.1.4.3.
State
Theme,Drinking -Theme,
■Actor
Drunk
Figure 49 Hierarchy of states.
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Figure 50 Shows in more detail the properties of Feeling. This category 
subsumes one- and two-argument psychological states. In both cases the er must be 
sentient. One of each kind of state is shown as an example. A single semantic 
relationship is shown for each; this stands for a fuller characterisation of the words' 
meanings which would include for example the relationship between Happy and 
Smiling (the er of Happy is often the er of Smiling too).
Sentient
Feeling
er.
. \   ee^ .
Admiring
Happy
‘mood Imirer
Figure 50 Feeling.
Figure 51 shows the properties of At, the category subsuming locations, and the 
sense of AT. The ee of At defines the place of its er, which is therefore understood as 
the theme of a state defined by the ee. For this reason, the ee is also shown as the 
Landmark (see 3.1.4.3). Two subcases of At are shown, In and On, the senses of the 
prepositions IN and ON respectively. These two differ from At in that the place of the er 
is not the same as the ee, but is rather the same as the place of a part of the ee. In the 
case of In, this part is the interior; in the case of On, it is the surface. The diagram also 
shows that Containing and Supporting are the converses of In and On respectively (if a 
is in b then b contains a; if a is on b then b supports a). These facts are integral parts of 
the meanings of the prepositions.
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Figure 51 At.
Figure 52 shows the properties of Having, the sense of HAVE. As I show in 
Figure 49, the arguments of Having and those of Being have different properties. In the 
case of Having the er is also its actor and the ee its theme (see 3.1.4.3); in the case of 
Being the er is the theme, and the ee, if there is one, is a landmark, or plays some other 
role (in the case of the psychological states it is often called a stimulus). Figure 52 
shows that Supporting and Containing are subcases of Having (subsumed under a 
general category labelled 'Locating').
This explains why these categories assign their arguments in the opposite way 
to the corresponding concepts On and In, which inherit their argument structure from 
Being (by way of At). It may also help to explain the way in which some languages 
use verbs corresponding to English BE and h a v e  with different sets of verbs in perfect 
constructions and perhaps also explain the relationship between passive and perfect 
constructions even in English. This possibility needs to be explored in future work.
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Figure 52 Having.
The correspondence between Being and Having also suggests an alternative to 
the analyses presented in the previous chapter for verbs like g iv e  and the indirect 
object. I claim above (1.2.4.2, Figure 21) that the more specific semantics of indirect 
objects overrides the usual principle that the ee of a causative event is assigned as the 
er of its result (the gift, which is the ee of Giving, is the ee rather than the er of the 
result, if this is to be a case of Having). However, it is also possible that the result of 
Giving is instead a case of Being (more specifically, it isa At), which would preserve 
the default arrangement. This would also provide a means of describing the contrast 
between verbs like g iv e  and those like e q u ip  (rare in English) that show the opposite 
linking arrangement. This view is supported by the prepositions that are used with 
these verbs. GIVE selects TO (in the absence of an indirect object), which in other 
constructions refers to a path terminating in a location; e q u ip  selects w it h , which has 
Having as its sense.
This suggestion is sketched in Figure 53. The result of Giving isa At; its er (the 
thing located) is the ee of Giving and its ee (the location) is the recipient. The result of 
Equipping isa Having; its er (the possessor) is the ee of Giving and its ee is the 
'equipment'.
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Figure 53 Giving, Equipping.
Figure 54 shows the properties of the non-states. Event inherits the er 
relationship from the Predicate category, and passes it down to the subclasses. 
Becoming has additionally a result which is a state which shares its er; the class is telic 
and provides the semantic schema for unaccusative constructions. Dying is shown as 
an example (see Figure 58). Affecting has additionally an ee, which is a patient. 
Pushing is shown as an example (see Figure 56). Making represents telic affective 
events (it has a result). Two subclasses of Making are shown. Creating provides the 
model for effective constructions and Making' for causative (affective) ones. In both 
cases it is the ee that functions as the er of the result. Killing is shown as an example of 
Making' (see Figure 57).
Event
;Actor
State
er ■Yawninger
Becoming
Affecting
Being 'result Patient"
Dying Making
Pushing
-resuh-
-resuh-
Creating
Making’
er.
eeer.
Killing
Figure 54 Events.
144
Animal
Event
V
4
Yawning
er
Tired
Figure 55 Yawning isa Event.
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Figure 56 Pushing isa Affecting.
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Making'
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Figure 57 Killing isa Making'.
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■res ul
Dead
Dying
Figure 58 Dying isa Becoming.
3.1.4.3 Semantic roles and semantic relationships
Above I have given a hierarchical classification of predicate types defined by their 
properties (see Figure 48, Figure 49, Figure 54). Note that the senses of particular 
words (not just verbs: prepositions and adjectives refer to events, as do some nouns 
like destruction, wedding, etc) are arranged in the same hierarchy since they simply 
instantiate the more general predicate types. The properties of the predicate types 
determine the number and nature of the semantic relationships associated with these 
senses and the linking of those associations to syntactic dependencies; alternatively, 
the number and nature of semantic associations and the linking of those associations 
determines the position of the sense in the predicate type hierarchy.
In chapter 1 I provide linking regularities that link more or less schematic 
semantic associations with more or less schematic syntactic ones. There I give linking 
rules for subject (1.2.4.3), object (1.2.4.2) and indirect object (1.2.3.3, 1.2.4.2) as well 
as the more general (revised) syntax semantics principle (RSSP); elsewhere I give a 
linking rule for sharer (a kind of complement, see chapter 4). The semantic 
associations referred to in these rules are the same as those supported by the various 
predicate types. In fact the linking rules themselves form part of this hierarchy, 
appearing at the highest relevant level.
As noted above (3.1.4.1), semantic associations like result and recipient are 
fairly straightforwardly characterised in terms of other semantic relationships (in terms 
of their meanings) but er and ee, the two relationships involved in subject and object 
linking, are not. The ers and ees of particular events (or event classes) are 
instantiations of the more general er and ee that appear in the linking regularities (note 
that the er of Predicate (Figure 54) is the most general one there is, so this is the locus
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of the subject linking rule and all other ers are instantiations of this one). The 
properties of ers and ees of more specific categories are determined at the appropriate 
level in the predicate type hierarchy and it is here that the most semantic information is 
found.
In the preceding section I define the semantics of these relationships by relating 
them to named thematic roles (actor, patient, theme, landmark), but this begs the 
question in the absence of a fuller semantic definition of these roles. Indeed, as 
discussed below, once the thematic roles have definitions, it may no longer be 
necessary, or desirable, to keep the relationships agent, theme etc in lexical structure.24
Some of the problems with thematic roles have already been identified (see 
Dowty's objections discussed in 3.1.2). The most immediate practical difficulty is that 
different writers (and even different works by the same writer) use the same terms with 
different meanings; this is a particular problem for the terms Goal, Patient and Theme 
(see below).
A further, theoretical, difficulty (raised by Dowty) is the open-ended nature of
the set of roles to be used. Goldberg considers this only an empirical problem, since in
principle the set of thematic roles need not be finite, the nature of the roles being
determined by the set of predicate types recognised in the language:
"[Pjhrasal constructions that capture argument structure generalisations 
have argument roles associated with them; these often correspond roughly 
to traditional thematic roles .... At the same time, because they are defined 
in terms of the semantic requirements of particular constructions, argument 
roles in this framework are more specific and numerous than traditional 
thematic roles.” (2002: 342)
Since the semantic relationships supported by the senses of words instantiate 
(isa) those of more general categories, the senses of different words (or constructions) 
may elaborate the more general models in different ways, so that the set of thematic 
roles at the more specific levels can be very large indeed. In Figure 54, I used the 
thematic role actor as schematic over the first arguments of all non-states (including 
processes (157) and causative (158) and unaccusative (159) events).
24 O f course, if a particular speaker knows the words ACTOR and theme (as metalinguistic terms), then 
they must have these relationships in their lexicon, since they are (or should be!) the meanings o f the 
relevant terms.
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(157) a. The flag fluttered in the breeze.
b. The tourist yawned.
c. The flag distracted the tourist.
d. Perry pushed a pea with his nose.
(158) a. Perry pushed a pea to Peterborough.
b. The flag angered the tourist.
c. The judges made a cake.
d. Perry opened a bottle.
(159) a. The pea vanished.
b. The ice melted.
c. The band disbanded.
Trask defines actor as "that argument NP exercising the highest degree of independent 
action in the clause." (1993: 6), noting that this is a simple extension of the category 
agent to fit other kinds of subject-linked arguments. This extension covers verbs 
referring to changes undergone by their single argument (unaccusative verbs), whose 
arguments therefore may have few or no agentive properties (note however, that some 
are agents (159)c). In fact, the actors of other one- or two-argument events are also not 
agents ((157)a, (157)c, (158)b).
Agency is a property of some actors, determined by the thematic properties of 
the event, so the thematic role agent ("the semantic role borne by an NP which is 
perceived as the conscious instigator of an action" ibid: 11) is not called for. Actor, 
then, corresponds roughly to Dowty's (1991) proto-agent: it is defined by properties 
like volitional involvement, causal instigation etc but not all cases share all these 
properties. Dowty's proto-agent wills the event, is sentient, causes an event or change 
of state, moves and has independent existence; the WG treatment presented here 
accepts all of these but the fourth, movement.
Patient ("the semantic role borne by an NP which expresses the entity 
undergoing an action" Trask (1993: 202)) is schematic over the second argument of 
transitive events. Affecting, which is the most general such event, subsumes processes 
(like pushing a pea or patting a dog) and causative events (like pushing a pea to 
Peterborough or angering a tourist). The patient is the affected (or effected) argument,
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even in some of the transitive processes. Processes have a temporal profile that 
consists of a set of repeated events (see 4.1.2.2). These events may themselves be 
causative (Pushing consists of a set of repeated causative actions on an object), though 
they may also be states (Patting consists of a set of repeated locative states) in which 
case the patient is the theme of the state (see below).
Dowty’s (1991) proto-patient undergoes a change of state, is an incremental 
theme, is causally affected by another participant, does not move and does not have 
independent existence. Again, the WG analysis accepts all these but the fourth, 
concerning movement. The incremental theme is a product of the aspectual structure of 
affective events (see 4.1.2.6).
States have themes, and some have actors. Actors of states share the properties 
of those of non-states. The theme is the argument that the state is predicated of (theme 
is also used with similar meaning as the name of a discourse function, where it 
contrasts with rheme, as topic does with comment). Trask gives "an entity which is in a 
state or a location or which is undergoing motion" (1993: 278), a definition which 
subsumes some patients, as defined above; Trask also notes that the terms theme and 
patient are used more or less interchangeably. However, in the current framework the 
two are separate: patients undergo some affective/effective process or change; themes 
have some stable property. Locative states also have a landmark: the argument whose 
position defines that of the theme.
The above definitions of the thematic roles are given in terms of semantic 
properties. For example, an actor wills the event, is sentient, causes an event or change 
of state and has independent existence. These semantic properties of actor are shown in 
Figure 59.
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Figure 59 Actor.
In the linking framework outlined here, syntactic associations are linked to 
semantic ones in a regular way (subjects refer to ers, objects to ees, indirect objects to 
beneficiaries etc), and those semantic associations are defined by (structural) semantic 
properties. The relationships er and ee are defined by the categories of the predicate 
type hierarchy, and linked there to the various properties of actors, patients, themes 
and landmarks, like those in Figure 59. It is an empirical question whether it is 
necessary to keep hold of the relationships actor, patient etc: theoretically the ers of 
non-states could simply be linked directly to the structure shown in Figure 59 without 
the mediation of the actor relationship. In this and the following chapters some 
evidence is presented that the thematic roles do appear in the lexicon.
The contrast between Having and Being (the former has an actor-er and a 
theme-ee, the latter a theme-er and in some cases a landmark-ee, see Figure 49) 
demonstrates that er and ee are distinct from the thematic roles. This separation of 
properties is found in other frameworks also. As noted above (3.1.3), for example, in 
Goldberg's (2002) Construction Grammar the lexical structures of grammatical 
constructions are separated from those of specific words. Semantic relationships like 
Actor, Theme etc (participant roles), which are supported by the senses of words, 
instantiate the argument roles of phrasal constructions (these correspond to my er and 
ee), which are therefore schematic over them. The separation, in lexical structure and 
in the structures of sentences (constructs), of the two argument structures allows
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different verbs to elaborate different constructions differently: the argument structure 
of the construction may add or take away participant roles from the verb, or vice versa.
The WG framework, however, represents the distinction differently: rather than 
being properties of two different kinds of elements, the participant roles and the 
argument roles are simply different kinds of association supported by the same 
elements (events). This property of the WG framework is crucial in the treatment of 
specific examples in this and the following chapters, since it becomes clear there that 
both words and constructions may select both argument and participant roles.
Since the participant roles are defined in terms of sets of default properties, it is 
possible for more than one argument of a verb's sense to fit the bill for one or other 
participant role. This is the case for the verbs s p r a y  and l o a d . A s is well known, 
these two verbs can be used with objects referring to a thing or substance moved or to 
the place it is moved to. These two possibilities reflect two ways of interpreting the 
roles of the participants (of choosing which participant best fits the patient model, and 
is therefore linked to ee and thence to object).
In these cases the lexical properties of the syntactic relationship (here object) 
can be added to those of the verb. Where the two are not in conflict, they are simply 
merged. For example, since LOAD does not select either of its non-subject arguments as 
an incremental theme, this property is assigned to the object-linked argument by the 
semantics of the ee relationship (160) (the mechanics of this example are discussed in 
4.1.2.6).
(160) a. Larry loaded *(the) lorries with (the) lollies in 2 hours, 
b. Larry loaded *(the) lollies on (the) lorries in 2 hours.
When there is a conflict between the lexical properties of the construction and those of 
the verb, the construct is (usually) rendered incoherent. The two examples in (161) are 
unacceptable because the lexical structure of p o u r  specifies that the ee of its sense is a 
liquid (that is how the manner of pouring is defined) and that of COVER specifies that 
the ee of the sense ends up underneath something. These two requirements clash with 
the semantics of the construction.
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(161) a. * Polly poured the pot with water
b. *Corrie covered the quilt over the baby.
More examples of interactions between the lexical structures of the various 
elements within a sentence (construct) are given in the following chapters. In the 
following section I sketch WG analyses for the examples given above in (131)-(136), 
and in the next part (3.2) I investigate verbs of motion, giving particular attention to 
their linking properties, considering the linking of their subjects and objects and of 
other dependencies (prepositional complements and adjuncts).
3.1.5 The return of the great white hunter
At the beginning of this chapter I introduced some examples to illustrate the challenges 
faced by an account of linking. These examples are dealt with here:
The challenge I set above was to explain how the referents of the dependents of 
the verbs in (162)a and b are assigned their semantic roles, including how both refer to 
the death of a gazelle.
(162) a. The gazelle choked to death.
b. The hyena choked the gazelle to death.
The explanation is that the referents of the verbs in (162) are examples of Making’ and 
Becoming respectively. The simplest account for this is that the verb CHOKE must be 
able to have more than one sense: it is polysemous. Under this explanation c h o k e  has 
one causative sense and one unaccusative sense, which is the result of the former (it is 
possible that two sub-lexemes are involved). The details of this kind of polysemy are 
explored in 5.2. The expression to death in both of these examples defines the result of 
the Becoming event. The details of resultative expressions are explored in 4.2.
Next, I must explain the difference between the roles of the referents of the 
subjects in (162) and (163)a, and explain the unacceptability of (163)b.
(163) a. The hyena laughed.
b. *The gazelle laughed the hyena.
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Laughing is an event without a (lexical) result and this accounts for the difference in 
the interpretation of its subject: the thematic properties of the ers of causative and 
unaccusative events are not shared by other kinds of event. In chapter 5 I give an 
analysis of the variation in (162) that requires that participating verbs should have 
resultative senses, which l a u g h  lacks, which then rules out (163)b.
The examples in (164) and (165) are dealt with in the following part of this 
chapter, where I explain the pattern in terms of the interaction of verbal and 
prepositional semantics.
(164) a. The great white hunter drove on the river bed. 
b. The great white hunter drove onto the river bed.
(165) a. The great white hunter went on the river bed.
b. The great white hunter went onto the river bed.
The pattern in (166) was discussed above (1.2.3.3).
(166) a. The medicine man gave the hunter a charm,
b. The medicine man made the hunter a charm.
I offer no explanation for the pattern in (167), except to say (as I did above) 
that it appears to involve two alternative senses of the verb.
(167) a. The medicine man made the hunter (into) a god.
b. The medicine man made the lion's claw *(into) a charm.
3.2 Verbs of motion
3.2.1 Properties of verbs of motion: linking of subjects and objects; linking of 
prepositional complements; resultative expressions; aspectual properties
In this part of the chapter I describe the behaviour of verbs of motion. This provides an
opportunity to demonstrate the properties of the WG linking mechanism described
above. The linking properties of verbs of motion are particularly interesting because
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they can conflate agency and affectedness (changing position) and because they 
exercise varying control over prepositions and other adverbial elements other than 
subject and object. The discussion of verbs of motion in this chapter also prefigures 
some of the treatment of specific data in the following chapters.
As I show, a variety of verbs are used in constructions referring to motion 
events. As I also show, not all of these verbs behave alike, or appear in like 
constructions, but I nevertheless use the term verb of motion to describe them all 
collectively. Some of the verbs of motion are discussed in depth here.
In discussing the similarities and differences between the various verbs of 
motion, and the similarities in the behaviour of certain of these verbs and other verbs 
not involving motion, I am able to shed light on the nature of the semantic properties 
that determine how the verbs behave. By showing that the verbs of motion can be 
classified aspectually according to the same parameters as are responsible for the 
aspectual classification of non-motion verbs (see 1.2.3.2, chapter 4), I demonstrate that 
the contribution of the lexical semantics of these verbs to their syntactic behaviour is 
controlled by these general parameters (eg felicity), rather than by their semantic field. 
This supports Croft's claim (1990: 53, discussed in chapter 5) that syntactic behaviour 
is affected by predicate type (force-dynamic properties) but not by event class 
(thematic properties).
However, I also show that some of the properties of the verbs of motion derive 
from the nature of the activities and events they profile (the nature of motion itself), 
which contradicts this claim by demonstrating that thematic properties still have a part 
to play. For example, the lexically resultative verbs SEND and l a n d  do not have stative 
passive uses, unlike other lexically resultative verbs which do (see 4.2.2, 5.2.3.5):
(168) Wait until the ice has been/is completely frozen before attempting to cross.
(169) Wait until the message has been /*is completely sent before disconnecting the 
modem.
(170) Wait until the helicopter has been/* is completely landed before attempting to 
disembark.
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I argue below that this does not show that Landing is not a telic event (doesn't 
have a result), rather that its result (being on the ground) is not distinctive in that there 
is no difference between being on the ground as a result of landing and being on the 
ground for whatever other reason. A similar argument is advanced in 4.2.2 and in
5.2.3.5 to account for the absence of unaccusative uses of some causative verbs.
The linking of verbs of motion is interesting because of the wide range of 
constructions that they support. The subject may refer to an agent who acts on some 
other entity causing it to move (171) (some of these cases are further complicated by 
the "accompanied causation" constraint identified by Levin (1991: 31), see below 
5.2.1.4); or it may refer to a (sometimes agentive) entity that changes its place ((172) 
and (173)). The object, if there is one, may refer to a (usually passive) entity changing 
its place (171) or to the distance traversed (173) (or to an obstacle or other point on a 
path: jump the wall, cross the bridge). In some verbs of motion, the entity which is 
changing its location usually participates in an activity which causes the motion. In 
((171)a, b) Rollo and the barrel respectively move by turning over a horizontal axis, 
and similarly in ((172)a, b), but the (c) examples are different in that the cuboid moves 
by virtue of the rolling of some other element (the wheels of the trolley).
(171) a. Roddy rolled Rollo (down the stairs).
b. Roddy rolled (out) the barrel.
c. Roddy rolled the cuboid across the desk (on a trolley).
(172) a. Rollo rolled (down the stairs).
b. The barrel rolled (out).
c. The cuboid rolled across the desk (on a trolley).
(173) a. Wally walked the streets.
b. *The streets walked.
I also consider in this chapter the linking of dependents other than subject and 
object. Verbs of motion often appear with prepositional or other adverbials referring to 
properties of the movement (like the path), and as I show here the different verbs of 
motion do this in different ways. Some are selected by the verb and their contribution 
to the structures of sentences is therefore determined by the lexical structure of the
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verb; others are able to affect the structure of the sentence in a more radical way, as 
outlined below (3.2.3.1).
The treatment of path and result expressions with verbs of motion feeds into 
the treatment of resultative expressions in 4.2. I argue that (spatial) resultative 
expressions with verbs of motion are just a subset of resultative expressions more 
generally. I also show that some single-argument verbs of motion tolerate resultative 
constructions of two kinds, selected and non-selected (174), and that the same is true 
of some two-argument verbs of motion ((175) and (176)).
(174) a. Jimmy jumped clear of the falling debris.
b. Whenever he feels bad, Jimmy just jumps himself jolly.
(175) a. Sooty swept the crumbs off the floor.
b. Sooty swept the path clear.
c. Sooty swept himself exhausted/the bristles off the broom.
(176) a. Laurie loaded the lolly on the lorry.
b. Laurie loaded the lorry full.
c. Laurie loaded herself exhausted/her back sore.
In chapter 4 I also discuss verbs of motion with respect to their aspectual 
properties. Some verbs referring to motion events (like a r r iv e ) are necessarily telic 
while others (like s t r o l l ) clearly profile processes and still others (eg COME and to a 
lesser extent RISE) share some behaviour with both telic and non-telic verbs ((177) and 
(178)). The details of these examples are discussed in the following section and in 
chapter 4.
(177) a. Harry arrived in an hour, ['succeeded in arriving']
b. Cathy came in an hour, ['began/succeeded in coming']
c. Stacey strolled in an hour, ['began strolling']
d. Rosie rose in an hour, ['began rising']
(178) a. Harry arrived for an hour, ['arrived and stayed an hour']
b. Cathy came for an hour, ['came and stayed an hour']
c. Stacey strolled for an hour, ['passed an hour in strolling']
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d. Rosie rose for an hour, ['passed an hour in rising']
In chapter 5, I show that some verbs of motion are able to appear in both 
causative and unaccusative constructions (under appropriate circumstances) ((179) and 
(180)). There are also verbs of motion that can appear only in one or only in the other 
of these constructions ((181) and (182)).
(179) a. Jenny jumped (out (of) the window/up and down).
*)
b. Jenny jumped the horse/*her husband (out (of) the window/*up and down).
(180) a. Wally walked (to the Wal-Mart/up and down).
b. Wally walked the wardrobe/Wendy ?(to the Wal-Mart/up and down)
(181) a. Cathy came (out of the box).
b. *Carlos came Cathy (out of the box).
(182) a. *The ha'penny shoved (into the end zone).
b. Shelley shoved the ha'penny (into the end zone).
I address some of the issues raised above in the remainder of this chapter. First 
I look at two ways of classifying verbs of motion: according to the number of 
arguments (into transitive and intransitive verbs of motion); and into four classes 
according to specific features of their thematic structure which affect their behaviour 
with respect to constructions like those just identified. I explain and justify this 
classification in terms of the WG lexical structures of the verbs.
The four classes are distinguished from each other by their behaviour, and by 
the WG lexical structures presented in the following section, but it must be borne in 
mind that the classes are not internally homogeneous. For example, as noted above 
((179)b, (180)b) (and discussed in chapter 5), JUMP and w a l k  (both 'manner of motion 
verbs') differ as to their ability to be used in causative constructions without path 
expressions. At one level of analysis these differences within classes are ignored for 
expository purposes; they must nevertheless be dealt with at another level, partly in 
order to preserve the claim that there is some semantic feature shared by the verbs in 
question, and partly for themselves, since it is part of my goal to identify the thematic 
properties that distinguish the meanings of words from each other.
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In the course of the discussion I present the WG structures of the relevant verbs 
and constructions, developing a classification of (English) lexical structures referring 
to motion events. There I address the specific issues raised above and in the other 
chapters about the behaviour of these verbs with respect to resultative, causative and 
unaccusative constructions and address their aspectual and linking properties.
3.2.2 Classification of verbs of motion: one and two argument verbs of motion;
manner, path and result
I note above that the verbs of motion do not share all their properties. Verbs of motion 
can be classified in (at least) two ways: according to the number of their arguments 
into transitive and intransitive verbs of motion; and according to their thematic 
(conceptual) properties into manner verbs, path verbs etc. I address these 
classifications in order.
3.2.2.1 Transitive and intransitive verbs of motion
Intransitive verbs of motion (l a n d , g o , r is e , c y c l e , etc) appear with subjects 
referring to a moving entity. The referent of the subject may have many agentive 
properties (l a n d , GO, CYCLE), but it need not. In Rising, for example, the referent of 
the subject need have no particular properties at all. Other verbs make very specific 
demands on the argument. These are chiefly manner verbs (see below), since in many 
cases the specified manner makes intrinsic reference to specific properties of the agent. 
Walking, for example, presupposes at least two legs and Galloping presupposes at least 
four (if it does not demand that its argument be a horse, though cf Dick Turpin 
galloped past the inn). Ambling specifies manner, gait and mental state (relaxed): IThe 
string puppet ambled out o f the booth.
As well as exercising semantic control over the moving argument, some also 
specify properties of the movement: the speed (RUSH, p l u m m e t ), the path (r is e , 
b o u n c e ) or other spatial properties (l a n d , s p l a s h d o w n ) etc.
Some of these verbs have transitive uses {Larry landed the plane, Rocky rolled 
the barrel), where the subject refers to a causing agent and the moving argument is the 
referent of the object (though it is in some cases implicit that the referent of the subject 
also moves, as discussed below: Wally walked Wanda to the Wal-Mart).
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Most of the transitive verbs of motion have the same interpretation: the subject 
refers to an agent causing the movement of the referent of the object; again the agent 
may or may not move along with the other argument. These include verbs like p o c k e t , 
SEND, RAISE and CARRY. They exercise semantic control over either or both of the 
arguments as well as properties of the movement as with the intransitive verbs. Some 
have intransitive uses.
There is a further, small, set of transitive verbs of motion (f o l l o w , s t a l k , 
RIDE (We rode the wave into the harbour)) where both arguments necessarily move. 
These verbs differ from the other transitive verbs in that the direction and pace of the 
movement are determined by the referent of the object (if you stalk a stag, you must go 
where the stag chooses), though some assign some agentive properties to the referent 
of the subject (McKay escorted the prisoner into the waiting prison van).
3.2.2.2 Path and manner
It is common to divide verbs of motion into path and manner verbs. This classification 
is found, for example, in Hoekstra (1984), Talmy (1975, 1985) and in Levin (1993) 
and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) where the classes are called "verbs of 
inherently directed motion" and "verbs of manner of motion" respectively. Levin's 
verbs of inherently directed motion include ADVANCE, a r r iv e , c o m e , EXIT and RISE 
(1993: 263) and her manner of motion verbs include (nonagentive) f l o a t , r o l l  and 
SLIDE and (agentive) FROLIC, WADDLE and WALK (ibid: 264-267).
Shortly I offer a classification in terms of two properties that divides verbs of 
motion into more than two classes, but first I give a brief account of the distinction 
given in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995).
Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim that the first class (the inherently directed 
verbs, which profile a directed change in their single argument) are unaccusative 
whereas the second class (the manner verbs, which do not) are unergative (in Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav only the intransitive verbs are treated as verbs of motion) (ibid: 
146-148). The manner verbs, however, have a special property, which is that they may 
be used with a "directional phrase" (ibid: 183) ((183), (184)), and that they are 
unaccusative when used in this directed sense (ibid: 185).
159
(183) The raft floated onto the rocks.
(184) Wally waddled into work.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav offer the following evidence. In (some) languages 
where there is a choice of auxiliaries in perfect tenses, the BE equivalent is used, 
instead of the default h a v e , when the direction phrase is present ((185) shows an 
example from Dutch) (ibid: 184);
(185) Willy heeft gewiebeld/is naar het kantoor gewiebeld.
Willy has wobbled /is to the office wobbled
In English, manner verbs can be used with resultative expressions predicated of the 
subject (186) or of a non-selected object (187) (ibid: 186-187). Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav point out that only a very limited class of adjectives or other "directional 
elements" (a p a r t , t o g e t h e r , a w a y , etc) can appear in constructions like (186), and 
that they must be able to refer to a (change of) location, but there are no semantic 
constraints on the kind of construction seen in (187).
(186) Darcy danced free of the trap.
(187) Darcy danced herself dizzy/her pumps to shreds.
Finally, the manner verbs have (in some cases limited) causative transitive uses as in
(188), (189). The fact that these cases have causative uses is taken to indicate that they 
are unaccusative in their intransitive use, and it is for this reason that they (mostly) 
require the direction phrase in the causative use: it is this that makes them unaccusative 
in the first place (ibid: 188).
(188) Gary galloped the horse for 2 hours.
(189) The scientists ran the mouse *(round the maze).
160
3.223  Manner, path and result
In this section I develop an alternative thematic classification of verbs of motion, based 
on the semantic relationships manner, path and result. I present relevant examples and 
sketch an account for them using these three relationships.
Non-selected resultative expressions (resultative expressions predicated of non- 
lexical arguments, see 4.2.2.3) do select among the verbs of motion in the way that 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) claim ((190)-(193)). The manner verbs allow non­
selected resultative expressions predicated of a reflexive dummy object, or of a full 
object; none of the other verbs do.
(190) Sally cycled herself fit/the wheels off her bike.
(191) *The sun rose itself visible/the valley lighter
(192) * Cassie came herself breathless/the party complete.
(193) *Andy arrived himself happy/the meeting quorate.
However, they can all appear with a selected resultative expression (one 
referring to a (change of) location). And the selection of the resultative expression 
divides the verbs of motion in a different way:
(194) a. Julie cycled in the circus, [not resultative: 'Julie cycled while in the circus']
b. Julie cycled into the circus.
c. Julie cycled clear.
(195) a. The sun rose in the sky. [not resultative: 'the sun rose while in the sky']
b. The sun rose into the sky.
c. The sun rose clear of the trees.
(196) a. Cassie came in the room.
b. Cassie came into the room.
c. Cassie came away.
(197) a. Andy arrived in the boardroom.
b. *Andy arrived into the boardroom.25
25 It is true that guards on British trains commonly say things like We will shortly be arriving into 
London Euston, which contradicts what I say about these verbs throughout this chapter. It is not clear to
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c. Andy and Sandy arrived together, [not resultative: 'they arrived at the same 
time']
Spatial in  receives a locative interpretation when it appears with c y c l e  and r is e  
((194)a and (195)a refer to cycling event contained by the circus and a rising event 
contained by the sky respectively), but with COME and a r r iv e  it receives a resultative 
interpretation (the mover ends up in the relevant location in (196)a and (197)a). COME 
can also be used with in t o , where it receives a similar interpretation, as can c y c l e  and 
RISE, but a r r iv e  cannot be used with in t o  at all (197)b. Similarly, only the first three 
can be used with non-prepositional resultatives.
Finally, the aspectual properties of these verbs also separate CYCLE and RISE 
from COME and a r r iv e . The first two refer to unbounded events in the absence of a 
path expression, or other delimiter, whereas the last two refer to bounded events even 
in the absence of a delimiter ((198)-(201), this test for boundedness was introduced 
above (1.2.3.2) and is discussed at length in the following chapter).
(198) a. Sally cycled for/*in two hours.
b. Sally cycled into town for/in two hours.
(199) a. The balloon rose for/*in two hours.
b. The balloon rose into the sky for/in two hours.
(200) Cassie came (into the room) for/in two hours.
(201) Andy arrived (in the room) for/in two hours.
The preposition IN, in this use, refers to the length of time it took to complete some 
bounded event, which is why it is incompatible with the unbounded events in (198)a 
and (199)a (in the following chapter I note that there is a possible interpretation for 
these examples, where the preposition refers to the length of time it took for the event 
to (be) start(ed)). The preposition f o r , in this use, refers to the duration of some 
unbounded event or state; in (198)a and (199)a it refers to the duration of the activity
me what this usage signifies, but it may be related to the use o f the progressive in these cases. Note that 
station announcements are typically o f the form The next train to arrive at platform 4....
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(event) referred to by the verb; in all other cases it refers to the duration of the final 
(result) state.
The facts in (200) and (201) suggest that the lexical semantic structures of 
COME and ARRIVE include a result, which is a location. This view is supported also by 
the data in (194)-(197): only these two cause locative in  to be interpreted as a result.
The data in (194)-( 197) also suggest that the lexical structures of the three 
verbs c y c l e , r is e  and c o m e  include (or can include) a path and that that of a r r iv e  
does not: in t o  refers to a path, identified by its end point so its referent can fill the 
path slot for the first three, and is incompatible with the last.
The behaviour of CYCLE and RISE in (198)b and (199)b suggests that when the 
senses of these verbs are provided with a path specifying an end point they receive a 
result at the same time (when the preposition is present, they behave just like the 
resultative verbs in the other two examples). This follows from the nature of the path 
relationship. When an event has a path, it is bounded by that path (to the extent that 
the path is bounded): the end of the path is the end of the event. In the case of the verbs 
of motion, where there is a causal relationship between the motion event and the 
traversing of the path, the end of the path is therefore the result of the motion event. 
The relevant lexical structures are given below.
In the light of this, the data in (190)-(193) (particularly (190)) seem rather 
confusing: if cycling has a path (and therefore an implicit spatial result), then why does 
CYCLE permit non-spatial resultative expressions? The answer to this question (again, 
given in more detail below) is that cycling does not necessarily have a path. Cycling, 
by itself, is an activity which can be undertaken for purposes of fitness, enjoyment etc, 
or for no purpose at all. Nevertheless, there is a strong association between cycling and 
motion (because there is a strong association between bicycles and motion), which is 
realised in a (lexical) subclass of cycling which does have a path; this subclass has 
more general Cycling as its manner. So the verbs in (190) and (198)b have, in fact, 
different senses one of which is a subset of the other. See Hudson and Holmes (2000) 
for a detailed analysis of the various uses of the verb c y c l e .
The examples given in this section separate all four verbs from each other in 
one way or another, as do the explanations I have offered. The differences are as 
follows: CYCLE refers to an undirected activity, a salient subclass of which has a path
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like the directed motion verbs; r is e  refers to a (not inherently bounded) event, defined 
by its path; COME refers to an event with a path which is also bounded by the presence 
of a result; a r r iv e  refers to a simple resultative event. We should also expect to find 
verbs with both manner and path, and with manner and result, and perhaps even with 
all three, p l u m m e t  provides a possible example of the first, s c a r p e r  of the second and 
p l u n g e  of the third.
The transitive verbs of motion can be classified, thematically, according to the 
same principles:
(202) Shorty shovelled the coal in(to) the hole/his hands raw.
(203) Maisy lifted Eddie in(to) the loft/*her back sore.
(204) Timmy took his anaconda in(to) the pool/*the swimmers uneasy.
(205) Penny penned the sheep in(*to) the yard/*herself exhausted.
The relationship between the one and two argument verbs of motion is explored in the 
following section.
3.2.3 Linking properties of verbs of motion: manner, path and result
The linking properties of these groups of verbs are, like the linking properties of all 
words, determined by properties of their meanings. Above I showed that the semantic 
relationships result, path and manner classify the verbs of motion into the relevant 
classes. It should be clear, however, that not all the members of each class behave in 
the same way in all cases.
For example, the three manner verbs s h o v e l , b o u n c e  and s l it h e r  differ as to 
whether they can be used in one or two argument constructions. SHOVEL, which refers 
to an activity defined by the instrument, cannot be used in unaccusative constructions 
and SLITHER, which refers to an activity defined by the mover, cannot be used in 
transitive constructions. These contrast with BOUNCE, which refers to an activity 
defined in terms of properties of the path and can be used in both transitive and 
intransitive constructions. In this way, the thematic properties of the verbs serve to 
further subdivide the class of manner verbs.
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In the rest of this section I deal with the four classes of verb o f motion in turn, 
looking at their linking properties. I investigate how specific thematic properties affect 
the selection of subjects, objects and various prepositional complements and adjuncts.
3.2.3.1 Manner of motion verbs
The manner of motion verbs form a very large set (I estimate that there are over 400 in 
Levin 1993): the range of things that can be implicated in motion is very wide. 
Because of the sheer size of the set, and its heterogeneity, the members exhibit a range 
of linking properties. The manner verbs are distinguished by their thematic content (the 
constant, in terms of the predicate argument approach to semantic structure discussed 
in 2.2.1.1). More specifically, they are distinguished by particular thematic properties 
of particular elements of the argument structure. Some (like SCHLEP) refer to properties 
of the causing agent; some (like SHOVEL) refer to properties of the instrument; some 
(like f l u t t e r ) refer to properties of the motion; and some (like SLOSH) refer to 
properties of the moving element. These four groups are dealt with in turn:
> causer selecting verbs
(206) CARRY, PUSH, SCHLEP, KICK, TOSS, LOB.26
These verbs are defined in terms of properties of the causer of their sense. 
Carrying and Pushing specify particular physical activities that the causer must engage 
in; Schlepping additionally implies the causer's attitude to the relevant physical 
activity; Kicking, Tossing and Lobbing refer to particular limbs, as well as to specific 
activities involving them.
None of these verbs can be used in unaccusative constructions, presumably 
because of the requirements placed on the causer. They permit spatial (ie semantically 
selected, see 4.2.2) resultative expressions predicated of the mover (the referent of the 
object) (207); to the extent that they can be used intransitively with understood objects 
(which is not great), they also permit non-selected resultative expressions predicated of 
non-selected objects (208).
26 Most o f the verbs named in this section are collected from Levin (1993). The classification is mostly 
my own.
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(207) Jonny kicked the ball between the posts.
(208) Jonny kicked himself silly/England into the record books.
Many belong to other thematic classes, because of the same properties that 
qualify them for membership here. For example, KICK can also be used as a "verb of 
contact" in the same constructions as h it .
Figure 60 shows a partial lexical structure for CARRY. The sense, Carrying, has 
an er and an ee. The er must hold the ee and move. All the manner of motion verbs 
entail an example of Moving in their semantic structures. Moving itself has a path, so 
these verb senses implicitly inherit the path from above. The consequences of this for 
the linking properties of these verbs are explored above. Moving itself has no result 
but, again as explored above, when the path is defined by an end point, this location is 
construed as the result o f the motion event. The parts of the path (the parts of a path are 
locations: isa At) share their er with the er of the moving.
At
part
Holding
■Moving -■'P3**1er.
ee
er
Carrying
sense
CARRY 
Figure 60 c a r r y .
> instrument selecting verbs
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(209) BRUSH, CART, CYCLE, PUNT, ROW, SCRAPE, SCRATCH, SHOVEL, WHEEL, YACHT.
These verbs are defined in terms of the properties of the instrument of their 
sense; many are named after (share their form with a noun referring to) the relevant 
instrument. They can be used in causative and unaccusative constructions, depending 
on the nature of the instrument (Shovelling is necessarily causative; Punting can be 
causative or unaccusative; Yachting can only be unaccusative). Both kinds permit 
resultative expressions predicated of the mover {shovel coal into the hole, yacht over to 
Cowes).
Again, to the extent that they can be used with understood objects, they also 
permit non-selected resultative expressions: shovel yourself sore!the handle o ff the 
spade. Related to this possibility is the fact that some of these verbs additionally 
permit resultative expressions predicated of a landmark (the place the mover moves to 
or from: brush the stones with!free o f  sand, shovel the hole full! clear o f  coat). The use 
of the prepositions w it h  and OF in these examples matches their use in constructions 
with verbs like FILL and EMPTY.
Figure 61 shows a partial lexical structure for p u n t  (in fact for the verb p u n t / v 
and the related noun PUNT/n). The sense, Punting, has an er who stands in a punt and 
uses a pole with the result that both punter and punt move (this is shown by a set 
comprising two separate motion events), which is also the purpose of Punting. The 
semantic structure does not specify which moving entity is the ee (it is vague in this 
regard) so the same structure allows for both causative and unaccusative uses (punt 
into the lagoon!punt the barge along the tunnel).
167
Set Vehicle
Pole purpose
I Moving
J  f -
^ ^T^membe\^merr^ bey 
------------ ee---------
Using ,er
•result"
Boat-er
purposeer er.
Punting ;Punt
sensesense
PUNT/nPUNT/v
basebase.
{punt} 
Figure 61 PUNT.
> motion selecting verbs
(2 1 0 )  BOUNCE, FLOAT, FLUTTER, ROLL, SLIDE, WOBBLE, DAWDLE, BUZZ, ZOOM.
These verbs are defined in terms of properties of the movement itself. Relevant 
properties include the trajectory (BOUNCE), the pace (d a w d l e ) and an accompanying 
noise (BUZZ). All can appear in unaccusative constructions (A butterfly fluttered by), 
and many can appear in causative constructions too (Zadie zoomed the plane over the 
rooftops), though some make additional demands on the mover (the er of Dawdling 
has a specific attitude to the movement; that of Fluttering has specific physical 
properties), and these are excluded in causative constructions.
Both causative and unaccusative uses support resultative expressions 
predicated of the mover {Felicity floated the frigate I The frigate floated free o f the 
reef). None of these verbs supports landmark resultatives i f  The storm floated the 
harbour fu ll o f  jellyfish), though some allow non-selected resultative expressions {roll 
yourself sick/the carpet bare). Some verbs (eg WOBBLE) refer to movement internal to 
the mover, and to this extent they approximate to the verbs in the following category.
168
Figure 62 shows a partial lexical structure for d a w d l e . Dawdling is a kind of 
moving; the speed is slow; the dawdler is relaxed and one person's dawdling results in 
someone else's impatience.
> mover selecting verbs
(211) BACKPACK, CRAWL, CYCLE, DANCE, GALLOP, SLITHER, STOMP, WALK, DRIBBLE, 
DRIZZLE, SLOSH.
These verbs are defined in terms of properties of the moving argument. 
Crawling and Walking specify physical activities; Backpacking, Dancing and 
Stomping additionally specify social or attitudinal properties; Galloping selects a 
particular species (or genus?); Slithering specifies physical properties of the mover 
(slimy), as do Dribbling and Sloshing (liquid).
All verbs have unaccusative uses (backpack round Europe) and some have 
causative uses (gallop Silver into the corral), though (as before) some make such 
specific demands on the mover that this possibility is excluded (c r a w l , s l it h e r , 
s t o m p ). All support mover resultative expressions. Some additionally support 
landmark resultative expressions (drizzle the avocado with oil). They do not readily 
permit non-selected resultatives.
Figure 63 shows a partial lexical structure for GALLOP, which is polysemous (it 
has two senses, see chapter 5). The sense Galloping/c is a causative event whose result 
isa (unaccusative) Galloping. The er of Galloping is a horse and steps with each of its
Impatient
Moving
Relaxing
Dawdling
t
sense
DAWDLE
Figure 62 d a w d l e
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four legs in turn in a specific order. I do not show all the part relationships between the 
er and its legs, or between the Galloping and its parts (the steps) since they would 
render the diagram practically unreadable.
MovingLeg
RidingHorse
V er ee
Hind result.
Right leg Left leg
GaUoping/cGallopingetc
sensesensetim< ee eeee
-tim< Fastee
,tim<
GALLOP
time
Stepping
Figure 63 g a l l o p
3.2.3.2 Path verbs
(212) d r o p , h o is t , l if t , l o w e r , r a is e . (Levin 1993: 114)
ADVANCE, ASCEND, CLIMB, DESCEND, MEANDER, PLUMMET, PLUNGE, RECEDE, 
r is e , s o a r , t u m b l e , (selected from ibid: 263; I have added p l u m m e t  and s o a r )
The path verbs form a small set in English ((212) contains all the examples to 
be found in Levin (1993)). Most seem to refer to vertical paths. The path verbs can be 
divided into transitive (causative) and intransitive (unaccusative) classes, since none of 
them can be used in both constructions (causative PLUNGE seems to be a resultative 
path verb, like those in the next section). Both kinds support mover resultative 
expressions; none supports non-selected resultative expressions.
Some of these verbs can be used with an object referring to a landmark (climb 
the stairs), after the model of those other verbs like CROSS, p a s s  and ROUND, for which 
this is the usual linking arrangement. Note that the referent of the object is not 
perceived as affected in these cases (they do not support landmark resultatives).
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Figure 64 shows a partial lexical structure for r is e . Rising has an er and a path, 
which is defined in terms of two parts, one of which is higher than the other and has a 
later time. The parts of the path have the same er as the rising (see Figure 60).
Moving Before
V
•timi
i art'-path-er-
ee
Rising
part-
sense
er.
RISE
Figure 64 RISE
Because their semantics contains a path, these verbs combine readily with 
prepositions like INTO that profile paths; if the preposition refers to a bounded path the 
combined interpretation is a telic one. Since the path is unbounded, these verbs do not, 
by themselves, have telic interpretations however, and they also do not support 
resultative use of prepositions referring to locations.
3.2.3.3 Path and result verbs
(213) COME, GO. BRING, TAKE, CRAM, LOAD, SCATTER, SPRAY.
These verbs are essentially like the path verbs (they are also divided into 
causative and unaccusative, the latter represented only by COME and GO), with the 
added property that they refer to bounded events. This is because the path in their 
lexical semantic structure is defined in terms of its end. The end of the path may be 
determined deictically (c o m e , b r in g ) or by some specification of the effect on the 
mover (s c a t t e r ) or the landmark (c r a m ). This last group has the same linking 
properties as the verbs like f il l . Many verbs can be used with both mover and 
landmark resultative expressions (cram the currants in the bag/the bag with currants).
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Figure 65 shows a partial lexical structure for sca tter . The verb has two 
senses: causative Scattering (Scooby scattered snacks on the stage/the stage with 
snacks) and unaccusative Scattering/u {The gang scattered when the police arrived). 
Scattering/u has a result, which is the same as the end of its path: a set of locations, 
with a large size, all of whose members are on the same surface (the properties of sets, 
and their effects on verbal semantics, are explored in the following chapter (4.1.2.1)). 
The unaccusative sense also has an er, which is the same as the er of (the members of) 
the result, but the causative sense does not specify whether the mover or the surface it 
moves to is to be construed as the ee. Like punting (see Figure 61), causative scattering 
is vague in this regard.
Many
Making Becoming
Surface
I ^path' 
Scattering/u
-member.Scattering resuh-
SCATTER
Figure 65 scatter
As observed above, these verbs support spatial resultatives referring to the path 
(into) and to the end of the path (in). These are always predicated of the mover, be it 
the referent of the subject or of the object. Because the result is built into the meaning 
of the verb, they do not permit non-selected resultatives.
3.2.3.4 Result verbs
(214) ARRIVE, DEPART, RETURN, INSERT, ESCAPE, LEAVE, LAND, (DIS)LODGE, CORRAL, 
JAIL, PEN, POCKET, DRAW (a SWOrd), OUST, REMOVE.
These verbs are defined solely in terms of their results: the mover arrives at a 
location. Some are deictic, and others select particular properties of their landmarks 
(l a n d , pocket); some make additional demands on the mover (c o r r a l , d r a w , jail, 
pen ). The deictics are either exclusively unaccusative or exclusively causative (with
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the exception of r e t u r n ) , but those that select landmarks may appear in either 
construction. The large set o f verbs that select movers are all named after ways of 
containing or controlling the mover, and these appear only in causative constructions.
Many permit mover resultatives, referring to a location as opposed to a path. In 
some cases, the lexical structure is so specific about the nature of the location that a 
resultative expression would be pleonastic (*pocket it in a pocket) (see 4.2.2.1).
There is a further class of resultative verbs that refer to the posture or attitude 
of the mover in the result state (these can usually also be used in stative constructions), 
including h a n g , l ie , l a y , s t a n d , c o il  and l o o p ; some of these are discussed below 
(5.2.1.3).
Figure 66 shows a partial lexical structure for ja il . Jailing has a result which 
isa In. Its er is the ee of Jailing and its ee (landmark) isa Jail, the sense of the noun 
JAiL/n. The verb can be used with a direct object referring to the ee, and may 
additionally take a resultative expression that refers to a specialisation of the concept 
Jail (They jailed Jamie in Pentonville). With or without the resultative expression, the 
interpretation is telic.
In Jail
result'
Jailing sense
sense
JAIL/n
JM L/v
base.  ^ ___ -base
^{jailT 
Figure 66 ja il
3.3 Summary
In the second part of this chapter I have presented some ways of classifying verbs of 
motion, according to transitivity and according to thematic properties, and I have
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identified three thematic properties that provide for an alternative classification. I have 
looked at the linking properties of the verbs of motion so classified and discussed how 
these are affected by the thematic properties.
Transitivity in verbs of motion depends on one of two properties: for some (the 
deictics like com e  and b r in g ) it is simply determined lexically; for others (those that 
select thematic properties of some participant) it is a consequence of thematic structure 
(arguments whose properties are selected are generally obligatory). The moving 
participant may be the referent of the subject or of the object; in the latter case the 
subject refers to a participant which causes (or is instrumental in) the movement (and 
may also move in doing so). Because of the agentive properties of referents of subjects 
(see above), when the subject refers to the mover it is common (though not obligatory) 
for the mover to be construed also as a causer. In some cases, the movement can be 
construed as affecting the landmark, in which case the verb can also appear with an 
object referring to that landmark.
The thematic properties of the verbs of motion also select specific prepositions, 
or specific interpretations of prepositions: those that have results impose a resultative 
interpretation on locative prepositions like in , and they also select particular kinds of 
result (insert in, remove from); those that have paths permit prepositions referring to 
those paths ( into , a l o n g  etc); those that can refer to movements affecting the 
landmark can appear with a preposition like WITH or OF whose complement refers to 
the argument that moves in relation to that landmark.
The linking framework I have outlined in this chapter has a number of 
properties. It permits some syntactic dependencies to be predicted on the basis of 
specific force-dynamic and thematic properties and provides a framework for 
accounting for variable behaviour on the basis of the same properties. In this 
framework the range of thematic relationships is in principle unlimited, as is the range 
of event types. The multiplicity of thematic relationships is reconciled with the 
categorical demands of syntax by means of the semantic relationships er and ee, which 
collect together the various properties associated with the referents of subjects and 
objects respectively in what are effectively prototype categories (in the sense of Taylor 
1995, 1998).
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For the sake of comparison, Jackendoffs approach to this same problem, as 
outlined above, is to admit an open ended list of thematic roles and link them to 
syntactic dependencies using variable linking rules; in Dowty’s approach, again as 
outlined above, the various thematic properties are collected together into two 
prototypes; Levin and Rappaport Hovav explicitly exclude thematic properties from 
affecting argument linking, recognising instead only a limited number of semantic 
roles defined in terms of argument structure; Davis and Koenig, Lemmens and 
Goldberg all allow a range of thematic roles, as determined by the event classes, which 
also determine their linking properties. The WG framework presented here obviously 
has much in common with Dowty's framework, though it shares with the class-based 
approaches the close relationship between event and role type.
175
4. Aspect and Resultative Expressions.
In this chapter I investigate the properties of aspect. Aspect is a classification of the 
meanings of utterances according to the temporal structure of the profiled event; the 
aspectual classes, as defined by Vendler (1967) and Croft (1998b), are introduced in 
the first section. The interpretation of an utterance is determined by a range of factors, 
including the linguistic and non-linguistic context, and in this chapter I look in 
particular at the properties of lexemes and of their linguistic contexts that affect the 
aspectual interpretation of utterances. A number of specific words and constructions 
are known to have aspectual properties (for example, progressive constructions refer to 
processes, the parent of temporal IN refers to a bounded event), and these can serve as 
diagnostics for the aspectual properties of verbs appearing in these constructions or 
alongside these words but they can also serve to explain changes in the interpretations 
of verbs brought about by the aspectual expression itself.
In the second half I look at a construction with a specific aspectual 
interpretation, the resultative construction. I show that the construction, which has a 
telic interpretation, can be used with lexically telic verbs (4.2.2.1), in which case they 
refer to the result built into the meaning of the verb, and with lexically non-telic verbs 
(4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3), in which case they constrain the interpretation of the verb by adding 
a result to its meaning. I provide a WG account of the structure of resultative 
expressions which proposes a resultative construction that can be used with non- 
resultative verbs and which matches the resultative portions of the structures of 
resultative verbs. On the way I consider some existing treatments of resultative 
expressions, including those framed in terms of syntactic unaccusativity.
4.1 Aspect: aspectual class; aspect in WG; aspect and the event type hierarchy
4.1.1 Aspectual classes: accomplishments, achievements and states
Vendler (1967) identifies four aspectually defined classes of event: activity, 
accomplishment, achievement and state. The identification of the classes derives 
from contrasts in the compatibility of members of each class with constructions that 
also refer to the aspectual properties of the event.
Activities and accomplishments are distinguished from achievements and states 
by the fact that the first two have internal structure (they have parts which are separate
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events). This difference is reflected in their compatibility with progressive (215) and 
simple (216) present constructions (ibid: 99). The present progressive refers to an 
event that forms part of an ongoing activity, and so is only compatible with those 
events that have internal structure (215). The simple present refers to an undivided 
state of affairs that holds at a (definite or indefinite) point in time, so it is compatible 
with states ((216)d) and with activities and accomplishments only when these are 
construed as states (a common outcome is that they receive a habitual interpretation) 
((216)a,b). The use of achievement words in simple present constructions ((216)c) is 
discussed below ((231), 4.1.2.5).
(215) a. I am pushing a pea.
b. I am killing a king.
c. *1 am recognising your mother.
d. *1 am knowing a good joke.
(216) a. I push peas.
b. I kill kings.
c. I recognise your mother.
d. I know a good joke.
Activities and accomplishments are distinguished from each other by the fact 
that the latter are inherently bounded. Vendler demonstrates this by combining each 
aspectual class with expressions referring to the duration of a process and the 
completion of an action ((217)-(221)) and by considering the entailments of each in 
progressive constructions ((222)-(224) these examples adapted from ibid: 100-101).
(217) How long did you push the pea for?
(218) *How long did it take you to push the pea?
(219) *How long did you kill the king for?
(220) How long did it take you to kill the king?
(221) I killed him/*pushed it in seven minutes.
(222) a. I am pushing a pea. 
b. I have pushed a pea.
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(223) a. I am killing the king,
b. I have killed the king.
(224) a. I am pushing a pea to Peterborough,
b. I have pushed a pea to Peterborough.
> The preposition for refers to the duration of an event: it imposes boundaries on an 
otherwise unbounded process. Pushing a pea is not inherently bounded (there is no 
specified completion), and so FOR can be used to set the boundaries (217); killing 
a king is, however, inherently bounded (it ends with the death of the king), so FOR 
cannot be used in this way (219).
> Expressions like How long did it take ((218), (220)) and some using in (221) refer 
to the extent of an already bounded process so they are compatible with, bounded, 
accomplishments (220) but not with, unbounded, activities (218).
> As well as being unbounded, activities are internally homogeneous (all parts are 
alike). When a activity is used in a progressive construction, it refers to part of an 
ongoing event, any part of which counts as an example of the same activity. It 
follows from this that if someone is engaged in an activity then they have been 
engaged in it for some time ((222)a entails (222)b).
> Since they have defined end points (which necessarily differ from other preceding
stages), accomplishments are not internally homogeneous:
"they also go on in time, but they proceed towards a terminus which is 
logically necessary to being what they are" (ibid: 101).
When an accomplishment is used in a progressive construction, it refers again to 
part of an ongoing event, but one where the parts of the event do not all count as 
examples of the same event (all parts before the end lack the end). It follows from 
this that if someone is engaged in an accomplishment they cannot yet be said to 
have accomplished it ((223)a does not entail (223)b). Notice that the same effect 
is achieved when an end point is added to the verb by some other construction 
((224)a does not entail (224)b).
Achievements and states are both incompatible with progressive constructions,
as noted above, because they do not have internal structure. An achievement consists
of a single transition occurring at a point in time; a state consists of a stable situation
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that extends indefinitely through time: ’’achievements occur at a single moment, while 
states last for a period of time" (ibid: 103). Achievement words can be used alongside 
temporal expressions referring to points in time (225); state words (like activity words) 
can be used alongside expressions setting the temporal bounds of the state (226).
(225) At which moment did you recognise her mother?
(226) How long have you known that joke?
On the difference between accomplishments and achievements, Vendler notes 
(ibid: 103-104) that, while the latter cannot appear in progressive constructions 
((215)c), because they refer to single moments in time, they can nevertheless be used 
with expressions referring to the length of time the event took to be completed:
(227) How long did it take you to recognise my mother?
(228) Miss Marple found the clue in five minutes.
Here, the period referred to is the time taken before the event itself occurred. (227) is
enquiring after the length of time that the hearer did not recognise the mother; (228)
refers to the length of time Miss Marple spent looking for the clue. Croft (1998b: 74)
calls these 'run-up achievements'. Vendler notes that they differ from similar
constructions with accomplishment words in that the event cannot be said to be (or
have been) taking place during the run-up period:
”[I]f I write a letter in an hour [writing a letter is an accomplishment], then 
I can say I  am writing a letter at any time during that hour; but if it takes 
three hours to reach the top [reaching the top is an achievement], I cannot 
say I  am reaching the top at any moment of that period." (1967: 104, my 
italics)
Croft (1998b) is more specific about the interaction between the aspectual 
properties of individual verbs and those of constructions, and classifies verbs 
according to their interpretations, rather than according to the constructions they can 
appear in (ibid: 73-74). He identifies a number of constructions that have aspectual 
properties ("aspectual grammatical constructions" ibid: 70-71), the simple present (/ 
play), the present progressive (/ am playing), the 'container adverbial' (in five minutes),
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the 'durative adverbial’ (for five minutes), 'punctual adverbials' like s u d d e n ly ,  the 
adverb ALMOST, 'prospective' be about to, and 'conative' try to; and four classes of 
event denoted by verbs, states, point states, processes and achievements, defined by 
whether they involve change and whether they extend in time. He shows how the 
interpretation of the various constructions is affected by the event structures of 
different verbs.
States (including 'point states' like being on time which are true only at a single 
moment) do not involve change. Non-states are divided into processes (writing letters), 
which extend in time, and achievements (shattering a window), which do not; some 
processes (the accomplishments) are also telic (naturally bounded) (writing three 
letters).
Like Vendler, Croft notes that the simple present is used to refer to ongoing 
states (those that are true at the time of speaking). When the verb lexically denotes a 
state, this is straightforward (229) (many of these examples are from Croft); when the 
verb denotes a process or achievement, the event must be somehow construed as a 
state, for example a habitual or generic property ((230), (231), see also (216) above).
(229) Jeff is a jerk, (ibid: 71)
(230) Tess plays the flute, (ibid: 69)
(231) Sudden stresses shatter concrete.
The present progressive refers to an ongoing process so here the situation is 
reversed: use of a verb denoting a process is unexceptional (232), but verbs denoting 
states require special interpretations ((233) refers to some specific, ongoing, action(s) 
of Jeffs that characterise(s) him as a jerk; (234) refers to a process of change in the 
extent to which the state of understanding holds).
(232) Tess is playing the flute, (ibid: 69)
(233) Jeff is being a jerk, (ibid: 71)
(234) I am understanding the semantics of aspect better and better every day. (ibid: 71)
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Verbs denoting achievements (which do not extend in time, and so cannot be construed 
by themselves as ongoing) also receive special interpretations in progressive 
constructions. (235) is interpreted iteratively (it involves several repeated 
achievements); (236) can be interpreted as slowing time to the point where the 
instantaneous transition in the state of the concrete does after all have an internal 
structure; (237) exemplifies Croft's 'run-up achievement' (Croft argues, contrary to 
Vendler, that examples like this are acceptable, and that the process referred to is one 
that is leading inevitably to the transition denoted by the verb). (236) might 
alternatively illustrate the use of the progressive to refer to imminent future events: It 
is decided: Shelly is shattering the concrete, you are sweeping up the shards, so here's 
your broom. This possibility is discussed below (4.1.2.5).
(235) Shelly is shattering concrete.
(236) Shelly is shattering the concrete.
(237) Help! She's dying! (ibid: 74)
The 'container adverbial' specifies the length of time from beginning to
completion of a telic event. It therefore requires the event to be construed as an
accomplishment (telic process). As before, this leads to a straightforward interpretation 
of verbs with matching profiles (238) and calls for special interpretations o f verbs with 
non-matching profiles. (239) shows that the container adverbial can be used with verbs 
profiling states, referring to the duration of a process culminating in the beginning of 
the relevant state; (240) shows that it can also be used with verbs profiling processes, 
referring to the duration of the process culminating in the beginning o f the relevant 
activity; (241) shows that it can also be used with verbs profiling achievements, 
referring to the run-up period.
(238) I wrote the letter in an hour, (ibid: 75)
(239) In two years, she was president of the company, (ibid: 77)
(240) The horse was galloping in two minutes, (ibid: 77)
(241) She fell ill and died in two weeks, (ibid: 76)
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The 'durative adverbial' refers to the duration of an otherwise unbounded state 
of affairs. It is therefore most natural with verbs denoting states or activities ((242), 
(243)). However, it is also compatible with verbs denoting telic processes (in (244) it 
refers to the duration of the state resulting from the accomplishment profiled by the 
verb) or achievements (in (245) it refers to the duration of a cyclic process consisting 
of a series of point transitions and in (246) to an iterated series of point transitions).
(242) She was president for two years.
(243) I slept for three hours, (ibid: 75)
(244) Patty put it in the pantry for three hours.
(245) The light flashed for five minutes, (ibid: 76)
(246) He shattered windowpanes for half an hour, (ibid: 76)
SUDDENLY profiles a pointlike transition. This is obviously most appropriate 
with achievements (247), though it is also compatible with state words ((248) refers to
the sudden inception of the relevant state), with activity words ((249) refers to the
sudden starting of the relevant activity) and with accomplishment words ((250) refers 
to an action that takes place punctually and so compresses the time taken between 
beginning and completion into a single moment).
(247) The window suddenly shattered (ibid: 75)
(248) Suddenly he was in a large cavern, (ibid: 78)
(249) Suddenly the horse galloped, (ibid: 78)
(250) She suddenly shut the door, (ibid: 78)
Finally, Croft uses the adverb alm o st , the 'prospective' be about to, and the 
'conative' try to to demonstrate that the structure of accomplishments (telic processes) 
requires two transition points (ibid: 78). These three constructions profile the processes 
running up to the inceptions of activities (251), achievements (252) and states (253), 
but are ambiguous with accomplishments, where they profile either the process 
running up to the inception (the first transition) or that running up to the completion 
(the second transition) (254).
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(251) She almost ran/was about to run/tried to run.
(252) The mouse almost squeaked/was about to squeak/tried to squeak.
(253) She almost was chair/was about to be chair/tried to be chair.
(254) She almost crossed the river/was about to cross the river/tried to cross the river.
In this section, I have presented Vendler's (1967) and Croft’s (1998b) aspectual 
categories. The two are in rough correspondence: both agree that events can be 
classified into states and non-states and that the latter consist of processes, bounded 
processes (accomplishments) and point transitions (achievements). They also both 
demonstrate (Croft with particular force) that, though particular verbs may be 
associated canonically with particular aspectual classes, all can be coerced into any of 
the other classes, by other words or constructions. Further, that it is the constructions 
that are used to identify the various classes that are responsible for this coercion.
It should also be clear that the aspectual classes are in some measure 
independent of event types of the sort discussed above (3.1.4). The state/non-state 
distinction is reflected in the event type hierarchy (3.1.4.2), but the classification of the 
non-states does not fully reflect their aspectual properties: Becoming, Creating and 
Making between them represent the telic events, some of each being achievements and 
some accomplishments, and the remainder (some in Happening and some in Affecting) 
are the non-telic events (processes/activities).
The partial correspondence between the two classifications follows from the 
nature of the classifying properties: the event types in the event type hierarchy are 
defined by the number and nature of the semantic roles they support and some of the 
properties of the various semantic roles are relevant to aspectual class (for example 
whether the affected argument undergoes a permanent change of state), whereas others 
are not (for example whether the affected argument is the same as the actor). Similarly, 
some of the defining properties of the aspectual classes are relevant in the selection 
and linking of argument roles (for example whether the event is telic - whether it has a 
result), whereas others are not (for example whether a telic event extends in time - 
whether the time of the causing event and that of the resulting event are different).
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The distinction between the temporal and causal properties of event structures
is also made by Croft:
”[T]he basic structure of events is causal: Event structure is part of the 
causal network that unfolds over time” (ibid: 79).
While the temporal structure of events interacts with their causal structure (and 
determines properties and interpretations of sentences as noted above), it is only the 
causal structure that determines the number and nature of the semantic roles associated 
with the event.
This leads to an analysis where the aspectual classes identified above are 
generalisations over different aspectual structure configurations. WG representations 
of the relevant generalisations are given in the following section, where I also explore 
the mechanism that governs the interaction of the aspectual class of the verb and that 
of the construction.
4.1.2 Aspect in WG: event classes; states and processes; telic and non-telic 
processes; point transitions; iteration
In this section I present a WG analysis of the various aspectual classes identified
above, expressed in terms of differences in semantic structure (both lexical and
compositional). These differences in semantic structure explain the interactions with
the various constructions discussed above. As in Jackendoffs (1992) analysis (which is
briefly presented here too for comparison), the semantic structures that define the
aspectual classes are used also in the analysis of semantic number and other properties
of the referents of nouns.
Unlike that analysis, this one does not express the differences in terms of
binary features, rather in terms of network structures of the sort already discussed at
length. This makes the WG analysis both more explanatory (the semantic structures
explain the interactions between words and constructions) and more flexible (different
words' senses have different sets of the properties that identify the aspectual classes:
for example, Flashing and Dying are both classified as achievements, yet It flashed all
day receives an iterated interpretation where She died all day does not). This is an
important property of the WG analysis (and one which surfaces throughout the thesis).
In the current section it means, among other things, that the separation of events into
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four distinct aspectual classes is not possible (for presentational purposes, and because 
they do represent significant generalisations, I keep the terms for the aspectual 
classes).
I begin with a classification of entities in WG.
4.1.2.1 Classes of entity; classes of event
Jackendoff (1992), working in the framework of Conceptual Semantics (Jackendoff 
1976, 1983, 1987, 1990), develops a feature-based account of noun phrase semantics. 
"Using the strong formal parallelism between noun phrase semantics and event 
structure that is a hallmark of the Conceptual Semantics approach" (1992: 9), an idea 
which he also traces to Bach (1986), Gruber (1976), Langacker (1987) and Talmy 
(1978) among others, he applies this account to an analysis of aspect and event 
structure.
Jackendoff identifies four classes of concept defined by the two "fundamental 
conceptual features" (1992: 18) +/-b (bounded) and +/-i (internal structure). These 
features apply to both objects ("Material Entities]") and events ("event/process" 
1992: 20). The table shows the four classes; the descriptions of the objects and events 
in each class, and the examples provided, are from Jackendoff (ibid: 20).
+b -b
-i
individuals (a pig)
closed events 
(John ran to the store)
substances (water)
unbounded homogeneous processes 
(John slept)
+i
groups (a committee)
bounded iterative events 
(The light flashed until dawn)
aggregates (buses, cattle)
unbounded iterative processes 
(The light flashed continually)
Table 3. Four classes of objects and events.
Bounded elements are differentiated from unbounded ones by consideration of 
their parts: unbounded elements can be divided up into parts (or portions), which still 
count as a token of the same element (water can be divided into portions which can be 
described as water), whereas bounded elements cannot (the parts of a pig cannot be 
described either as a pig or as pigs). The feature b distinguishes plurals and mass
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nouns on the one hand from singular count nouns on the other (a set of buses can be 
divided up into parts also describable as sets of buses, though not without limit). 
Unbounded elements can have distributive locations (255); the property carries over 
into events with unbounded arguments (256) (ibid: 19).
(255) a. There was water all over the floor.
b. There were books all over the floor.
c. *There was a book all over the floor.
(256) a. Bill ate custard until dawn.
b. Bill ate hotdogs until dawn.
c. *Bill ate a hotdog until dawn.
The feature i distinguishes mass nouns from plurals. Elements with internal 
structure (whether bounded or unbounded) consist of sets of more or less 
homogeneous members.
The WG analysis presented here makes the distinction between differentiated 
elements (things) and undifferentiated substance (stuff) basic: it appears at the top of 
the isa hierarchy. This distinction closely matches that made by Jackendoffs 
boundedness feature, except that, as I show, aggregates are counted under things; it 
also matches the distinction made by Jackendoffs +/-i, except that individuals are 
counted as +i (they have parts). The relevant structure is shown in Figure 67.
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.part
Location
Range
plaC^ N i  ^  
substance Stuff
.size'
Thing
Curly
substance Wate r
•m2-
NumberSet
Amount
Measun size—
: u b stan ce .
size
Committee
Figure 67 Stuff and Things.27
> Stuff is identified by the fact that it occupies a range of space (its place 
isa Range; Range itself will prove to be a kind of set (an aggregate, see 
below), though this is not shown here).
>  Stuff has a substance (which will prove to be a kind of part); the 
substance is itself stuff, and in the subclasses (Water is shown) the 
substance is a token of the parent (it has all the same properties).
> A thing occupies a single location (Location itself isa Thing), rather 
than a range, and has a size (it is bounded).
> Things have parts (contrary to Jackendoffs claims, I argue that 
individuals do have parts; for example pigs have tails, trotters etc). The 
parts of a thing are, by definition different (and different in kind) from 
the thing they are the parts of (a pig’s tail is a tail, not a pig).
> Sets are a special kind of thing, in that the parts are members. The 
members (there are always at least 2) are homogeneous. This is shown 
in the diagram by the fact that both members inherit from the same 
category. Notice that this homogeneity is a matter of degree/construal:
271 i is not immediately clear that Stuff and Thing need to have a common parent. They do have some 
properties in common (both have a place for example), and for this reason a common parent C is shown.
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the parts of a pig for example share a common ancestor (body part), 
though they are not construed as a set (except for example in the 
referent of the phrase parts o f  a pig).
> A set may have a place, which is a range. The parts of the place (which 
are locations) are the same as the places of the members. Since the 
parts of a range are locations (and therefore Things), and since they are 
all locations (and therefore form a homogeneous group), it follows that 
they are members (Range must isa Set) (Figure 68).
piace^
Figure 68 The place of a set is a range.
> The size of a set is a number (the number of the members).
> Mass nouns clearly refer to stuff, and singular count nouns to things. Some count 
nouns (eg c o m m it t e e ) refer to sets, as do plural nouns {three little pigs refers to a 
set of pigs, each of which is little (see Figure 69)).
three little pigs
Figure 69 three little pigs
> Other (count) nouns refer to Amounts (eg a pound o f butter). An amount has a 
unit size, and its place is a location. Exceptionally, it has a substance (a substance 
is a part which isa Stuff).
Set
member'member
Range
■member
referent
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Stuff
substance 
¥
Amount
Butter
Pound
7
substance /
*  V
P o u n d o fb u tte r  
Figure 70 Butter; pound of butter
An amount can also have as its substance the referent of a plural count noun (eg a 
pound o f  peas). In this case, the substance is an Aggregate, which is a set 
construed as some stuff. This is only possible when the members are sufficiently 
homogeneous (similar to each other). Arguably, things like rice are always 
aggregates, rather than stuff, because they consist of a number of individuals, 
though this property is not foregrounded.
Because the elements of which an aggregate is composed are (construed as being) 
so small and so homogeneous, it is as if it has no part which is not a token of the 
same aggregate (see Figure 71).
The places of sets (which are themselves sets) can also be construed as aggregates, 
to the extent that the places of their members approximate to each other. The 
places of aggregates are necessarily construed as aggregates.
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-placmembei— ^
Set
member
place
■plac
substanc
xegate
substanceplace^
■substance
Rice
Figure 71 Set and Aggregate.
> The examples given above are of entities. The claim is, however, that the same 
system of classification also applies to events (predicates). This means that the 
hierarchy given in Figure 67 must be merged with the event type hierarchy given 
in 3.1.4.2. This is achieved using multiple inheritance, as shown in Figure 72.
-time
Predicate
.time";imi EventState
actor'therm
member
member
-tim<OccasionPeriod
Process
substanceA
Stuff
Set
Time
A
Thing
Figure 72 States and Events.
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> Predicates have ers and times. Some (the states) isa Stuff and some (the events) isa 
Thing (are things). States (represented by Being) and Events have the thematic 
properties discussed above (3.1.4.3): the er of a state is its theme; the er of an 
event is its actor.
>  The time of an event is an occasion (a point in time); the time of a state is a period 
(which also isa Stuff). Notice that this pattern matches that of the places of Stuff 
and Thing (Figure 67): the temporal properties of states and events are parallel to 
their spatial properties.
> Just as there are sets of entities, there are also sets of events. These have times,
which are periods whose members are the times of the members of the set, unless
they are sufficiently similar to count as the substance of an aggregate. Again, this
is the same pattern as was given above for the places of sets. A set of similar
events with different times corresponds to Vendler's category of processes:
"[RJunning, writing and the like are processes going on in time, that is, 
roughly, [that] they consist of successive phases following one another in 
time.” (1967: 99).
Walking consists of a set of successive steps (acts of stepping), writing of a set of 
successive acts of writing a single character etc.
> Vendler contrasts these processes with states, which are not sets but rather single
states of affairs that persist through time:
" [A] 1 though it can be true of a subject that he knows something at a given 
moment or for a certain period, knowing and its kin are not processes 
going on in time.” (ibid: 99-100)
4.1.2.2 Canonical uses o f ’simple' and 'continuous' present
Verbs profiling states and processes are canonically associated with different tenses in 
the present: states with the 'simple' and processes with the 'continuous' present. This is 
illustrated in (215) and (216) above, and in (257) and (258). Under the present account, 
this must follow from the interaction of the lexical semantic structures of the verbs 
(specifically, their aspectual properties) with those of the two 'tenses'.
(257) Ashley understands aspect.
(258) Wally is walking.
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A present tense verb refers to a lasting state of affairs true at the time of 
speaking (a state whose time is a period including the time of the utterance);28 a 
present progressive refers to a process (ie a set) ongoing at the time of the utterance. 
These properties are represented in the structures given in Figure 73 and Figure 75.
t
referent
-time-^
\
part
V
'  x time Present-------
Figure 73 The present tense.
> Present is a lexical category. Present tense verbs inherit the properties given in 
Figure 73 from the inflectional category alongside the properties of their lexeme, 
by multiple inheritance (see 1.2.2). A partial structure of (257) is given in Figure 
74.
Period 
V
Being  t i m e ^ ^
•
\t ' J
sense -
[^^-tim e 
Ashley understands aspect
rG^ Understanding part
UNDERSTAND Present
Figure 74 Ashley understands aspect.
> The sense of understands, which is derived from the lexeme u n d e r s t a n d , is a 
state. The referent of understands (the meaning of the utterance) is a token of the
28 Croft notes that the simple present may also be used in the case of'point states' as in It is midnight 
(1998b: 70). Here the time o f the referent is exactly the same as that o f the utterance.
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sense, and so also a state; its time is a period, part of which is the same as the time 
of the utterance.
> Present participle is another lexical category and again verbs can inherit properties 
from it alongside their own lexical properties. In the present progressive, PresPart 
is used as the complement of present tense BE, the properties of the construct 
deriving from those of the participle and those of its parent. Present tense b e  
contributes the temporal properties of the present tense (Figure 73) and takes its 
referent from its complement (as is common for b e ); the complement contributes 
its own semantics, which include the specification that the referent is a set. This is 
specific to the construction, and overrides the normal referent of BE (which isa 
Being). A partial structure of (258) is given in Figure 76.
Set
Presentpartic iple
Present referent
referent
.complement
Figure 75 The present progressive.
Set
referent Walkingmember
referent
WALK
Wally is walking
Present PresPart
Figure 76 Wally is walking.
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> The sense of walking, derived from the lexeme WALK, is a set. The referent, which 
is also the referent of is (and so the meaning of the utterance), also is a set and 
again its time is a period, part of which is the same as the time of the utterance.
4.1.2.3 Non-canonical uses of 'simple' and 'continuous' present
As noted above, Croft (1998b) points out that, in appropriate contexts or with 
appropriate interpretations, many verbs (and adjectives) can be used in non-canonical 
constructs. So a verb whose sense is a state can be used in a progressive construction
(259) and a verb whose sense is a process can be used in a 'simple' present construction
(260).
(259) Ashley is understanding aspect more and more each day.
(260) Wally walks.
Far from undermining the analyses for the aspectual classes and the constructions 
given above, these examples actually support it, because the interpretations under 
which they are possible depend on the meaning of the verb being coerced to conform 
to that of the construction. Partial structures of (259) and (260) are given in Figure 77 
and Figure 78.
Greater than
membern'
referent '  J S
/ referent ^
/ Understanding
\ sense
\  /
Ashley is understanding <*P** more and more each day
Figure 77 Ashley is understanding aspect more and more each day.
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> Since the lexical structure o f the progressive requires that its referent be a process 
(a set), a process is made out of the sense of the verb in order to make the 
construct coherent. In this case, this takes the form of a set of states of 
understanding, taking place on successive days and with progressively greater 
magnitudes.
> The referent of is (and therefore also the referent of understanding) is a set. Its 
members are tokens of Understanding, the sense of understanding. Two members 
are shown, the nth and the n+lth, and their times (on consecutive days) and sizes 
(that of the latter greater than that of the former) are given. The construct is 
otherwise exactly similar to that shown in Figure 76.
> Notice that the members of the set are ordered. The relevant meaning cannot be 
expressed without referring to the respective order of the states of understanding 
(this is the only property that distinguishes this structure from that of Ashley is 
understanding aspect less and less each day). The members of a set share some 
common property or properties, but necessarily differ from each other in other 
properties. When they differ as to time or place, they can of course be ordered 
with respect to this property.
:hem< 
— er egate
ubstancWally
^  member 
er J
timereferentWalking
sensi
■part
Wally walks 1011
Figure 78 Wally walks.
> Wally walks refers to a set of different walks undertaken regularly by Wally. The 
sense of the verb provides the model for the members of the set (the sense is itself 
a set, a subsense identifies a set whose members all have Wally as their er (a 
single walk of Wally's), and this acts in turn as the model for the membership of 
the referent).
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> Because the taking of regular walks is construed as a stable property of Wally's, 
the particular set functioning as the referent is an aggregate: the interpretation 
abstracts away from its membership and foregrounds instead its global properties. 
Aggregates are exceptional, as sets, in that their members are reanalysed as 
substance, and in that they support associations other than member and size: they 
have the properties of non-sets. Because of this they behave very much like 
substances. The referent of walks in the example has Wally as its er and theme, as 
a state would.
> As an aggregate, the referent has a period as its time, part of which is the same as 
the time of utterance.
4.1.2.4 Two kinds of process
Having explored the difference between states and processes, Vendler goes on to
distinguish two kinds of process: telic and non-telic. Telic processes are directed
towards (and end in) a specific goal, whereas non-telic processes are not:
"Running a mile and drawing a circle have to be finished, while it does not 
make sense to talk of finishing running or pushing a cart." (Vendler 1967:
100).
Non-telic processes consist of sets (or aggregates) of relatively undifferentiated 
members: the members o f a set are all of a kind, which is to say they instantiate a 
relatively specific event. The members of a process, which is a set of individual events 
with different times, are ordered as to time. The telic processes demonstrate that some 
processes are defined by the final member of the set. Figure 79 shows the structure of 
Ronnie ran, which refers to a non-telic process; Figure 80 shows the structure of 
Ronnie ran a mile, which refers to a telic process.
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er
referent
Ronnie Running
sense
Ronnie ran
Set
Figure 79 Ronnie ran.
disttrav
er
1 mile
Rumingref<7remRonnie
referentsense
a mileRonnie ran
Set
Figure 80 Ronnie ran a mile.
> The sense of ran in Figure 79 is Running, a set. The referent instantiates this set 
(by way of an intermediate set all of whose members have Ronnie as their er).
> The sense of ran in Figure 80 is also Running. The referent instantiates this set (by 
way of an intermediate set all of whose members have Ronnie as their er). The end 
(final member) of the referent is identified by the distance travelled (one mile).29
The presence of the end relationship in the structure of telic processes accounts 
for the fact that progressive constructions referring to telic processes do not entail
29 The relationship labelled -disttrav> ('distance travelled') is a simplification. Very likely a properly 
developed analysis would be somewhat more complicated. However, it will certainly have to refer to the 
end o f the process.
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corresponding perfective constructions (see (223) and (224) above). Because of the
nature of a set, the parts of a process themselves count as events of the same kind:
"running and its kind go on in time in a homogeneous way; any part of the 
process is of the same nature as the whole." (Vendler 1967: 101)
But since telic processes have a defined end, the parts preceding the end are not 
themselves telic (and they are therefore a different kind of event).
(261)a entails (261)b because the structure of the former contains that of the 
latter (see Figure 81, Figure 82). (262)a, by contrast does not entail (262)b because the 
structure of the former does not contain that of the latter (see Figure 83, Figure 84).
(261) a. Ronnie is running, 
b. Ronnie has run.
(262) a. Ronnie is running a mile, 
b. Ronnie has run a mile.
tembern-
.member l
time
timetime
er
referent
RunningRonnie part
.ersense ee
ee-
—time'
Ronnie is running
er-
Set
Before
Figure 81 Ronnie is running.
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member.
timeer
Ronnie Running referent
sense
ee.
-time'Ronnie has rui
Set Before
Figure 82 Ronnie has run.
lembern-
lemberi listtrav.
1 mile
time
i r m  ember
timetime
er
referentreferent
RunningRonnie part
.ersense ee
ee-
-time'
a mileRonnie running
Set
Before
Figure 83 Ronnie is running a mile.
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Ronnie
er
/
Ronnie hat
#^nnemb
 ^ ^^--disttrav
Running referent referent
Set Before
Figure 84 Ronnie has run a mile.
> The progressive construction refers to a set one of whose members (not the first or 
last) coincides with the time of utterance. The perfective construction refers (in 
these examples) to a set whose final member precedes the time of utterance.
> The structure of the progressive construction with the non-telic referent contains a 
structure where a set of suitable events precedes the time of utterance. That with 
the telic referent does not, since the progressive is not compatible with a structure 
where the final member of the set precedes the utterance. Of course, (262)a does 
entail (261)b, since that structure is contained in the progressive construction.
The prepositions FOR and IN, in their temporal uses, also distinguish between 
bounded and unbounded processes:
(263) Ronnie ran for/*in 5 minutes.
(264) Ronnie ran a mile * for/in five minutes.
Both prepositions can specify the time of a process. FOR profiles a relationship 
between a state or process and its time (which is a period), IN profiles a relationship 
between the time of a telic process and another period. Figure 85 gives partial 
structures for both.
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egate;ime
substance
For/t
referent
time
sensesense
BeforeFOR/t
Period member l ee
Verl
time'
membern
er
member!
In/t
sense ee
sense
membern
,IN/t
Figure 85 for and in .
> For/t (the t is for ’temporal') has an er and an ee; the ee is the time of the er. It is 
not immediately clear how this is related to other uses of FOR (of course, it need 
not be related at all). The ee is an aggregate, and has a substance, which is the time 
of the substance of the er (the event must therefore also be construed as an 
aggregate).
> In/t has an er and an ee; the first member of the ee (which is a period, so its 
members are point times) precedes the time of the beginning (first member) of the 
er (which is a process, so its members are events) and the last member follows the 
time of the end of the er. This structure represents the containment of the process 
by the time period, and it corresponds exactly to spatial containment (in one 
dimension) so it is clearly related to the structure of spatial In.
> Clearly the structure given for In/t is only compatible with telic processes: the er 
must have a beginning and an end, with separate (point) times. The structure of
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For excludes its use with telic processes, since these cannot be construed as 
aggregates.
A telic process like running a mile can be converted into a non-telic one by 
being made into a habit {Ronnie runs a mile each day; see Figure 78 above). This can 
itself have a duration, so that under this habitual interpretation for and other 
expressions profiling durations are possible:
(265) Ronnie ran a mile each day for a month.
4.1.2.5 Accomplishments and achievements
The telic processes above are the accomplishments. In some accomplishments the end 
is also a result. Running a mile is not effective or affective, but drawing a circle (for 
instance) is effective: it produces a circle. That the result is a different kind of 
relationship from part or member can be seen by comparing the accomplishments, 
which have members and results, with the fourth and final of Vendler's classes, the 
achievements, which are not sets (and so do not have members) but do also have 
results.
Achievements, unlike accomplishments, occur "at a single moment" (Vendler 
1967: 103). It is for this reason that words referring to achievements appear most 
naturally with the preposition a t , which profiles a point in time:
(266) The glass shattered at 3.03/?in 3 hours/*for 3 hours.
P r i t t l p Period
Event
Brokenmemberi
Shattering
referent
The glass shattered at 3.03
Figure 86 The glass shattered at 3.03.
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> Shattering is an Event and has an er, which is an actor. The er must be brittle to be 
able to shatter (this is also part of the definition of brittleness).
> The time is a point, the referent of 3.03.
> Shattering has a result, here given as a case of Broken, which is a state so its time 
is a period. The time of the result starts at the moment of shattering. It is because 
of the presence of this state that some verbs referring to achievements can appear 
with temporal FOR (Wendy woke fo r  3 hours); in these cases the preposition refers 
to the duration (=time) o f the result.
Because they have point times, achievements are not readily compatible with 
the present simple and progressive constructions, both of which have a time which is 
part of an ongoing period ((267), (268)). Words referring to achievements are more 
natural with the present perfect: (269) can refer to a shattering that takes place at (or 
immediately before) the moment of utterance.
(267) *The glass shatters.
(268) *The glass is shattering.
(269) The glass has shattered.
Of course, and as noted above (4.1.1), verbs usually referring to achievements 
can be used with simple and progressive constructions, if the meaning of the 
construction is adapted to conform to that of the verb (270) or vice versa (271).
(270) a. I’m in the pub last night, right, and this geezer comes up and shatters my glass. 
I goes, "Oil" ...
b. She's leaving town tomorrow.
c. The prisoners die at dawn.
(271) a. Glass oven dishes shatter if you use them on the hob.
b. See, now the brick is shattering the window.
c. Come quick, Shelly's shattering all the glasses!
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> (270)a exemplifies the 'historical present', where the present tense adds immediacy 
to a narrative of events that took place in the past. This is possible whatever the 
aspectual class of the verb's referent.
> (270)b and c both refer to future events. Again the use of the present tense adds 
immediacy. Perhaps the times of the referents are periods including the time of 
utterance and the time of the event (they both mean that the event is bound to 
happen, as determined at the time of utterance (b) or before it (c)).
> (271)a is interpreted habitually or genetically. The structure is similar to that 
shown in Figure 78 above for Wally walks.
> (271)b construes the event as if it were happening in slow motion (it might be 
appropriate in a context where the shattering of the window is being viewed on a 
video playback). By extending the moment at which the brick passes through the 
window, shattering it, it forces the event to be interpreted as an accomplishment.
> (271)c refers to a series of repeated achievements (a set), as in (235) above. This 
possibility is noted by Croft (1998b: 74). The structure is as given in Figure 87. 
The referent is a set of shattering events, each having the same er, and so is a 
process, which may or may not be telic {She shattered glasses all afternoon, She 
shattered all the glasses in 12 minutes flat).
Event Glass
Set
■er
Shelly
member-shattering
sense referent
Shelly is shattering the glasses 
Figure 87 Shelly is shattering the glasses.
s h a t t e r  does not appear to support Croft's 'run-up achievement' (ibid: 74, see 
also (237) above). If we place a piece of glass in a vise and steadily increase the 
pressure until it shatters, we cannot say during the process that we are shattering the 
glass. As noted above (4.1.1), Vendler makes similar claims about r e a c h :
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"Even if one says that it took him three hours to reach the summit, one 
does not mean that the 'reaching* of the summit went on during those 
hours. Obviously it took three hours of climbing to reach the top." (1967:
104)
d ie , however, does support run-up achievements, as shown in Croft's original example 
{Help! She's dying!) (ibid: 74). The structure of this example must be rather like that of
(270)b: the time of utterance is a member of a set (or aggregate) of times starting with 
some (former) event (or state) that causes her death and ending with the (later) death 
itself. A structure is given in Figure 88.
Set
-tim<
membernmemberlast
memberlast
member l
-er- er.time
Her
Beforereferent
time
r e su lt
sense
She's dying Event
.time
Figure 88 She's dying.
Notice that this structure requires the presence of some causing event. Croft
notes that the example is not appropriate in the absence of such an event (something
must already have happened to bring about the imminent death of the actor):
"I cannot say I am dying at this very moment just because I am mortal; I 
have to be terminally ill or mortally wounded" (ibid: 74)
The referent in Figure 88 is an accomplishment, and indeed the 'run-up' 
interpretation of progressive constructions is the usual one for verbs profiling 
accomplishments (see (262)). The construction refers to a process leading up to the
205
profiled end point. This is equally true in past progressives, which refer to a past 
moment in the midst of such a process. Note, however, that the end point need not 
actually be reached (272).
(272) a. Ronnie was running a mile (when he dropped down dead).
b. I was writing a letter (when my pen ran out).
c. She was dying when they found her (but they saved her).
Achievements are not compatible with temporal FOR (even when construed as 
telic processes) (273). When a 'run-up' interpretation is available, temporal IN is 
permitted (274); here the causing event (the stabbing) counts as the beginning and the 
death as the end of the process profiled by the structure of the preposition (see Figure 
85).
(273) *The victim was stabbed in the neck and died for 3 hours (before paramedics 
staunched the bleeding).
(274) The victim was stabbed in the neck and died in 3 hours.
4.1.2.6 Iteration
Shattering and dying are both transitions: they profile a change between two 
contrasting states, one of which is the result of the event. Some achievements, 
however, consist o f more than one such transition. For example, when a light flashes it 
first goes on, and then goes off again very shortly afterwards ((275)a, b demonstrate 
that flashing is usually an achievement).
(275) a. The light flashed at 12 seconds after noon, 
b. *The light flashed in 12 seconds.
A partial lexical structure for Flashing is given in Figure 89.
206
Event
•er-
BecomingLight
er- Going on On
result-er
.p a rti"
Flashing
Going o ff O ff
er part2
er.
Figure 89 Flashing.
> Flashing is an individual with two parts. The first is a transition from off to on, the 
second a transition from on to off.
> The er of the flashing is also the er of the two transitions, and therefore also of 
their results (which are states); this argument is also the er of a preceding state (not 
shown) of being off (this is really part of the structure of the transition Going on).
It is possible to use the verb f l a s h  to refer to just part of this structure, as in 
(276). Here the context makes it clear that the flashing off (and the later flashing back 
on) consist of just one transition. They count as flashing presumably because of the 
speed of the transition, and because they appear as part of a series of flashes (the lights 
have been flashing rather a lot, so any change in their state can be construed as a flash).
(276) At one point all of them flashed off except for 3 of them. That formed a triangle 
then the light intensity shot up very brightly, then dimmed back to normal, then 
the other orbs flashed back on.
(http://www.mysticaluniverse.com/ufonews2/ufonews3/ufonews3.html).
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Furthermore, it is even possible to reverse the two transitions, as in (277), where the 
light first goes off and then back on.
(277) My dresser rocked back and forth, the walls creaked, a stuffed hanging parrot 
swung back and forth, pictures rattled on the wall, the light flashed off once, and 
I swayed back and forth, (http://www.lanphier.net/bemard.htm)
Assuredly these two examples are exceptional, and possibly ad hoc; examples like 
these are certainly rare but the fact that they can be found at all is significant.
Flashing can also be transformed into a 'run-up' achievement as in (278), which 
contrasts with (275)b above. Since flashing is also iterable (as defined below), it can 
also be transformed into a process as in (279) and (280).
(278) We fired up the generator and the light flashed in 39 seconds.
(279) The light is flashing.
(280) The light flashed all afternoon.
(279) and (280) refer to a process made up of a series of repeated flashes. This is 
possible because of the nature of flashing: the final state is the same as the initial state, 
so the event can be freely iterated. Notice that this is not possible with dying:
(281) Di died all afternoon.
Talmy recognises three kinds of transition: one-way nonresettable, one-way 
resettable and full cycle (2003: 68). Dying clearly exemplifies the first, and flashing 
the last; resettable transitions include falling and rising for example. One-way 
resettable transitions can be used with expressions profiling a duration, in which case 
this is interpreted as the duration of the resulting state ((282) refers to a fall in the stock
30 Talmy recognises a further three aspectual types: multiplex (which consist o f sets o f full cycle events, 
like my processes), steady-state (for the states) and gradient (for gradable changes like widening)
(ibid: 68).
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price, followed 6 hours later by a corresponding rise); of course this is not possible 
with non-resettable transitions (like dying) since the resulting state is permanent. Only 
cyclic transitions receive the iterative interpretation in (280).
(282) The company's stock fell for 6 hours.
As noted by Jackendoff (1992, see above), nonresettable transitions are 
interpreted as iterated when their affected arguments are indefinite sets (283), as are 
telic processes (284). Similarly, when the affected argument is a mass, the 
interpretation is of a process ((285), (286)).
(283) a. Soldiers died all afternoon
b. She shattered glasses all afternoon.
(284) a. Athletes ran miles all afternoon, 
b. Drew drew circles all afternoon.
(285) a. Water appeared at the join all afternoon, 
b. She shattered glass all afternoon.
(286) Barry baked bread all afternoon.
Notice that it is just the object argument (or subject argument of unaccusatives) 
that affects the interpretation in this way. The case of verbs with alternating object 
arguments makes this fact very clear:
(287) Laurie loaded (*the) lorries with (the) lollies all afternoon.
(288) Laurie loaded (*the) lollies onto (the) lorries all afternoon.
In (287), if the set of lorries is interpreted as unbounded then the loading can be
construed as an unbounded process, whereas if the number of lorries is bounded (for
example, by there being a known set (of known size) of lorries in the context), the 
loading is interpreted as a bounded process. In (288) it is the boundedness of the set of 
lollies that affects the boundedness of the process. This property of objects is captured 
by Dowty's incremental theme (1991).
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This same contrast affects the appropriacy of temporal in  in the construct:
(289) Laurie loaded *(the) lorries with (the) lollies in 2 hours.
(290) Laurie loaded *(the) lollies onto (the) lorries in 2 hours.
(289) and (290) must be interpreted as referring to bounded processes, if the 
preposition is to be included. This is only possible if the process is bounded, which 
depends on the boundedness of the set of lorries in the former case and the set of lollies 
in the latter. Relevant structures are given in Figure 90 and Figure 91.
Set
-size
size
member member'
f ^ i  /
referent
Laurie
referent
Loading
sensesense
Laurie loaded the lorries with lollies
Figure 90 Laurie loaded the lorries (with lollies).
Set
-size"
size
member'member
Laurie
referent
Loading Lolly referent
sense sense
Laurie loaded the lollies on lorries
Figure 91 Laurie loaded the lollies (on lorries).
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4.1.3 Aspect and the event type hierarchy
In this part I have provided WG structures for the various aspectual classes. The 
structures explain how the aspectual properties of words in constructions are 
interpreted, and how the aspectual properties of words are reconciled with those of 
constructions. The mechanism provides for an aspectual classification of verbs not 
according to the constructions they can appear in, but according to their interpretation 
in various constructions with aspectual properties (see Croft 1998b: 73-74, and above 
4.1.1). The classification is given in terms of detailed analyses of the aspectual 
properties of the words and constructions and the details of their interaction, which 
flow from the network structure of WG.
Because the elements in the network (both concepts and relationships between 
them) are classified according to their properties, generalisations over words, semantic 
classes, dependencies or other associations are represented in classes in a set of 
interdependent hierarchies. In this structure a statement like "verbs profiling telic 
processes can appear with an in  referring to the time taken to complete them" is 
equivalent to one like "when a verb appears with an IN referring to the time taken to 
complete some profiled event, that event is a telic process".
In detailing the aspectual properties of words and constructions above, I have 
integrated the event type hierarchy in 3.1.4.2 with the aspectual structure given in this 
chapter in Figure 72ff. The distinction between states and events is preserved in the 
separation of Stuff from Things and the requirements of aspect (and of the 
classification of noun referents) add the sets and aggregates to this structure. The use 
of sets and aggregates in the representation of complex events and processes makes 
available a mechanism for constructing the interpretations of expressions not provided 
(to my knowledge) in any other framework, one that is explored more fully in the 
remainder of this chapter.
In Figure 90 and Figure 91, I give structures for two alternative interpretations 
of utterances using the verb l o a d . The difference between the two interpretations 
derives from the way the ee is selected from among the thematic arguments of the 
sense (as described in the previous chapter). However, it is also possible for the linking 
relationships er and ee to be associated with thematic arguments of extensions of the
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sense. For example in Figure 78 I give a structure for Wally walks where the referent is 
an aggregate whose substance is an instantiation of the verb's sense and which is 
construed as a stable property of the referent of the subject, which is therefore its 
theme and its er.
In the second half of this chapter I explore the properties of resultative 
expressions and I develop an analysis where (some) resultative expressions involve the 
result as a thematic associate of an extension of the verb's sense. For example, in 
Freddy leapfrogged himself into the record books, it is not the case that each 
individual leap took Freddy into the record books, rather that all the leaps taken 
together (as a set) had that result. This argument applies to some verbs of motion also: 
Skippy bounced into the room refers to a set of bounces (up and down movements) 
whose joint result is Skippy being in the room.
4.2 Resultative expressions
4.2.1 Introduction: the direct object restriction; unaccusativity; control and 
ECM; a resultative construction
In the previous chapter (throughout 3.2) I referred to the ability of some verbs to take a
resultative expression (henceforth RE), usually an adjective or preposition, and
claimed that this ability varied with the inherent aspectual properties of the verb. In the
present chapter I look rather more closely at these expressions (exemplified in (291)-
(295)), determining the nature of the control exercised over their use by verbal
semantics.
(291) Billy broke the brolly in half.
(292) The brolly broke in half.
(293) Smithy beat the metal flat.
(294) Neddy bled to death.
(295) We drank the bar dry.
I begin by looking at the distribution of REs in English and the constraints on their 
interpretation. I consider some existing approaches to their analysis and present an
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approach in terms of WG structures, showing how the relevant patterns can be 
represented in this framework.
Elsewhere, I discuss differences between the linking mechanisms assumed by 
the current analysis and those assumed by Levin and Rappaport Hovav, and note some 
consequences they have for the treatment of the 'causative alternation' (see chiefly 5.2). 
Among these consequences is that in WG, unlike Levin and Rappaport Hovav's 
analysis, there is no syntactic unaccusativity, the observable differences between 
unergative and unaccusative constructions being described in terms of semantic 
structure alone. It is for this reason that REs must be dealt with here, since they are 
taken by some writers (including Levin and Rappaport Hovav, who give 45 pages to 
them (1995: 33-78)) to provide evidence for syntactic unaccusativity.
For Levin and Rappaport Hovav some verbs have unaccusative Predicate 
Argument Structures (PASs), which have a single internal argument and therefore 
conflict with unergative PASs, which have a single external argument. Whether 
projected from monadic unaccusative thematic structures or from dyadic causative 
thematic structures (with decausativisation) these unaccusative PASs project in turn 
onto unaccusative deep syntactic structures. These structures have objects, but no 
subjects, since the internal argument always projects into object position (the deep 
objects are transformed into surface subjects somehow). Unergative syntactic 
structures are projected from unergative PASs and the external argument projects into 
subject position.
The WG analysis differs from the one just sketched in that there are no 
differences between unergative and unaccusative syntactic structures. WG is 
monostratal and there is therefore no question of having deep-structure objects in the 
latter case. I show in the following chapter that this does not prove an obstacle in the 
description of the causative alternation (also used by Levin and Rappaport Hovav as 
evidence for syntactic unaccusativity), and argue that the purely semantic 
characterisation is a positive benefit in the descriptive work (for example in the 
treatment of verbs like r o l l  that have both unaccusative and unergative uses). In this 
chapter I start by considering some of the reasons why REs are considered to offer
31 These comments apply to Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995. Rappaprt Hovav and Levin 200, which I 
have not yet read, gives a very different analysis, I am told.
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such good support to the notion of syntactic unaccusativity, and go on to demonstrate 
that (in the WG framework at least), they too can be fully characterised without 
recourse to syntactic unaccusativity.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 33) propose a universal restriction on 
resultatives, the Direct Object Restriction (DOR), according to which an RE can only 
be predicated of its parent's direct object. In support of this proposal, they advance 
examples like (296)-(298). Causative constructions (296) can have REs predicated of 
the surface object, whereas unaccusative constructions (297) (which under the 
Unaccusative Hypothesis have deep syntactic objects) are like passives (298) in that 
they can have REs predicated of the surface subject.
(296) The cold snap froze the lake solid.
(297) The lake froze solid.
(298) The lake was frozen solid overnight.
Since passive and unaccusative constructions both involve deep objects moved to 
subject position, under Levin and Rappaport Hovav's analysis, both (297) and (298) 
conform to the DOR at the deep level.
Further, Levin and Rappaport Hovav point to examples like (299) and (300) 
that show transitive and unergative activity verbs used with REs. Where the object 
refers to the affected argument (299), the RE is predicated of the object, just as in
(296). However, where the subject refers to the affected argument (300), the RE may 
not be predicated of the subject and a (coreferential) 'dummy' reflexive object must be 
used.
(299) Molly shook the dolly to pieces.
(300) The engine shook *(itself) to pieces.
Evidently, these examples present something of a problem in an analysis where 
unaccusative verbs do not have deep structure objects. REs in unergative constructions 
do appear to conform to the DOR, yet those in unaccusative constructions do not. In 
the following section I show that the different behaviours of unaccusative and
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unergative verbs can be accounted for on the basis of semantic differences alone. I 
show that the difference between the REs in (297) and (300) is that the former, but not 
the latter is selected by its parent. I go on to show that only non-selected REs conform 
to the DOR, which is a general constraint on raising (ECM) constructions. Selected 
REs, which are control constructions, are not affected by the DOR.
Another problem that will be addressed is that of verbs apparently able to 
appear in constructions matching both of the patterns identified above. (301) and (302) 
show that verbs like s t a r v e  and JUMP can be used (as if they were unaccusative like
(297)) with REs predicated of their surface subjects (the (a) examples) and (as if they 
were unergative like (300)) with REs predicated of dummy objects (the (b) examples).
(301) a. Stevie starved to death in the mountains after the plane crash.
b. Stevie is starving herself to death in protest at the prison conditions.
(302) a. Jimmy jumped clear of the falling debris.
b. Whenever he feels bad, Jimmy just jumps himself jolly.
These examples highlight another important difference between the WG 
treatment of linking and that proposed by Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995). In 
discussing the 'causative alternation' in the following chapter, I contrast Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav's approach, where the syntactic constructions a verb appears in are 
determined by the verb's semantic class (unaccusative verbs appearing in unaccusative 
constructions, unergative verbs in unergative constructions and so on), with the WG 
analysis, where unaccusative and unergative are the names of constructions, defined by 
pairings of syntactic and semantic relationships (subject with theme or agent), and the 
ability of a verb to appear in a given construction is determined by the extent to which 
the construction matches with individual structural properties of the verb's semantics. 
This difference is relevant to the analysis of examples like (301) and (302), since the 
class-based analysis requires that verbs appearing with more than one kind of RE be 
treated as polysemous (or otherwise ambiguous), with the two senses (necessarily of 
different classes) being linked by some type-shifting operation. In a construction-based 
approach such as that advocated here, the verbs concerned can be analysed as
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monosemous (though of course they need not be), as long as their sense supports both 
kinds of construction.
A third issue that is significant in the treatment of REs concerns the 
relationship between the verb and the subject of the RE. Hoekstra (1988, 1992) and 
Stowell (1983, 1995) propose analyses where all REs are small clauses in the sense of 
Williams (1975). Under these analyses, the subject of the resultative predicate is not 
projected by the verb: it is not a verbal argument, but fills the specifier position in the 
small clause. In this way, resultative constructions have effectively the same structure 
as ECM constructions (see Radford 1997: 13, 21). Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) 
and Carrier and Randall (1992) argue against this approach, suggesting instead that (in 
line with the Projection Principle (Chomsky 1981)) lexically causative and 
unaccusative verbs must project their internal arguments in the same way in the 
presence of an RE as in its absence, so that resultatives with these verbs must be 
analysed as control constructions: the shared argument is projected (case-marked) by 
the verb.
Carrier and Randall note that some approaches propose different syntactic 
structures for control and ECM resultatives, a small clause structure for the latter and a 
verbal complement structure for the former. However, they advance arguments from 
control and binding evidence (as well as from lexical operations) against this approach, 
preferring an analysis where the post-verbal noun and the resultative predicate are both 
sisters of the verb.
In WG, ECM and control constructions have the same syntactic structures, 
differing only as to their semantics: the shared argument in a control construction 
refers to a semantic argument of the sense of the verb, whereas the shared argument in 
an ECM construction does not. The difference between these two types of construction 
is explored below.
These three issues (the DOR, semantic classes of verbs, and the question of 
control/ECM structures), among others, are addressed in the following sections. There 
I look closely at the behaviour of REs and develop an analysis in terms of WG 
semantic structures. For the purposes of the analysis I distinguish three types of RE, 
justifying this classification by showing that it allows for a full characterisation of the 
data. The three types are distinguished by the different lexical properties of the verbs
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that participate in them, particularly inherent aspectual properties, so this part of the 
chapter throws further light on the issues of aspect discussed in the first part.
The analysis developed here amounts to the proposal of a resultative 
construction, like those used in the previous chapters for subject and object linking. 
This construction corresponds to a linking rule linking the semantic relationship result 
with the syntactic relationship sharer. One interesting consequence of this is that it 
gives special status to the result relationship, in that it is centrally involved in syntactic 
processes. Like er and ee, result has special status because it corresponds regularly 
with a defined syntactic relationship. This is not particularly surprising since the 
definitions of er and ee given above made explicit reference to force-dynamic 
structure, which is of course itself partly defined in terms of the result relationship.
The three types of RE are discussed separately in each of the following three 
sections (4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3). 4.2.2.4 deals with verbs that show variable behaviour with 
respect to the resultative construction and 4.2.2.5 deals with a further set of verbs 
showing variable behaviour. In the final section I summarise the findings about the 
structures of REs and discuss their relevance to the theoretical issues.
4.2.2 The resultative construction(s): REs with resultative verbs, argument and 
non-argument REs
4.2.2.1 Resultative expressions with resultative verbs
Many verbs, like kill , die  and b r e a k , profile a telic event (one with a result). 
Sometimes, these verbs can be used with an adverbial element referring to the lexical 
result, and making it more specific. This element may be a particle (303), an adjective 
(304) or a preposition (305).
(303) a. Billie broke the buggy up. 
b. The buggy broke up.
(304) a. Billie broke the safe open, 
b. The safe broke open.
(305) a. Billie broke the brolly in half/to pieces, 
b. The brolly broke in half/to pieces.
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When the RE is a preposition or a particle, it can profile a change of state (to 
pieces) or the end state (in half). Adjectives can only profile the end state. This is not 
surprising since, as I show in 3.2, prepositions can generally be used alongside the 
verbs of motion with one of these two meanings, while adjectives generally profile 
states. In many cases an adjective exists which profiles just exactly the lexical result of 
a resultative verb. These adjectives can not be used as REs with their corresponding 
verbs, presumably because they do not add anything to the interpretation. Phenomena 
of this sort are discussed by Cruse (1985: 105) under the label encapsulation: the 
sense of br e a k  encapsulates that of b r o k e n .
(306) *Billie broke the brolly broken.
(307) ?Kathy killed the kitten dead.
(308) *The doggy died dead.
However, the RE must be compatible with the lexical result; usually this means 
that it must instantiate (elaborate) it:
(309) Billie broke the brolly apart/to pieces/?crooked/* useless/* into a handy wedge for 
the door.
This property of REs with resultative verbs is often described in terms of the 
inappropriacy of sentences referring to events with more than termination/result (see 
for example Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 55), Ritter and Rosen (1998)). If the 
brolly has been broken then the (breaking) event is complete, and for the brolly to be 
further changed into a handy wedge amounts to a second event. Notice that this is not a 
constraint on the structure of events in the world, or on conceptual structure, but rather 
a constraint on the representation of events in syntactic structure:
(310) Billie broke the brolly, making it into a handy wedge for the door.
Since the RE in these cases is semantically selected by the verb, it must form 
part of its lexical semantic structure. The lexical structures presented for these verbs in
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the following chapter explicitly contain a result, as predicted. The lexical structures of 
resultative verbs also determine which argument undergoes the change:
(311) Allie arrived (*Polly) in Amsterdam.
(312) Kitty cut *(Kathy) in half.
The er of Arriving, the sense of arrived, a verb with unaccusative semantics, is marked 
by its lexical structure as the undergoer, the er of the result state. However, in the case 
of Cutting, the sense of cut, an obligatorily causative verb, it is the ee that is marked as 
undergoer. These examples present few problems, since they are (must be) controlled 
largely by the lexical structure of the relevant verbs. However, there are cases that 
show more complicated behaviour, which I investigate in the following section.
The examples in this section are clearly fully controlled by lexical structures. 
The verbs to which they apply are inherently (ie lexically) resultative and the RE refers 
to the lexical result of the verb concerned. This is why the verb exercises semantic 
control over the RE (see (309) above), and it is also why the verb determines which of 
its arguments the RE is predicated of (see (311), (312)).
The semantic structure of an RE involves sharing (see Figure 92: Breaking/u 
shares its er with Breaking/c and Broken shares with Breaking/u), so that it makes 
sense to assign a sharing analysis to the syntactic structure too (see Figure 93, Figure 
94). Another, more compelling reason for using a sharing relationship is presented in 
4.2.2.3.
er-
erer. •result-•result-
BrokenBreaking/uBreaking/c
sensesense
BREAK
Figure 92 Breaking.
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Break in g/u
sharer^ s u b je c t^ ^ ^ -  
lt broke
referent referent
'subject
Figure 93 It broke in half.
referent
result
/ result
Break ing/c
referent
referent
V sense —sharerBilly broke in half
u. X
'subject
Figure 94 Billy broke it in half.
The pattern in Figure 93 and Figure 94 generalises over all resultative verbs, as 
shown in Figure 95:
-result-
Verb
referentsense
iharer-
Figure 95 Result linking rule.
The generalisation in Figure 95 represents a linking rule for sharers: some sharers refer 
to the result of their parent's sense. This is not the only possible linking arrangement
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for sharers, since so m e are con trolled  by the lex ica l structure o f  the parent (those found  
with verbs like w a n t  and REFUSE for exam ple), and others fo llo w  other regularities 
(for exam ple sharers in d ep ic tive  constructions).
Following the generalisation in Figure 95, verbs that have results in their 
semantic structures can take a sharer referring to that result. The argument of the result 
will be an argument of the sense of the verb, since the verb not only specifies the 
nature of the event affecting this argument but also defines its semantic properties 
directly. In this way, the subject of the sharer is selected by the lexical structure of the 
verb. An obligatorily causative verb like CUT, whose object refers to the affected 
argument, shares its object with the sharer, whereas an unaccusative verb like arrive  
shares its subject. Lexically resultative verbs (semantically) select the RE itself in the 
same way. Since the lexical structure of, say, br eak  specifies that the result is Broken, 
if a token of b r e a k  is to be used with a sharer of the kind shown in Figure 95 then the 
word filling the sharer role must be able to refer to an instance of Broken.
The exclusion of REs when their meaning too closely matches part of the 
lexical semantic structure (seen in (306)-(308)) can be explained (as suggested there) 
in terms of encapsulation (Cruse (1986: 105). Cruse treats it as a defining property of 
syntactic dependents that their senses cannot be encapsulated by those of the parent 
without semantic anomaly. Cruse's examples are ?a male uncle and 1 Arthur drinks 
liquids, which are both pleonastic since the dependents (the adjunct male and the 
object liquids) contribute nothing that is not already represented in the lexical semantic 
structure of the parent. Clearly the same principle applies to (306)-(308).
Transitive resultative verbs can freely appear in passive constructions, with or 
without REs (313). These passives can be interpreted non-statively (314), or statively 
(315).
(313) The buggy was broken (in bits) (by Billie).
(314) The buggy was/got broken to pieces in Billie's savage attack.
(315) The buggy was/is completely broken after Billie's savage attack.
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The structures I give for these verbs in the following chapter (5.2.3) include 
both a causing event and a state which serve as the senses for the participles in (314) 
and (315) respectively:
er-
Broken 
V  Verer. -result- Adjective-result-
Breaking/uBreaking/c sense
sensesense BROKEN
I refterent
BREAK referentreferent
referent
referent It was 6ro£e«[adjective]referent
It was broken[eventive passive]
It was broken[s\aX\VQ passive]
Figure 96 It was broken, three ways.
Not all transitive resultatives permit stative passives, however. The verbs of killing, 
a s s a s s in a t e , m u r d e r , d r o w n , etc, are distinguished only by properties of the 
causing event. For this reason, they cannot be used in stative passives: the state in all 
cases is the same -  Dead. Other causative verbs do permit stative passives; for 
example, CUT, d ic e , d r il l , g r in d  etc are differentiated by the instrument used in the 
causing event, but also by the nature of the result state:
(316) By the time Dicky had finished with it, the meat was ground, not diced.
It should be expected that any verb with a lexical result will permit a stative passive, 
since this is the part of lexical structure that the stative passive construction exploits. 
The exceptions (k il l  etc) are motivated by thematic properties of the relevant verbs, in 
this case the salience in their thematic structure of the agent. A similar argument is 
presented in 3.2.1 and in 5.2.3.5 to explain the absence of unaccusative uses of these 
verbs.
222
As stated in the following chapter, resultative verbs that permit causative 
constructions also permit middles. In fact these verbs make for prototypical middle 
constructions.
(317) This buggy breaks (in half) easily.
(318) The bread won't cut (into slices).
The semantic properties of the middle construction are well documented (and were 
discussed in 1.2.5). The expression is interpreted generically, with no fixed time 
reference or causer; the referent of the subject is interpreted as having the necessary 
properties that enable it to be brought into the result state (or that prevent it in the case 
of negative middles (318)). Middles formed with causatives have all these properties. 
The subject refers to the ee of the causing event, which has the necessary properties by 
virtue of filling a selected thematic role. The verb's profile defines the expected result 
state. Lexically resultative verbs can form middles with or without an RE. However, as 
I showed in the previous chapter, and as further discussed in the following sections, 
because of the importance of the result in the middle construction, verbs that do not 
have lexical results can only form a middle when an RE is present.
There are some verbs profiling changes of state which do not necessarily 
receive telic interpretations, f r y , for example, profiles a (possibly causative) process 
affecting some entity (usually an item of food, of course). This process may be telic 
(applying heat to something through the medium of oil until it is fried) or it may not 
(simply applying heat to something through the medium of oil).
(319) The fritter fried in/for five minutes.
(320) Freddy fried the fritter in/for five minutes.
Often the telicity of sentences containing such verbs can be determined by the 
context. As discussed above, Jackendoff (1992) shows that EAT is interpreted telically 
when it has a bounded direct object, and therefore excludes delimiting expressions like 
until dawn (321). GRIND behaves similarly (322).
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(321) a. Etty ate hotdogs until dawn.
b. *Etty ate half a dozen hotdogs until dawn.
(322) a. Gary ground coffee until dawn.
b. *Gary ground a pound of coffee until dawn.
These verbs can also receive a telic interpretation from the presence of an 
accompanying (lexically selected) RE (notice that without the RE these examples are 
ambiguous as to telicity, since definiteness does not entail boundedness: We ate the 
hotdogs/ground the coffee in/for five minutes).
(323) We ate the hotdogs up/%down/*gone (in/*for five minutes).32
(324) We ground the coffee up/down/coarse/to a fine powder/?fluffy/* ready.
However, they can also be used with non-selected REs, predicated of non-selected 
direct objects (325). This construction excludes the selected object (326), and is only 
possible for verbs that are able to appear without selected objects (compare (327) and 
(328)).
(325) a. Etty ate herself silly.
b. Windy ground the mill stones smooth.
(326) a. *Etty ate hotdogs herself silly.
b. *Windy ground the wheat the mill stones smooth.
(327) a. Etty ate (until dawn).
b. Gaiy ground (until dawn) (while Rosie roasted).
(328) a. The spring sunshine melted ’“(the snow).
b. *The spring sunshine melted the road impassable.
32 Selected REs with EAT are very highly constrained. Only UP (and for some DOWN) are really 
acceptable. The lexical result o f  Eating is already very specific (the ee is inside the er), which may 
explain the constraint (recall the encapsulation argument given above). UP and DOWN are commonly 
used as resultative particles highlighting the completion o f the event, but allowing the verb itself to 
specify the exact nature o f  the result.
224
REs of the kind seen in (325) are discussed in 4.2.2.3; the properties of verbs 
that permit more than one kind of RE are discussed in 4.2.2.4.
4.2.2.2 Resultative expressions with non-resultative verbs: verbal arguments
(329) Smithy beat the metal flat.
(330) Sooty swept the floor clean.
(331) Slippery Sid skidded into a ditch.
(332) Benjy bled (the bull) to death.
The verbs in (329)-(332) are not by themselves telic {Smithy beat the metal/srwept the 
floor/skidded/bled for/*in ten minutes), yet the constructions are. Their telicity derives 
from the adverbial expression, which is interpreted as a result.
Though their lexical structures do not entail a result, these verbs nevertheless 
exercise semantic control over the RE:
(333) Smithy beat the metal flat/into a saucepan/into the ground/?shiny/*expensive.
(334) Sooty swept the floor clean/spotless/free of dust/?shiny/*smart/*hygienic.
(335) Slippery Sid skidded into a ditch/off the track/away/*hurt/* disqualified.
(336) Benjy bled dry/to death/ * sickly/* sticky.
The thematic role filled by the referent of the object in (333)-(334) and that of the 
subject in (335)-(336) are determined by the lexical structure of the verb; these are 
selected arguments: Smithy beat the metal/*the theory (flat). Since the verb determines 
the nature of the action carried out and the role played in that action by the relevant 
argument, it also constrains the kinds of result that the action may have.
Semantic constraints of this kind on the RE are discussed by Wechsler (1997: 
309), who appeals to the 'canonical’ result of the event specified. Croft (1998b: 42-43), 
dealing with an example like (335) {She swam across the pool), treats the RE as an 
extension to the end of the causal (force-dynamic) chain, the nature of which is 
determined by the lexical profile of the verb. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) do 
not discuss semantic constraints of this kind.
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The problem with these examples is that, while the result state should not 
appear in the lexical semantic structure of the verb since these verbs are not lexically 
telic, lexical structure must nevertheless provide some means of choosing between 
result states. My claim is that it achieves this by specifying the semantic properties of 
the shared argument, and o f  the process affecting it, and so constrains the set of 
possible (plausible) results. The analysis I gave above for manner of motion verbs with 
direction adverbials also captures Dowty’s canonical result in the close association 
between activities which can be manners of motion, and the motion events they can be 
the manners of.
The act of skidding, for example, entails that the skidder follows a path, so it 
must be a concrete object capable o f changing location. Since the change that appears 
in the lexical structure o f the verb is a change of location, if the verb is to be 
interpreted telically, the result state must be a location. This may be expressed by a 
preposition or particle profiling the end state {into a ditch, away) or by a preposition 
profiling the beginning of the path {o ff the track). Motion verbs like s k id  have a path 
in their thematic structure, w hich can be elaborated by a telic path expression. A telic 
path has the properties both o f  paths, and of results. The behaviour of motion verbs is 
discussed at length in the previous chapter.
Similarly, the act of beating entails that the beatee is a concrete object, and that 
it is (usually repeatedly) struck w ith force. The application of force by the beater to the 
beatee leads this argument to be interpreted as a patient, so it is necessarily affected by 
any change that results from the beating. Furthermore, beating can only bring about 
certain kinds of change: a change o f  shape, orientation or location (see (333)).
Carrier and Randall (1992), in their footnote 43, consider and reject a similar 
account for semantic selection o f  results which they attribute to an anonymous 
reviewer. They raise two objections to the account. The first is not relevant to the 
current account since it derives from limits on control imposed by phrase structure 
which do not apply in WG. The second objection is incorrect: they claim that "result 
APs in -ing  and -e d  are semantically incompatible with resultatives" and that this 
incompatibility can only be described in terms of the semantic relationship between the 
verb and the RE; however, since this restriction applies to all REs (even those that are 
not semantically selected) it cannot be a semantic restriction.
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The object in examples like (333) and (334) is a normal object: it is selected by 
the verb (see my arguments in 1.2.1 for treating objects in the same way regardless of 
the other constructions in the sentence). For this reason, these verbs can appear freely 
in passive constructions, with or without the RE:
(337) The metal was beaten (flat).
(338) The floor was swept (clean).
However, without the RE both (337) and (338) can only be interpreted eventively. The 
stative passive is impossible without the RE since the verbs do not themselves profile 
an end state. With the RE both can be interpreted statively:
(339) I'm not letting you go until that metal is beaten *(flat).
(340) I’m not coming in until that floor is swept (clean).
As noted by Levin (1993: 26) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 43) (see 
also 4.2.2.1), processive verbs also permit middles in the presence of an RE ((341) and 
(342)). b l e e d  permits a middle construction even in the absence of an RE (343). 
Without the RE, this middle still receives a telic interpretation, in this case an 
inchoative one: it is easy to cause a haemophiliac to start bleeding.
(341) The brass won’t beat *(flat).
(342) New Sno-wite carpet tiles just sweep * (clean)!
(343) Haemophiliacs bleed (to death) easily.
Since the objects in these examples refer to arguments of the senses of the verb, they 
are clearly able to affect the success of carrying out the action, but the RE (or some 
other property that confers telicity) must be there if the construction is to fulfil the 
other criterion for middles identified above: that the properties of the ee are such that it 
is easy/difficult to bring it into a specified state. It is for this reason that middles are 
generally only permitted with processive verbs when an RE is present.
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The middle construction is a good test for telicity. Lexically telic (causative) 
verbs permit middles under all circumstances, whereas non-telic verbs do so only when 
some other element confers telicity on the whole construct. As noted above, the 
interpretation of the middle construction is that the referent of the subject is 
responsible for the ease, or otherwise, of performing the profiled action. In the case of 
non-resultative beating, only the beater can be responsible for the success of the 
beating (for example, he or she must have hands). However, when a result is specified, 
the beatee is able to influence the achievement of that result (beating lead flat is easier 
than beating steel flat). In (333) {Smithy beat the metal flat), as shown in Figure 97 
below, the referent is a set of blows whose combined result is the flatness of the metal 
(the referent of metal is a thematic argument of this set as well as of its members); in
(341) {The brass won’t beat flat), it is this result that provides the telic interpretation 
required by the middle construction and it is the thematic relationship between the set 
and its patient that allows the latter to determine the success of the profiled activity.
The REs in this section have the following properties: they are predicated of a 
lexical argument of the verb (the shared argument is semantically selected, the relevant 
verbs allow eventive passives with those arguments even in the absence of an RE); 
they are able to coerce an otherwise non-telic verb into a telic interpretation (thus one 
that allows both stative passives and middles); and they are controlled semantically by 
the verb (though perhaps not as strongly as those in the previous section). These 
properties must follow from the lexical structures of the relevant verbs, and from the 
structure of the resultative construction. Figure 97 shows a simplified structure for 
Smithy beat the metal flat, beat has a sharer, flat, with which it shares its object; 
Beating, the sense of beat, selects its er and ee in the usual way (see Figure 98); the 
category C, which isa Beating, has a result defined by the sharer whose argument is 
(by the definition of result) the Patient of C.
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result""
:Patiem
Theme
refereni
referent
referent
referent
-subject-
the metalSmithy
Figure 97 Smithy beat the metal flat.
Structurally, these REs do not differ significantly from those discussed in the 
previous section (see Figure 93, Figure 94). The verb has a sharer referring to the result 
of its sense. The affected argument (the er of the result) is an argument of the verb 
(fills a thematic role in the structure of its sense).
The important difference between the two constructions is that they are 
differently motivated. The REs in the previous section are fully controlled by the 
lexical structures of the relevant verbs; control over those in this section is shared 
between the lexical structure of the verb and that of the resultative construction. A verb 
like BEAT has no (profiled) lexical result; it is inherently processive. Figure 98 gives a 
possible lexical semantic structure for the verb. Beating, it is claimed, is a process 
consisting of multiple hitting events. The ee of Beating is the same as the ee of the 
result of the Hitting (recall that in chapter 1 I defended an analysis of HIT where the 
result of Hitting isa Touching (Figure 27)).
TouchingSet Hitting
.member- result-
Beating
eesense
BEAT
Figure 98 b e a t .
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Because of the relationship between the ee of Beating and the result of Hitting, 
b e a t  selects just the same semantic properties as HIT. Because Beating has itself no 
built in result, it can receive one from the linguistic context (notice that this is not 
possible for Hitting, since Hitting does have a built in result, the touching event: Hatty 
hit the metal against the wall/*flat). This contextual result can be controlled by the 
resultative construction identified in the previous section. The result-sharer linking rule 
(Figure 95) provides an interpretation for sharers used with these verbs. The RE is 
(following the properties of results) predicated of the argument identified as affected in 
the lexical structure of the verb.
Figure 99 shows a simplified structure for Benjy bled to death. Bleeding has a 
sense which is an aggregate whose er is the patient of its substance. The concept C, 
intermediate between the sense and the referent, has a result which shares the same 
patient; this is mediated by the same structures that were applied to similar constructs 
involving path verbs (compare Benjy dropped to his knees). Bleeding is an 
unaccusative process: its sense is a set of events affecting the participant; and, just as 
with the path verbs, these events may between themselves be sufficient to bring about 
a result (the set itself may be telic).
’atient'
Patient substance
referent
referent
eferent
referent
death
ubject------
— subject-
Figure 99 Benjy bled to death.
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Transitive verbs of the kind discussed in this section support (eventive) 
passives in the usual way. Stative passives, however, require that the profile contains a 
result state (see Figure 96); thus these verbs support stative passives only when there is 
an RE. The same considerations apply to the middle construction.
As before, when the verbs in this section can appear without their selected 
objects they can also support REs predicated of non-selected objects (344). Verbs with 
obligatory objects cannot (345). O f course, verbs like b l e e d  that support causative and 
unaccusative constructions are interpreted as unaccusative when they appear without 
objects, and necessarily as causative when they appear with an object; the object in a 
transitive construction with BLEED must therefore be a selected one (346).
(344) a. Sooty swept.
b. Sooty swept the air full of dust.
(345) a. * Smithy beat.
b. * Smithy beat the room full of sparks.
(346) a. Benjy bled.
b. * Benjy bled the bucket (full).
As before, non-selected REs are discussed in 4.2.2.3 (the following section), and verbs 
that permit more than one kind of RE are discussed in 4.2.2.4.
4.2.2.3 Resultative expressions with (non-)resultative verbs: non-verbal 
arguments
(347) Shamie shouted herself hoarse.
(348) Barney barked him awake.
(349) We laughed Larry off the stage.
(350) Darcy drank the bar dry.
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The verbs in (347)-(350) are not by themselves telic, any more than those in (329)- 
(332) (Sharnie shouted/barked/laughed/drank for/*in ten minutes)33 though, again, the 
constructions are.
The examples in (347)-(350) differ from those in (329)-(332) above in that the 
object is not selected by the verb: *Sharnie shouted herself, *Barney barked him, 
* Darcy drank the bar, *We laughed Larry. Neither does the verb exercise any 
semantic control over the RE:
(351) Darcy drank the bar dry, the Russians under the table, himself half crazy and his 
mother into the poor house.
(352) Terry can talk the birds out of the trees, the voles out of their holes, a corporation 
omnibus six feet into the air and all the beer from here to Middlesbrough sour in 
the barrel.
The lexical structure of t a l k  has no result, and no object or ee, so the properties of the 
result, and of its argument, are determined entirely by the RE: * Terry talked the table 
to sleep/the birds sour. The argument of the result does not fill a thematic role in the 
lexical semantics of the verb, so the verb cannot select the object.
Though the post verbal noun is not selected as object by the verb, it still clearly 
is an object. I noted above (4.2.2.1) that some verbs that appear with selected REs and 
optional objects (like d r in k  for example) can also appear with non-selected REs. 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 38) stress that this possibility is not open to verbs 
with obligatory objects:
(353) The bombing destroyed *(the city).
(354) *The bombing destroyed (the city) the residents homeless.
The thematic argument of d e s t r o y  must appear as the syntactic object, so the 
verb cannot appear with a non-selected object (only one object is permitted per verb).
33 These sentences can receive an inchoative interpretation, which is telic: We tickled Sharnie and Larry 
with a feather to see who would laugh first. Sharnie laughed in 10 minutes, Larry in 12. See 4.1.
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For Levin and Rappaport Hovav, this lends strong support to the DOR, especially 
when taken alongside examples like (355) (repeated from above) and (356).
(355) Sharnie shouted herself hoarse.
(356) Danny danced himself dizzy.
In these examples, lexically intransitive verbs34 are used with non-selected REs. The 
argument of the result is also an argument of the verb, the shouter and dancer 
respectively, which is represented by the subject in syntactic structure. Yet the RE 
demands that its subject be the object of the verb, so a 'dummy' object must be used 
that corefers with the subject. Non-selected REs apparently do conform to something 
like the DOR.
The claim that the subjects of non-selected REs are objects of their parents is 
given further support by their behaviour in passive constructions. As well as permitting 
passives with the lexical object as subject, verbs like d r in k  also permit passives with a 
non-selected object as subject, though only when there is also an RE (see (357) and 
(358)). Intransitive verbs also permit passives with non-selected objects in subject 
position just as long as there is an accompanying RE (359).
(357) The last of the beer was drunk (up) at/by 1 am.
(358) Darcy's mother was drunk into the poor house.
(359) The birds were talked out of the trees.
(357) (which contains an RE like those discussed in 4.2.2.1) can be interpreted 
either eventively or statively. However, (358) and (359) can only have eventive 
interpretations (She is drunk into the poor house and They are talked out o f  the trees 
can only be interpreted habitually). This is not surprising: the change of state profiled 
by non-selected REs is defined only by the RE itself, so the state of having been talked 
out of a tree is no different from having been charmed, whistled or frightened out. This
34 Both SHOUT and DANCE can be used with objects in other constructions: She shouted a battle 
cry/danced a victory dance. These are discussed in Chapter 1.
233
is the sam e exp lanation  as is  o ffered  elsew here (3.2.1, 4.2.2.1, 5.2.3.5) for the absence  
both o f  statively  interpreted p a ssiv es  and o f  unaccusatives w ith KILL etc.
The REs in this section are not compatible with the middle construction:
(360) * Burton's beers talk sour easily.
(361) Russians just won't drink under the table, [active interpretation only: 'They will 
not imbibe liquids while under the table'; cf. won't/can't be drunk)]
These examples satisfy the second condition on middles (that there is a specific result 
state), but not the first (that the subject fills a thematic role position of the verb).
In summary, REs of this kind can be used with non-telic verbs which are 
capable of appearing without a selected object. They are predicated of the object of the 
verb, even if this means using a dummy object. The RE is not selected semantically by 
the verb; nor is the object. These REs do not support middles or stative passives, 
though they do support eventive passives. The eventive passive structure is just like 
that of passives formed with other REs, and the reasons for the exclusion of stative 
passives and middles have been discussed. The remaining question is why these REs, 
unlike those discussed in the previous sections, can only be predicated of a direct 
object.
In their syntactic structures, these REs are no different from the other kinds. 
The syntactic structure of (350) is shown in the diagram:
■sharer-
>bject..subject.
drythe bardrankDarcy
subject
Figure 100 Darcy drank the bar dry (syntax).
Semantically, they differ in that, as noted, the affected argument is not an argument of 
the verb's sense (see Figure 101). Clearly, the object cannot refer to the ee of Drinking 
in this case, since the ee of Drinking must be a liquid (and must be drunk). In the 
semantic structure of (350) the sense, Drinking, has its usual properties: the drinker 
acts causing some liquid to go inside them. However, the referent of the verb has a
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different result: the referent is a set of drinking events whose result is the referent of 
the sharer.
Liquid
In
■result-
result member
»r inking referent
referent
referent
referent
. /
Darcy drank the bar
Figure 101 Darcy drank the bar dry (semantics).
dry
This is the crucial difference between the REs in this section and the other two 
kinds. These non-selected REs appear by virtue of the result-sharer linking rule 
identified above, that links the sharer and the result relationships. By definition they 
bring their own argument. As noted above, the sharer relationship also appears in other 
structures, where it is linked to different semantic relationships. These other cases can 
also be divided into two groups according to whether the shared dependent is selected 
by the parent. This is the distinction between control and ECM (raising) 
constructions. Strikingly, ECM constructions (where the shared dependent is not 
selected) also conform to the DOR.
Verbs that select ECM constructions (eg c o n s id e r , f in d , e x p e c t , b e l ie v e ) 
select the syntactic properties of their sharers (362), as well as their semantic 
properties (b e l ie v e  selects a state specifically, EXPECT allows other kinds of event), 
but they do not select their objects, which are instead selected by the sharer (363).
(362) a. Phillie found Barry (to be) boring.
b. Phillie believed Barry *(to be) boring.
(363) a. I expect the president to be drunk/it to rain.
b. *1 expect the table to be drunk/the president to rain.
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By contrast, verbs that select control constructions (eg p e r s u a d e , t e l l , 
c o n t in u e , p r o m is e , c l a i m ) select the sharer, syntactically (364) as well as 
semantically (365), and the shared dependent (366), also determining which of the 
verb's dependents is shared (367).
(364) a. Connie continued to wait/waiting, 
b. We persuaded her to wait/* waiting.
(365) a. Ralphy refused a million pounds/to eat worms,
b. Polly promised a million pounds/to eat worms.
(366) Percy persuaded the president to speak/*it to rain.
(367) a. Connie continued (*Wally) to wait.
b. Percy persuaded *(the president) to speak.
This pattern provides an explanation for the constraints on predication of REs. 
Two sharer constructions govern the data. One, a generalisation over the control-type 
structures, involves a shared semantic argument, whose syntactic role is specified by 
the parent; the other, a generalisation over the raising-type structures, involves a shared 
object whose semantic role is determined by the sharer.
The parallel between the two kinds of RE and the control/ECM distinction is 
noted by, among others, Simpson (1983), Carrier and Randall (1992: 226), and 
Wechsler (1997: 309), who also suggests that it explains why non-argument REs 
should conform to the DOR while argument REs do not. Verspoor (1997) develops a 
single cognitive structure for the meanings of resultatives and 'traditional' control and 
ECM constructions, including some constructions with properties of both (those 
profiling performative speech acts like DECLARE, c a l l  etc).
In this section I have explored the properties of REs predicated of non­
arguments of the verb's sense. I begin the following section by summarising the 
properties of the three different kinds of RE discussed above and go on to investigate 
the behaviour of those verbs that appear with more than one of the different kinds.
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4.2.2.4 Verbs that appear with more than one kind of RE
In the preceding sections I have identified three kinds of RE: lexical resultatives 
(4.2.2.1), non-lexical argument resultatives (hereafter argument resultatives) (4.2.2.2) 
and non-lexical non-argument resultatives (hereafter non-argument resultatives) 
(4.2.2.3). All of these three construction types are telic and in all cases there is an 
adjective or preposition depending on the verb that refers to the result of the action 
profiled by the verb. In all cases the RE is predicated of a (syntactic) dependent of the 
verb (it is a sharer). The other properties discussed above do not apply to all three 
types. They are presented in the table.
lexical argument non-argument
pred. of (s) subject 0 0 0
eventive passive 0 0 0 *
stative passive 0 0 * 0
middle 0 0 * 0
semantic control 0 0 0
Table 4. Properties of 3 kinds of RE. * with RE only
The non-argument REs are clearly very different from the other two. They may 
not be predicated of the (surface) subject, they do not permit middles or stative 
passives and the verb exercises no control over either the RE itself or its argument. 
Verbs appearing with REs of this type are, by themselves, intransitive so they do not 
appear in passives of any kind, unless the RE is also present.
The first two types of RE have matching properties: both permit intransitive, 
middle and passive use and in both cases the verb exercises semantic control over the 
RE and its argument. The differences between these two types arise from differences 
between the relevant verbs. Verbs appearing with non-lexical argument REs do not 
permit the middle or the stative passive unless the RE is present.
Significantly, as noted above, some verbs that permit REs of the first two types 
apparently also permit REs of the third kind. Here I consider two such verbs (d r in k  
and p a in t ), showing how the properties in the table distinguish between different 
kinds of RE formed with these verbs. I go on to look at three cases that are apparently
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the sam e (sw e e p , l o a d ; m anner o f  m otion  verbs) to see i f  the sam e principle can be 
applied to their analysis.
(368) a. Dylan drank the beer up. 
b. Dylan drank the bar dry.
(369) a. Pablo painted the canvas red.
b. Pablo painted himself into a comer.
In 4.2.2.1 I claimed that ea t  is a lexically resultative verb, selecting a very 
limited set of REs {up/down). If this is correct, then it also applies to drink  (see
(368)a). I also noted there that ea t  permits unselected REs, when it is used without the 
selected object. Again, the same applies to DRINK ((368)b). PAINT is apparently not 
telic by itself {Pablo painted the canvas for/in half an hour), though it does allow REs 
predicated of a selected object ((369)a). pa in t  further allows non-selected REs, 
predicated of non-selected objects ((369)b).
Before looking at the behaviour of these verbs with respect to resultative 
sharers, I briefly consider their other argument taking properties. Both can be used 
(without objects) to profile a process/activity. The (a) examples in (370) and (371) 
refer to ongoing processes, the (b) examples to iterative or habitual states. Both these 
interpretations are available in the past tense ((370)c and (371)c). These examples are 
clearly not telic.
(370) a. Dylan is drinking.
b. Dylan drinks.
c. Dylan drank for three days solidly/all his life.
(371) a. Pablo is painting.
b. Pablo paints.
c. Pablo painted for three days solidly/all his life.
Both verbs can be used with direct objects. Objects with DRINK refer to the liquid that 
is drunk (or to a toast: Dylan drank a toast to the queen', this is an idiosyncratic lexical 
property that is also open to a very few other verbs, like propose). Objects with paint
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refer to one of three things: a surface or object to which paint is applied, an image 
produced by the act of painting or an element depicted in such an image (it is also 
possible to use the verb with an object referring to the substance that is painted onto 
the surface, but only when an RE is present; this case is discussed shortly). If the 
object refers to a bounded entity, the profiled event may be telic (see 4.2.2.1).
(372) Dylan drank a whisky (in/*for five seconds).
(373) Pablo painted a canvas/a picture/Pablito in/*for four hours.
The primary question in the treatment of verbs like p a in t  that behave 
ambiguously with regard to their syntactic arguments is whether they are to be treated 
as polysemous, in the sense that the structures in (373) are motivated by three different 
senses, or whether the proper analysis allows three different object linking 
arrangements on the basis of a single sense (this issue is discussed at length in the 
following chapter). Conceptually p a in t  profiles an activity carried out (usually with an 
instrument) by an agent, whereby some substance (paint) is applied to some surface; 
often the activity is central to the process of creating a work of art. This conceptual 
structure allows the verb to be taken as profiling either an affective activity (altering a 
surface by painting) or a creative activity (producing an image by painting); because of 
what we know about images, the subject (the thing depicted) is assigned particular 
salience, which motivates the third possibility shown above.
This situation does not require us to posit three senses for the verb, since the 
object relationship is already linked to affected themes and to products and the three 
alternative construals can be taken as alternative projections of the same semantic 
structure. However, in the case of p a in t  there does seem to be some evidence that the 
three variants represent separate senses. For example, the interpretation of elliptical 
constructions must match that of their antecedents ((374)-(375)) (this is the 'zeugma 
test' Cruse (1986 :13, 21)).
(374) ?Jackson painted his bathroom and Pablo (a picture of) a minotaur.
(375) ?Pablo painted the canvas blue all over and then (a picture of) his son on top.
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Verbs like p a in t  serve to underline the importance of using semantic properties 
carefully in determining argument linking (see 1.1.1, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 
(1995: 9)). p a in t  and d r a w  could both be called Verbs of representation’, or some 
such, and they undoubtedly have a lot in common in their conceptual structures. 
However, d r a w  does not support objects referring to the surface to which the 
substance is applied (Pablo drew the paper can only mean that Pablo drew a picture of 
the paper). This constraint on d r a w  is predictable only from what language users 
know about drawing, as contrasted with painting: drawing does not usually cover the 
entire surface and the effect on the surface is generally secondary to the production of 
the image. Because of the effect of language users’ knowledge of the world, the 
semantic structure of d r a w  does not assign the affected argument role to the surface, 
so that the object linking rule cannot apply to this argument.
Compare this with the similar situation of cooking verbs, b o il  allows an object 
referring to a liquid, which is brought to or kept at boiling point ((376)a), or to a food 
item cooked by immersion in boiling liquid ((376)b); b a k e  allows an object referring 
to a food item cooked by exposure to hot air ((377)b), or to a food item produced by 
the exposure of some other element to hot air ((377)c); b o il  does not allow this last 
alternative ((376)c), nor does b a k e  allow the first alternative ascribed to b o il  ((377)a).
(376) a. Borsley boiled the water/milk.
b. Borsley boiled an egg.
c. Borsley boiled *(the wine into) a thick syrup.
(377) a. * Barry baked the air inside the oven.
b. Barry baked a potato.
c. Barry baked (the dough into) a cake.
Both verbs must have all three elements in their conceptual structure (a heat transfer 
medium, the item to which the heat is applied and the product of that application of 
heat), but because of a difference in the events profiled they differ as to which of these 
elements may be expressed as syntactic dependents. A similar argument is advanced in 
the previous chapter to account for the heterogeneity of the various classes of verbs of 
motion.
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Returning to the verbs at hand, d r in k  permits middle constructions (378). 
PAINT does not permit middles with any of the object arguments identified above in 
subject position ((379)a-c), though it does allow what look like middles with subjects 
referring to the substance applied to the surface ((379)d) or to the instrument 
((379)e).35
(378) Chilean wine drinks easily.
(379) a. * Properly primed woodwork paints more smoothly.
b. * Abstracts paint more quickly than portraits.
c. * People paint more easily than animals.
d. This new emulsion paints wonderfully smoothly.
e. My new brush paints beautifully.
Both verbs support eventive passives, but only d r in k  supports stative ones:
(380) a. The wine was drunk by someone in the night, 
b. When I arrived the wine was all drunk.
(381) a. The bam was painted by the whole community together, 
b. *When I got there the bam was completely painted.
(382) a. The Mona Lisa was painted by da Vinci.
b. *Ifm glad to say your portrait is now finally painted Ms Lisa.
(383) a. This famous scene has been painted by all the great artists of our time, 
b. * Choose another scene, this one is already painted.
The evidence from middles and stative passives suggests that DRINK, unlike 
PAINT, is lexically telic: both constructions require that the verb profiles a distinctive 
end state. This implies that d r in k  should be able to take a selected RE, of the kind 
discussed in 4.2.2.1, and that PAINT (since it clearly has an affected argument) should 
be able to take an argument RE, of the kind discussed in 4.2.2.2. This prediction is
35 The acceptability judgments in this section may be questioned by some readers. It has been suggested 
that paint behaves in just the same way as drink with respect to these constructions; if  this is the case 
then the comments contrasting the two verbs' behaviour do not apply.
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apparently borne out ((384)-(385)); when the object refers to the product, however, 
p a in t  does not permit an RE for the simple reason that the product is the result (386).
(384) Dylan drank the wine up.
(385) Pablo painted the canvas red.
(386) *Pablo painted the portrait valuable/Pablito famous.
However, as noted above, these verbs also permit REs predicated of non- 
selected objects ((387)-(388)). p a in t  additionally permits REs predicated of objects 
referring to the substance applied to the surface (389); recall that this element can also 
surface as the subject of a middle construction ((379)d) but note that it cannot appear 
as object unless the RE is present: * Pablo painted the emulsion. This pattern is 
discussed below with regard to similar verbs, like s p r a y  and LOAD.
(387) Dylan drank the bar dry.
(388) Pablo painted himself into a comer.
(389) Pablo painted the emulsion onto the wall.
Comparing the properties of the constructions in the examples with those given 
in Table 4 above makes it clear that these verbs can appear with more than one kind of 
RE.
>  First, neither d r in k  nor p a in t  can be used intransitively with an RE. By itself this 
does not help to distinguish between the different examples, but it is clear the 
examples in (387)-(388) are non-argument REs (drink yourself silly. paint yourself 
into a corner).
> Middle constructions can be made using the REs in the selected examples above, 
where the result is one canonically associated with the verb, but not with other 
results ((390)-(391)). Further, contrasting (390) with (378) and (379) above 
suggests that DRINK is, while p a in t  is not, a lexically resultative verb.
(390) a. This young but considered Pinot drinks up wonderfully smoothly.
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b. Red walls don't paint white again so easily.
(391) a. * Russians don't drink under the table in five minutes, 
b. * At last, a brush the bristles won't paint off!
> Stative passives can be made using the canonical REs (392), but not with the other 
results (393). In 4.2.2.2 above (examples (337)-(340)) I claimed, following Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 43-44), that non-selected REs did not permit stative 
interpretation in the passive. The examples in (393) are, as we would expect, 
unacceptable. However, some passives formed with non-argument REs can 
apparently have a stative interpretation (394). It is unclear whether this is a general 
property of non-argument REs (in which case Levin and Rappaport Hovav's claim 
is wrong) or an exceptional stative passive licensed by some highly conventional 
idiomatic constructions.
(392) a. They won't let you leave till all the wine is drunk (up), 
b. I'm not moving in until the whole flat is painted (white).
(393) a. * Dylan won’t rest until his mother is drunk right into the poor house, 
b. *1 can't do any more: the bristles are painted right off my brush.
(394) - Can I have a beer please?
- No, I'm sorry sir. The bar is/we are drunk dry.
>  Both kinds of RE permit eventive passives. Without the RE the verbs permit 
passives only when the object is the one selected by the verb:
(395) a. They won't let you leave till the wine is drunk (up),
b. I'm not moving in until the flat is painted (white).
(396) a. Dylan won't rest until his mother has been drunk *(into the poor house),
b. I can't do any more: the bristles have been painted *(off my brush).
As noted above (4.2.2.3), this is not surprising since in the absence of the RE the 
verbs cannot appear in active constructions with the objects in the (396) examples 
(without implausibility: He drank his mother/painted the bristles have highly
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unlikely meanings). This confirms that these examples are cases of non-argument 
REs; (395) confirms that these verbs can nevertheless be used with REs predicated 
of selected verbal arguments.
In summary, d r in k  appears to be a lexically selected telic verb whose profile 
includes a drinker, a (liquid) drinkee and the action of the former on the latter, that 
results in the drinkee being contained by the drinker (or perhaps simply absent). It 
appears that p a in t  inherently profiles an activity, carried out by a painter (using an 
instrument). There are (at least) two other participants that are plausibly affected by the 
activity: the paint and the surface to which it is applied. The choice between these two 
arguments as paintee is discussed shortly, but from the above discussion it is clear that 
the surface can appear as affected argument, whether or not the profiled event is telic. 
Telic painting can result in a product (a painting) or in a change in the state of the 
surface.
Both verbs can be used in non-telic constructions, with objects with unbounded 
referents or without objects altogether, and therefore also in telic constructions where 
the result is not that defined by the profile of the verb. These constructions conform to 
the general requirements on resultative sharers.
4.2.2.5 Other verbs showing variable behaviour
The tests given in Table 4 can be used to shed some light on another well-known case 
of variability: that of verbs like s w e e p  and w ip e , Levin and Rappaport Hovav's (1991) 
'verbs of clearing', and perhaps also that of verbs like SPRAY and LOAD (see 3.2.3.3, 
4.1.2.6). Verbs of both o f these kinds can appear with REs predicated of a direct object 
referring to a location or to something removed from or placed at that location. They 
can also all appear with non-selected REs predicated of non-arguments. Typically the 
location-object and locatum-object variants of these verbs are treated as separate 
lexemes related by derivation (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995, Jackendoff 1990), 
though some (eg Dowty 1991) argue for a single lexical representation, claiming that 
differences in interpretation are predictable on the basis of differences in the 
construction. If both location-object and locatum-object REs can be shown to be
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argument resultatives then it is at least clear that the profile of the verb must permit 
either location or locatum as its ee, however this is to be mediated.
(397) a. Sooty swept the path clear.
b. Sooty swept the crumbs off the floor.
c. Sooty swept himself exhausted/the bristles off the broom.
(398) a. Laurie loaded the lorry full.
b. Laurie loaded the lolly on the lorry.36
c. Laurie loaded himself exhausted/his back sore.
> REs predicated both of the location and of the locatum allow middles (though the 
location-object example with l o a d  is doubtful); REs predicated of non-arguments 
do not:
(399) a. New Sno-wite carpet tiles just sweep clean!
b. ?My new Loadalot lorry doesn’t load full in a hurry!
(400) a. Coffee grounds don't sweep up easily.
b. The safe won’t load into that lorry without a forklift.
(401) a. *At last, a broom the bristles won't sweep off! 
b. * Straight backs don't load sore.
> Both kinds of argument RE also permit stative passives, whereas non-argument 
REs do not:
(402) a. I'm not coming out until the floor is swept clean, 
b. Drive off as soon as the lorry is loaded full.
(403) a. I'm not coming out until the crumbs are swept up. 
b. Drive off as soon as the lolly is loaded on the lorry.
(404) a. *Get yourself a new broom if the bristles are swept off that one. 
b. *Go to the chiropractor if your back is loaded sore.
36 "lol*ly ... Br slang dated money." CIDE: 837.
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> The verbs can appear in an eventive passive with or without an RE if the object 
refers to the location (405), but only with an RE when the object refers to the 
locatum (406). This is not altogether surprising, since it can also only appear in 
active expressions with the object referring to the locatum when there is an RE
37(408) . Neither verb can appear in eventive passives with non-selected objects in 
the absence of an RE; strangely l o a d  cannot do so even when the RE is present 
((407)b).
(405) a. I'm not coming out until the floor has been swept (clean), 
b. Drive off as soon as the lorry has been loaded (full).
(406) a. I'm not coming out until the crumbs have been swept *(up).
b. Drive off as soon as the lolly has been loaded * (up/on the lorry).
(407) a. Get yourself a new broom if the bristles have been swept *(off that one), 
b. *Go to the chiropractor if your back has been loaded (sore).
(408) a. Sooty swept the carpet/*the crumbs/*the bristles, 
b. Laurie loaded the lorry/*the lolly/*his back.
The behaviour of these words with REs shows that both the locatum and the 
location are (lexical) semantic arguments of the verb. It further shows that the referent 
of the object (be it a locatum or a location) is construed as affected by the profiled 
event. This is in accordance with observations (Dowty 1991, Rappaport and Levin 
1988, above 4.1.2.6) that the referent of the object (when definite) is construed as 
wholly affected, and with the related fact that it is this argument that determines the 
aspectual properties of the utterance: ((409)a) implies ((409)b), but ((410)a) does not 
imply ((410)b).
(409) a. I am sweeping crumbs off the carpet 
b. I have swept crumbs off the carpet.
(410) a. I am sweeping the crumbs off the carpet 
b. I have swept the crumbs off the carpet.
37 SWEEP does tolerate locatum-object constructions without an RE in some circumstances: All morning 
Cathy cut the hedge and I swept the clippings.
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As noted, the locatum-object uses require the RE. This property is common to a 
number of constructions referring to caused motion: Patty put the putty *(in the frame). 
Verbs that have this property encode a result, which is the same as the location (see
(403)); other caused motion verbs (including MOVE) do not encode a result, and for this 
reason they can be used without the RE.38 Figure 102 shows Putting and Moving/c, the 
senses of p u t  and (causative) m o v e  respectively. Moving/c isa affecting, where the 
effect on the ee involves its following a path, Putting isa Moving/c, but also isa 
Making, since it has a result (see 3.1.4.2, Figure 48).
LocationTheme
er.
Moving/c
path-
Making
er
result.
.path'
end
Putting
result-
Figure 102 Putting and Moving.
38 Some caused motion verbs that do encode a result can be used without the result being expressed as 
long as it can be derived from the context: Iggy inserted a new cassette.
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Resultative verbs like i n s e r t  have senses that isa Putting and non-resultative 
verbs like PUSH have senses that isa Moving. Verbs like SWEEP and LOAD can be used 
with a sense of each kind.
4.2.3 Summary (REs and Climbing)
The sharer-result construction given in 4.2.2.1 (repeated in Figure 103) provides the 
structure for all REs.
 result ^
Verb
referentsense
harer-
Figure 103 The resultative sharer.
When the verb is a resultative one (has a result built into its lexical semantic structure), 
the RE refers to that lexical result. When the verb has a causative sense, and so the 
argument of the result state is the ee of the verb’s sense, the result is predicated of the 
ee (the referent of the object):
(411) Gary ground the coffee to powder.
When the verb has an unaccusative sense, and so the argument of the result state is the 
er of the verb's sense, the result is predicated of the er (the referent of the subject):
(412) The river froze solid.
When the verb is not resultative, an RE can be used (under the right circumstances) to 
add a result to the composite semantic structure. Since the sharer-result construction 
specifies that the result is predicated of the ee of the verb's sense, where the verb's 
sense has a lexical ee, the RE is necessarily predicated of this argument:
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(413) Smithy beat the metal flat.
When the verb has no lexical ee, the RE is able to introduce one of these to the 
composite semantic structure as well:
(414) Darcy drank the bar dry.
These are the three kinds of RE identified in the preceding sections. Their 
properties are determined by those of the resultative construction and those of the 
various verbs. Under this analysis the resultative construction as a lexical category has 
a family resemblance structure similar to that proposed for Climbing by Fillmore 
(1982). Climbing, Fillmore argues, involves a manner ('Clambering') and a path 
('Upwards'). Either one of these components is sufficient to classify an event as 
climbing {Clive climbed down the tree, The plane climbed to 10,000 feet). The 
resultative construction is similar in that it has two properties (obeys the DOR, is 
selected by the verb), either (but not both) of which may be absent.
The resultative construction consists of two uses of the sharer relationship, in 
control and in ECM constructions. In the former, since the affected argument is a 
thematic associate of the verb's sense, the verb's own properties determine whether it is 
the referent of the subject or object {grind the coffee to powder,; freeze solid); in the 
latter, since the affected argument is not a lexical associate of the verb's sense, it is 
selected by the resultative expression and must be the referent of an object {drink the 
bar dry/*silly, drink yourself silly/*dry). Naturally, some verbs with sufficiently 
flexible lexical semantics (polysemous verbs) can appear with either kind of RE 
{sweep the hall clean/the crumbs into a cupped hand/your team into the record books).
The semantics of the various REs is structured by the aspectual mechanisms 
introduced in the first part of the chapter. Resultative expressions are necessarily (by 
definition) telic and there is a limited number of ways that a verb's sense can be (or be 
made) telic. Verbs that have telic senses participate in lexical (control) REs. Of these
39 The ECM construction requires object-sharing perhaps because the verb exercises too much control 
over its subject to allow a merger o f  the two arguments. For the same reason only verbs that can appear 
without selected objects are compatible with an ECM resultative.
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some consist of simple events that have a result (achievements, cut an arm off) and 
others consist of sets (or aggregates) of events with a combined result 
(accomplishments, freeze the lake solid). The same possibilities are open to non-lexical 
(ECM) REs {sneeze the ffo th  o ff the coffee\ talk yourself into a job).
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5. Ambiguity and the 'Causative Alternation'
In the previous two chapters I have discussed words that appear to exhibit variable 
behaviour of one kind or another. In this chapter I attempt to regularise the treatment 
of variable behaviour by looking more closely at the phenomenon and at some 
mechanisms for handling it. In the second part of the chapter I look at a particular kind 
of variability: the causative alternation that relates examples like those in (415).
(415) a. I split my head right open,
b. My head split right open.
5.1 Ambiguity: classifying ambiguity; modelling ambiguity; a continuum
5.1.1 Classifying ambiguity
The term ambiguity is often used to refer to a situation where a particular word (or a 
particular word form, see below) has two or more alternative meanings (for example 
b an k : 'financial institution', 'geographical feature'). The sense I use here represents a 
much broader phenomenon that covers all cases of mismatch between different levels 
of linguistic structure. This sense subsumes formal variants (eg w h ile :  (while), 
{whilst}), synonyms (SHUT, CLOSED) and words with multiple valencies (415) as well 
as homonymy and polysemy (b a n k ; d o g :  'canine', 'male canine'). Before I narrow the 
view down again in the second part of this chapter (which deals with the case of the 
causative alternation) I provide a survey of the wider phenomenon, and of some 
approaches to it.
Ambiguity is a property of lexical items. A lexical item is easiest and most 
generally understood as an arbitrary (conventional) pairing of a meaning and a form 
(pronunciation/spelling). At its simplest, syntactic behaviour is determined by 
assigning the lexical item to a word class (defined according to syntactic or semantic 
principles). The rules of syntax then make reference to these word classes, defining the 
order they must follow in well formed sentences. However, this is not really enough, 
since many words make particular demands on the syntactic structures they appear in. 
d ev o u r  must have an object, ea t  may and DINE may not; rely  demands the 
preposition ON; w a n t  allows a noun direct object or a TO complement, whereas w ish 
permits only the latter. The specific syntactic requirements of lexical items can be
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represented in various ways (smaller word classes, lists of complements or 
complement features, etc) but, however it is encoded, this information must be 
associated with a part of the lexical structure. This means that a lexical item must have 
(at least) three poles: one that is the locus of information about its morphology, one for 
its syntactic properties and one for its meaning (called in WG the form, lexeme and 
sense respectively, see above). If this is correct, then it should be possible in principle 
for any of these poles to be ambiguously connected to any of the others. This provides 
eight different kinds of lexical item, summarised in the table.
a b c d e f g h
sense 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
lexeme 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
form 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Table 5. Eight kinds of lexical item.
The eight possible kinds of lexeme are differentiated by the linking between the 
poles. In the first kind, a single form is associated with a single lexeme (word class, 
valency...) and a single sense; in the second two alternative forms are associated with a 
single lexeme with a single sense; and so on. Examples can be found of each of these 
types as follows:
a. should need no exemplification, since it represents the 'normal' state of 
affairs. Truly unambiguous lexical items are hard to find, however. Perhaps 'logical' 
operators like NOT or technical terms like NOUN qualify (though even NOUN is 
ambiguous for some: 'noun/1'; 'noun/1 or pronoun').
b. might be called polymorphy (though see below), in that the lexeme is 
associated with more than one form. An example is while/ w hilst . Arguably, this is 
also the appropriate category for the treatment of i/ m e .
c. represents what Pustejovsky and Boguraev (1996) (among others) call 
'polymorphy'. I prefer the term polyvalence, since these examples involve a single 
form (morphology), associated with more than one lexeme (representing the valence). 
A good example may be BEGIN, where the same form, {begin}, can be used with three 
different valencies without any perceptible change in meaning (416)-(418).
(416) Becky began her run.
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(417) Becky began running.
(418) Becky began to run.
d. is synonymy. Just as with polysemy/homonymy (below), this kind of 
ambiguity may be arbitrary (eg f a s t , q u ic k ) or motivated (eg ex plo d e , explo sio n).
e. represents what is traditionally termed 'ambiguity’. This sort of ambiguity is 
generally separated into p o ly se m y  (eg DOG: 'canine', 'male canine') where there is an 
obvious relationship between the two senses and h om on ym y (eg b a n k : 'earth feature', 
b a n k : 'financial institution') where there is not. This distinction is discussed below.
f. represents the relationship between inflectional variants, where a regular 
variation in form corresponds to an equally regular variation in meaning for a given 
lexeme. In the case of o n e , the variation in meaning and in form are unrelated. ONE has 
two possible senses ('someone' and '1') and two possible pronunciations (/w An/, 
/won/).
g. is, like e., also often called ambiguity. The difference is that in this case the 
lexemes are separate too. Again these lexical items can be separated into polysemous 
cases (eg POCKET/n, po c k et /v) where there is a relationship between the two 
meanings, and homonymous ones (eg shift/v : 'move', SHiFT/n: 'shirt') where there is 
not. In the examples I give here, the lexemes are clearly different, since they are of 
different word classes; below I argue for such an analysis in cases where the separation 
of the lexemes is not so clear cut.
h., like a., represents the 'normal' state of affairs: unrelated unambiguous lexical 
items. However, it is also possible for the lexical items to be related to each other, by 
some derivation relation, as in the case of possible  and im possible or br ea k  and 
BROKEN/adj.
The discussion above summarises the possible kinds of ambiguity. They are not 
all equally common, though all seem to be represented, and only a few correspond to 
what is traditionally meant by ambiguity. Some of these possibilities will be 
considered later for use in the analysis of the causative/unaccusative alternation.
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5.1.2 Modelling ambiguity
In exemplifying the possibilities I have made a distinction between 'coincidental’ 
ambiguities, where the two meanings, lexemes or forms are not related (except in as 
much as they share a form, lexeme or meaning) and 'motivated' ambiguities, where 
they are connected by some semantic, lexical or formal relationship. This distinction 
corresponds (as I note above) to the traditional distinction between homonymy and 
polysemy, also called contrastive and complementary ambiguity respectively 
(Weinreich 1964). Some writers propose a more sophisticated division however.
For example, Pustejovsky and Boguraev (1996) recognise both contrastive and 
complementary ambiguity (which they treat as an example of 'logical polysemy', where 
the lexical item is underspecified rather than ambiguous and the alternative form, 
valency or meaning derives from the context; I return to this question), but propose an 
additional possibility they call sense extension (ibid: 6), which is a productive form of 
polysemy, where a separate and related sense is created by a (more or less) productive 
lexical rule. A good example is the use of a mass noun to refer to a specific (countable) 
portion: a beer, a coffee, etc. This pattern is quite general but it is subject to some 
limitations: a stilton and a motor oil refer to different things (a particular type or brand 
in each case). It may be possible to constrain some of these semi-productive extensions 
without stipulation in terms of the specific semantic structures that they affect.
As well as a typology of ambiguities we must have some means of assigning 
particular phenomena to the appropriate type (i.e. of deciding which kind of ambiguity 
is involved). Here I consider a set of models developed by Croft (1998a), and the 
arguments he puts forward regarding how the choice between different models can be 
made. Croft recognises four basic models, defined at different levels of generality. He 
argues that, while linguistic evidence can be used to rule out the application of the 
more general models to a particular phenomenon, it cannot be used to rule out the 
application of a more specific model, since there is no reason to suppose that linguistic 
information is represented at the most general level possible.
Croft’s models are described in the introduction as ‘points on a probable 
continuum’ (ibid: 151) and Croft explicitly recognises some intermediate models that 
share properties of more than one basic model. In 5.1.3 I show that the nature of that 
continuum becomes clear when the structural possibilities are represented in the WG
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framework. I also show that the linguistic models can be divided according to three 
identifiable structural features: formal relatedness, productivity and motivation.
The models apply to two kinds of ambiguity. The ‘simple’ models are 
representations of cases where the same form has separate uses, as in the case of d o g . 
The ‘complex’ models represent cases of different, but related forms with different 
uses. Croft’s examples of complex cases are: p ro ’duce/’produce, sing!singer, 
write/write down and hand me it/hand it to me (1998a: 154). Note that these examples 
include (at least) two of the kinds I identified above, because of differences between 
the WG framework and that used by Croft, as explained here.
In Cognitive Grammar (CG) (see Langacker 1991), the framework Croft uses, 
lexical items consist of pairings of a form and a use in a lexical unit. The form 
corresponds to the form and elements of the lexeme in the WG analysis. The first two 
quoted examples clearly involve different forms, but they also must involve different 
lexemes in WG since they are of different word classes. The second two involve a 
single form and, arguably, separate lexemes. The verb in hand me it has an indirect and 
a direct object, whereas that in hand it to me has a direct object and a complement. 
This difference is most straightforwardly represented by giving each valency to a 
different lexeme, each a subcase of h a n d / v ,  which share the same sense. Then the 
ambiguity is polyvalence (c. above).40 In CG, however, examples like this are 
polysemous, since the two constructions have different meanings, so that the relevant 
form has two possible interpretations, each of which entails a different syntactic 
structure. In this way CG use corresponds to the sense (and elements of the lexeme) of 
the WG analysis.
The models are arranged in the other dimension along a continuum which 
extends from the specific to the general. That is, some linguistic representations are 
specific to particular symbolic units, while others apply to more general categories. A 
significant part of his argument is that ‘grammatical and semantic idiosyncrasies are 
evidence for excluding the more general models’ (Croft 1998a: 151). To use a very 
simple morphological example, the fact that the plural form of m o u s e  is {mice} can
40 In chapter 1 I argue for an analysis o f  the indirect object relationship as a construction separate from 
the lexical entry o f its parent. This allows the two uses o f HAND to share a single lexeme, as in e. above 
(polysemy).
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only be represented at the level of the individual unit, while regular plurals may be 
represented at a more general level. So, for any given example of ambiguity, at least 
one of the models must apply. Close analysis of the data can supply evidence for 
excluding the more general models in each case. However, Croft argues that the 
converse is not necessarily true: ‘grammatical and semantic generality is not a priori 
evidence for excluding the more specific models’ (ibid). Croft's models are as follows:
The independent entries (homonymy) model. The classic case of homonymy 
is that of b a n k . Here, the same form has two unrelated meanings. Croft argues that this 
requires two separate entrenched (lexical) representations. In this model, formal 
identity (or relatedness for the complex model) is, synchronically at least, purely 
accidental. The two symbolic units are connected only in as much as they share a form 
(or in as much as their forms are related). Idioms provide good examples for this 
model. No semantic generalities connect the meaning of KICK with that of kick in kick 
the bucket that do not also apply to the semantics of a wide variety of other verbs, so 
the two must have independent entries.
The polysemy model. The polysemy model differs from homonymy in as 
much as there is a semantic relationship between the two uses. It is this semantic 
relationship that motivates the identity of form. In the case of the complex polysemy 
model, the semantic relationship corresponds to a formal (lexical) relationship between 
the two forms. This formal relationship is therefore itself symbolic, as it corresponds to 
a part of conceptual structure.
d o g  provides a good example for the simple polysemy model: it has two 
meanings, Canine and Male-canine, which are closely related semantically (one is a 
subset of the other). This relationship, however, is not general even to all animal types. 
In the case of cow, the opposite situation holds: cow refers to the concepts Bovine and 
Female-bovine.
A n  exam ple o f  a com p lex  p olysem y m odel m ight be IN- prefixing. There is a 
regular formal relationship betw een  a word and its 'iN-form’, w hich  includes som e  
regular spelling and pronunciation changes ( inaccessible , IMPOSSIBLE, ir r eg u la r , 
illegible), and a corresponding sem antic relationship betw een the senses o f  the tw o  
form s ( ‘negation or privation’ OED). H ow ever, both forms (m ore importantly the 'in - 
form s’) m ust be represented separately because not all adjectives have an ’IN-form’
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(* in a v a il a ble). The rule is not productive so the relationship must be represented 
lexically for each example.
The derivational model. The derivational model differs from polysemy in that 
the relationship between the two linguistic structures is productive. In this model there 
is only one independent (entrenched) unit. The other is derived from the first by a 
language-specific rule. The simple derivational model represents a semantic 
relationship between two classes of uses having the same form. For example, in a 
process called ‘animal grinding’ by Pustejovsky and Boguraev (1996: 3-4), the names 
of fish (including the noun f i s h  itself) can also be used to refer to the flesh of the fish:
(419) a. The fish/shark/haddock swam under the boat,
b. I ordered the fish/shark/haddock.
Since this applies to all fish (in fact, with only a few exceptions, it applies to all meat- 
bearing animals; Copestake and Briscoe (1996: 37) quote an example from the LOB 
corpus where m o le  is used in this way), it could be argued that only one symbolic 
relationship need be recognised in the lexicon: the relationship between a class of 
animals and their meat (flesh which is eaten). Under this analysis, the polysemy is a 
property of a more general category.
Copestake and Briscoe (ibid) analyse this as a case of sense extension. The 
mass use is produced, they argue, by a lexical rule, apparently applying to all (edible) 
animals. This productive rule is blocked by pork  and beef from applying in the case 
of PIG and COW, though they do quote an example of each of these count nouns in mass 
usages (ibid: 38).
The complex derivational model represents a regular symbolic relationship. 
Two forms are related in a regular way and the formal relationship corresponds 
regularly to a semantic relationship. The symbolic relationship is productive, for 
Pustejovsky and Boguraev coercive, so that, again, only one of the form/meaning pairs 
need be entrenched. The recipient indirect object provides a good example of this 
model (see 1.2.3.3). As noted above, all verbs of transfer can have an indirect object 
referring to the goal:
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(420) I sent/posted/faxed/emailed him the news.
Since this applies to any verb of transfer as soon as it becomes available, it 
must be a productive rule. In fact, it appears to apply even to nonce words where no 
independent representation is possible (I carshaltoned him the news), forcing them to 
be interpreted as verbs of transfer. It can also be used with verbs that are not lexically 
verbs of transfer, again forcing them to be so construed (Archie waggled Benjy the 
news with his ears).
Croft suggests, however, that the representation of the double object 
construction is nevertheless entrenched (as in the polysemy model) for the more 
conventional examples (1998a: 164). It is part of his claim that representation can be at 
more than one level o f generality and it does not seem unreasonable in this case. The 
resultative construction, like the indirect object construction, is defined in part by those 
lexical items that select it but it also has a more general lexical representation of its 
own that determines its behaviour when used alongside lexical items that do not select 
it (Tomasello 1998a: xvii-xviii, and see 4.2.2.3).
The claim that more specific representations can coexist with productive 
patterns makes sense from the point of view of language learning. Language learners 
must hear, and lexicalise, at least two verbs used with indirect objects in order to 
extract the relevant generalisation. The lexical representations of these verbs, including 
the information that they may be used with indirect objects, are presumably not 
forgotten when the generalisation is extracted, though they may decay through lack of 
exposure. Other examples of learning classes must work in the same way: we observe 
of the first people we encounter that they have two arms, hair, faces etc and eventually 
assign these properties to a class, but this doesn't mean that we have to consider the 
properties of humans in general to ascertain how many arms our mothers have.
The pragmatic model. The simple pragmatic model involves a single, 
monosemous, symbolic unit, pairing a single form with a single use. This use can be 
extended in a number of ways, according to general (therefore universal) cognitive 
principles. It might be argued that the use of a word referring to an institution to refer 
to the building that houses it (The bank is next to the school) follows from pragmatic
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principles. Of course, if that were so, this ambiguity would be found in all the world's 
languages.
The complex pragmatic model involves two symbolic units, both monosemous. 
The two forms combine according to the relevant formal principles but the 
combination of the two uses is interpreted according to general cognitive principles. 
For example, the difference between eat cheese and eat soup might be said to be 
predictable from the properties of eating and those of cheese and soup and not on the 
basis of the linguistic properties of the elements involved. This position is more 
plausible the more different world languages are found to use the same verb for the 
consumption of both cheese and soup. After a small survey, I can report that Chinese, 
Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Spanish and Turkish speakers prefer the 
translation equivalent of eat soup over that of drink soup, though many speakers of all 
languages can accept the latter to describe drinking soup out of a cup. This latter fact 
particularly supports the view that this involves a pragmatic model.
The pragmatic model subsumes some of Pustejovsky and Boguraev’s cases of 
complementary ambiguity (the rest belonging to the derivational model). The 
interpretation of the adjective in a fast typist, a fast car and a fast waltz is determined 
by what we know about typists, cars and waltzing respectively (1996b: 5). This cannot 
be part of the lexical semantic structure, since, as Copestake and Briscoe (1996: 33) 
point out, the default interpretations can be overridden:
(421) The skiing race was won by the fast typist, who beat the slow accountant by 10 
seconds.
The pragmatic model requires that the variability be common to all languages. 
Croft (1998a) gives the example of English water tower as an extended use of TOWER 
that cannot be assigned to the pragmatic model, since water towers are called chateaux 
d'eau ('water castles') in French. This seems reasonable in this case (especially since 
the alternative forms *water castle and *tour d'eau are not found), but I have some 
reservations about the principle because moving between two languages entails 
moving between two complex systems of assumptions (including the very rules of the 
languages!). If, for example Russian speakers prefer ( v i ) p e e t j  ('drink') to (s)YESTJ
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('eat') as the appropriate verb referring to the consumption of soup, this would not 
necessarily amount to evidence for excluding the variability eat soup/eat cheese from 
the pragmatic model, until it has been established that Russians typically eat soup in 
the same way as the English: it may be (though it isn't) that Russians traditionally take 
very thin soup, which they drink out of cups.
5.1.3 Croft’s models in the WG framework: a continuum.
In this section I look at how Croft’s models can be represented in the WG framework. I 
place the models on a continuum, and identify the features that distinguish between 
them.
The simple and complex models are distinguished by the number of forms: a 
simple model involves a single form and a complex model involves two related forms. 
As noted above, CG's form corresponds to both form and lexeme in WG. This 
difference has important consequences, that are explored below, but for now it will 
suffice to say that the simple models involve single lexemes and the complex models 
pairs of related lexemes.
> The homonymy, or independent entries models involve a lexeme, or pair of 
lexemes, associated with two semantically unrelated senses.
> The polysemy models involve a lexeme, or pair of lexemes, associated with two 
semantically related senses.
> In the derivation models, this semantic relationship is a regular one. That is, it 
applies equally to a number of lexical items, by virtue of semantic features 
associated with their senses. Regularity is represented in WG by assigning the 
relevant property to a class of elements so the derivation models establish two 
semantic classes, defined by the relationship between them. Evidently, an element 
can belong to more than one such class, to the extent that it possesses more than 
one of the qualifying features (or sets of features). For example the verb p r o d u c e  
participates in both stress-shifting nominalisation and in -ER nominalisation.
> The pragmatic model in WG calls for a single lexical item whose structure is 
sufficiently general to permit it to appear in different structures, the specifics of 
meaning or valency being filled in by the context.
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I n o w  turn to  a c lo ser  investigation  o f  the three distinguishing features 
identified  above. T he first o f  th ese  is  the identity o f  lexem e that d istinguishes sim ple  
from co m p lex  m od els. A s  can be seen  from  the exam ples o f  com plex  m odels given  so 
far, a num ber o f  syntactic properties distinguish the tw o lexem es and a number o f  
com m on syntactic properties con n ect them , pr o d uc e/v and PRODUCE/n share the same 
spelling but d iffer as to  pronunciation  and word class, sing  and sing er  additionally  
differ as to sp ellin g , w rite  and WRiTE/down share the sam e form and word class but 
select d ifferent dependents, p o ssib le  and IMPOSSIBLE differ (m orpho-syntactically) 
only in their form . S o  in  the co m p lex  m odels, the tw o syntactic lexem es can be related 
in any one o f  a num ber o f  w ays. In the light o f  this, the sim ple m od els can be 
considered as a sp ecia l ca se  w here the tw o lexem es are related by identity.
The second distinguishing feature identified above is that of semantic 
relatedness, which distinguishes homonymy from polysemy. In WG, as outlined 
above, semantic information (in fact, all linguistic information), is represented in a 
network. In a network, all elements are, to some extent, related to each other, so this 
cannot be considered a binary feature. Evidently, though, something interesting can be 
said about the closeness of the relationship in some cases. For example, the two senses 
associated with DOG are related by a single isa relationship (Figure 104), whereas two 
of the senses associated with b a n k  are relatively distantly related (Figure 105).
Canine
Bitchsense Dog
sensesense
DOG BITCH
Figure 104 DOG.
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Thing
Geographic al-feature
Institution
Earth-feature
Bank/earth
Bank/river
\ sense/
Bank/money
sens“ sense
BANK 
Figure 105 b a n k .
The fact that the relationship between the two senses of DOG is so close can be 
said to be significant: it motivates the polysemy. The relationship between the two 
senses of b a n k , being much more distant, is more likely to be accidental. However, it 
is not possible to give exact specification of the degree of closeness that is required to 
motivate a given example. All that is necessary in order to establish that two concepts 
are closely related in this way is that the individual speaker be (explicitly) aware of the 
relationship.
Polysemy is distinguished from derivation by the fact that in the latter case the 
semantic relationship applies to a class of concepts. The size of this class varies 
between cases. Animal grinding seems to apply regularly only to creatures whose flesh 
we are used to eating (though see below (423)). The recipient indirect object 
construction applies to all verbs of transfer (except those that already have lexically 
specified linking, e.g. b e s t o w , p r e s e n t ). Levin (1993: 83) identifies a regular 
alternation involving only two verbs, the ‘Source Subject Alternation’:
(422) a. The middle class will benefit/profit from the new tax laws.
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b. The new tax laws will benefit/profit the middle class.
Croft’s models of ambiguity, then, can be taken as limiting cases defined by 
interacting scalar criteria. The table gives the distribution of the simple and complex 
homonymy, polysemy and derivation models.
unmotivated motivated
unproductive productive
single lexeme simple homonymy simple polysemy simple derivation
two lexemes complex homonymy complex polysemy complex derivation
Table 6. Croft's models of ambiguity.
Figure 104 and Figure 105 show how WG models simple homonymy and 
polysemy. In both cases, a single lexeme is associated with two separate senses (which 
may or may not be related). Complex homonymy and polysemy are similar, though in 
these cases the syntactic pole consists of two more or less related lexemes. Croft’s 
models all involve small changes in the form of the word or its valency. Pustejovsky 
and Bouillon’s examples of polymorphy involve changes in valency, which preserve 
the form. However, there are examples where the lexemes are not formally related at 
all; for example, the relationships between the senses of HORSE and STALLION is just 
the same as that between the two senses of DOG, yet their forms are unrelated.
Derivational polysemy can be modelled quite simply in WG. Since no 
distinction is made between lexical and grammatical structures, semantic structures can 
contain relationships that hold between classes of semantic elements. The relationship 
between the class of meat-bearing animals and their flesh is shown in Figure 106.
Person 
/
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FoodFlesh Eating
Animal
Meat
sense sense 
\ /
Figure 106 m e a t .
The figure shows a class of polysemous lexemes (not named in the diagram). 
The alternative senses correspond to the animal and its edible flesh. Figure 106 
amounts to a schematic representation of the ‘animal grinding’ relationship by which 
any word that refers to an animal can be used to refer to its edible flesh. This 
generalisation may be a special case of the pattern that allows lexically countable 
nouns to be used to refer to the substance of the lexical sense (423), though it does 
need to be represented independently in the grammar because it is more limited in 
application. It will also, of course, be overridden in the case of pairs like COW and 
b e e f , p ig  and PORK etc.
(423) There was fish/aubergine/pig/balloon all over the floor.
Complex derivational polysemy involves two more or less related classes of 
word, {en} addition applies to a wide range of adjectives. The schematic 
representation of the syntactic pole involves a relationship between two lexemes (an 
adjective and a verb) whose bases differ only with regard to the {en}. The senses of 
these lexemes are a state and an action whose result is that state.
-result'
Adjective
sense
Verb
sense
{en}-verb.
I
base
{en}
)art2-
Figure 107 {en}-verb.
The schematic representations of these two productive relationships constitute 
the lexical rules that license the polysemy. I show below that this structural, 
declarative, account is only one of the ways of analysing these phenomena. Levin and
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Rappaport s (1995) account, which appears in the next section, is a procedural one, 
that makes use of word formation rules that operate on lexical structures.
The distinction between procedural and declarative analyses of ambiguity is 
one of two factors that will be significant in the treatment of the causative alternation. 
The second concerns the approach to polyvalence. Polyvalent elements are lexical 
items whose syntactic pole has variable properties (word class or valency). In WG, the 
lexeme represents the syntactic pole of a lexical entry and carries the properties of 
form, word class and valency (among others). This implies that any case of 
polyvalence should involve two separate lexemes. However, I have already argued 
against this implication for certain examples of variable valency. In discussing the 
beneficiary indirect object above (1.2.3.3), I claimed that it should be analysed as a 
construction applicable to any verb whose semantics is suitable. It is unreasonable to 
propose, for example, separate lexemes for uses of b a k e  with and without an indirect 
object. Goldberg applies a similar argument to caused motion constructions (424), 
beneficiary indirect objects (425) and resultative constructions (426) (1995: 9-10).
(424) He sneezed the napkin off the table.
(425) She baked him a cake.
(426) I can talk all the beer from here to Middlesbrough sour in the barrel.
This principle, that syntactic structures (constructions) may themselves be 
meaningful and that some cases of polyvalence can be analysed as an example of the 
pragmatic model (or in Pustejovsky and Boguraev's terms as a case of coercion), once 
established, reuses the question whether it is ever necessary or desirable to recognise 
two distinct lexemes in cases of variable valency. As I argued above, the separation of 
lexemes may be considered a matter of degree. Evidently t a l k  and s p e a k  are different 
lexemes: they differ as to form, valency and meaning. Both are members of the word 
class Verb but, aside from the similarities in their meanings, they are otherwise 
unrelated. The case o f the verb in (426), however, is different. The verb in (426) and 
that in I  can talk are both examples of the lexeme t a l k . They have different valencies 
but this is a property of the construction, not the lexeme.
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These two cases represent the extremes of polymorphy. s p r a y  provides a 
possible example of an intermediate case (this pattern is discussed above: 3.1.4.3, 
4.1.2.6).
(427) a. Jackson sprayed paint on the wall, 
b. Jackson sprayed the wall with paint.
The verbs in (427) have different valencies. They also have different meanings. In
(427)a, the verb refers to an act of Putting (caused motion); in (427)b it refers to an act 
of Covering. The difference in valency can be explained in terms of the difference in 
meaning (as it was in the case o f (426)): in (427)a, the ee is the paint; in (427)b it is the 
wall. However, the patterns in (427) are established in a way that that in (426) is not.
(426) represents a novel use of an entrenched form whereas (427)a,b represent two 
separate entrenched forms. We can represent this in the grammar by means of two sub­
lexemes of SPRAY, each with its own valency. Notice that there is little hard evidence 
for this analytical decision, apart from the circumstantial evidence given in 4.2.2.5. To 
establish the presence of two lexemes we must show that the different uses differ as to 
some further independent property, which I have not done.
This possibility (representing polymorphy in terms of sub-lexemes) exists also 
in cases where a lexeme can appear with two forms. WG routinely treats inflectional 
variants (eg AM, WAS) as examples o f the same lexeme. A similar analysis could be 
applied to the nouns b ik e  and c y c l e  for example. These two words differ as to their 
form but have the same meaning and word class. Here, though, there is clear evidence 
that they must be recognised as separate lexemes, at least in my mind, since c y c l e  has 
a zero-related verb while BIKE does not.
This issue will be borne in mind in the analyses that follow. In some cases it 
will be necessary to recognise two lexemes (or distinct sub-lexemes), rather than just 
one. In some cases, while it may not be necessary, it will nevertheless be desirable.
In the following section I turn to the properties of a specific case of ambiguity, 
the causative alternation. I try to present the relevant data in as neutral a way as 
possible. Further sections outline possible analyses.
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5.2 The causative alternation
5.2.1 Causative and unaccusative constructions: ambiguity; verbs in causative 
constructions; verbs in unaccusative constructions; variable behaviour 
verbs
5.2.1.1 Multiple valency as a kind of ambiguity
In the remainder of this chapter I develop an account in WG of those English verbs, 
like b r e a k , that appear in causative and unaccusative constructions:
(428) The burglars broke a window.
(429) The window broke.
These verbs have been quite extensively studied in various frameworks (Levin gives 
88 references (1993: 27)), particularly because they exhibit variable syntactic valency. 
In any framework where syntactic valency is related directly to lexical semantic 
structure, such variable valencies are bound to receive considerable attention.
The examples show that the verb form {break} can be used with two different 
valencies. Furthermore, the meanings of the two examples are different (the second is 
an entailment of the first, but not vice versa). According to the definition given above 
(5.1.1), this pattern must be considered a kind of ambiguity. Specifically it is an 
example of ambiguity as discussed above under (e) or (g) (ie polysemy or lexical 
relation). I assess these two possibilities in the WG analysis below (5.2.3) and 
conclude that the pattern can be analysed as polysemy (ie it involves just one lexeme in 
each case). I go on to consider the relationship between the two senses, asking 
specifically whether it is a simple case of polysemy, or if there is a productive 
derivational relationship between the two, as proposed for example in Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (1995); I advance evidence against Levin and Rappaport Hovav's 
analysis and I conclude that the pattern can be analysed most simply as a case of 
motivated polysemy.
I begin by exploring the properties of the alternation, including the range of 
verbs affected and the linking and aspectual properties of the two constructions. The 
pattern in (428) and (429) is especially significant in a theory of lexical semantics 
since it involves a change of syntactic valency, but also simply because it applies to so 
many verbs. Levin identifies 313 verbs that participate in some kind of causative
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alternation (1993: 26-32) (Levin’s index contains 3107 verbs so the alternating verbs 
represent slightly more than a tenth). Furthermore, the alternating verbs are themselves 
more common than the non-alternating ones: 20 of the 100 most common (non­
auxiliary) verbs in the LOB corpus alternate (all other things being equal we should 
expect only 10 of the first 100 to alternate). The productivity/systematicity of the 
ambiguity of verbs like b r e a k  is a serious question for lexical semantics and has 
important consequences for the way we think about the organisation of the lexicon. I 
argue below that the sheer number of verbs that participate in the alternation represents 
an important reason for preferring the polysemy analysis.
In the following sections, I consider the two constructions separately in turn, 
since they have important independent, as well as interdependent, features.
5.2.1.2 Causative constructions
(428) is clearly a transitive construction. The verb has a subject, the {burglars), and an 
object, a {window). The syntactic properties of the first dependent are just those of 
subjects (see 1.2.4.3):
>  the dependent is obligatory with tensed verbs (430);
> further when the verb is tensed, pronouns that have a marked form for subjects
appear in that form in this position, and the verb (when present) inflects to agree
with the dependent (431);
>  the dependent is (in some Englishes) obligatorily construed as the subject of a 
(preceding) subjectless adverbial participle (432);
> it is this dependent that is shared when the parent is a sharer 
(xcomplement/xadjunct) (433);
> it is obligatory in relative clauses (434);
> and it appears (normally) before the verb (435).
(430) * Broke a window.
(431) He/*him always break*(s) the window.
(432) Swinging his axe wildly, he broke the gate to pieces.
(433) We saw them break the window.
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(434) The burglars *(who) broke the window were FBI agents.
(435) *A window broke the burglars.
Semantically the referent of the subject fills an agent role. The details of the semantic 
relationship are explored below.
The syntactic properties of the second dependent are just those of an object (see 
1.2.4.2, Hudson 1992):
> the dependent appears as the subject of the verb in passive constructions (436);
> it can be extracted (437);
> it can appear before or after a particle (unless a pronoun) (438);
> it cannot be separated from the verb by any other adverbial element, except under 
‘heavy NP shift’ (439);
> it does not appear in marked subjective case (440);
> and it can be used alongside an indirect object (without it the indirect object may 
not be used) (441).
> Finally, just as one would expect of an object relationship, this dependency
supports many idiomatic expressions (break wind, break bread,...).
(436) The window was broken.
(437) The window they broke, the door they left alone.
(438) We broke the door down/down the door/it down/*down it.
(439) We broke quickly all the windows *(that remained after the previous day’s 
punishing bombardment).
(440) We broke them/*they.
(441) I’m making an omelette, break me *(some eggs).
The semantic properties of the construction are centred on a causing event 
(hence the term causative construction). They profile a process affecting one 
participant (the referent of the object) caused by an action of another (the referent of 
the subject). In this way the semantic roles of the subject and object fit very well into 
the schemata discussed above (3.1.4.3). The causer is a typical agent: often human,
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volitionally involved (and therefore sentient), controlling the event and having 
independent existence. The other participant is a typical patient: often inanimate, 
having no independent existence and undergoing a process or change of state with 
observable effects.
Some verbs in causative constructions profile a change of state in the patient. 
Constructions with these verbs are telic (see 4.1.1):
(442) The burglars broke the window in/* for ten minutes.
Others profile an ongoing process affecting the patient. Constructions with these verbs 
are generally not telic:
(443) The stevedores shoved the charabanc * in/for ten minutes.
Telic causative verbs permit middles (see 1.1.3, 1.2.5, Levin 1993: 25-26), 
whereas processive ones do not:
(444) Toughened glass doesn't just break.
(445) *That charabanc won't just shove.
Verbs in the causative construction permit resultative expressions predicated of 
the object, as in (446) (see 4.2.2).
(446) a. The burglars broke the vase to bits.
b. The stevedores shoved the charabanc into the shed.
As discussed in the previous chapter, resultative expressions with telic 
causatives are lexically constrained by the verb (447)a and necessarily predicated of a 
lexically selected object (447)b, but resultative expressions with non-telic causatives 
can be predicated of non-selected objects (448)b, though when they are used with a 
selected object they are nevertheless still semantically controlled (448)a.
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(447) a. The burglars broke the vase to bits/* leaky/*useless.
b. *The burglars broke the room draughty/themselves into jail.
(448) a. The stevedores shoved the charabanc into the shed/*sheltered.
b. The stevedores shoved the shed full of charabancs/themselves out of a job.
A resultative expression has (can have) the effect of making the construction 
telic. In this case, where the object is the semantically selected one, the middle 
construction becomes possible (449). Levin notes that many processive verbs permit 
middles only in the presence o f a resultative expression (450) (1993: 26).
(449) The charabanc won’t just shove into the shed.
(450) This metal beats *(flat) easily.
5.2.1.3 Unaccusative constructions
(429) The window broke.
(429) (repeated here) is intransitive. The single dependent shares the properties of 
subjects discussed earlier:
(451) * Broke.
(452) They/*them always break(*s).
(453) Being struck by an axe, the gate broke instantly into pieces.
(454) We saw the window break.
(455) The window *(that) broke was mullioned.
(456) * Broke the window.
I call these constructions unaccusative after Perlmutter (1978).41 Just as with the 
causative construction, unaccusatives are identified by their semantics. An 
unaccusative profiles either a change of state or process undergone by the referent or a
41 A note on terminology: the terms unaccusative and ergative are more or less synonymous. Levin 
(1993) uses the term inchoative  for the intransitive poles o f  the causative alternation, though only some 
o f them are in the strict sense inchoative.
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state predicated o f it. Here I have separated unaccusatives into three classes according 
to their aspectual properties and I consider the behaviour of each class in turn.
The construction in (429) represents the first class. It is, like the corresponding 
causative, telic (457). It is also clearly (and in fact necessarily) non-stative (458).
(457) The window broke in/*for five minutes.
(458) The window is breaking.
These constructions, profiling a change of state like the causatives, also permit 
resultative adverbials, lexically selected and predicated, in this case, of the subject:
(459) The vase broke to bits/* leaky/*useless.
(460) *The window broke the room draughty.
The referent of the subject in this construction is the patient of the profiled event, the 
participant undergoing the change of state. In many cases, the event is construed as 
being outside the control o f the patient.
In languages where there is a choice of auxiliary in perfect constructions, 
unaccusatives are sometimes characterised by the use of the equivalent of BE, rather 
than h a v e . In German, for example, gebrochen, the past participle of b r e c h e n  
(‘break’), appears in unaccusative perfect constructions with SEIN (‘be’); similarly in 
Dutch gebroken appears with ZIJN:
(461) Das Fenster ist gebrochen. 
the window is broken
The window broke/has broken.
(462) De raam is gebroken. 
the window is broken
The window broke/has broken.42
42 These examples are both (syntactically) ambiguous, since Dutch and German freely permit the 
formation o f  adjectives from the past participles o f change o f state verbs. English permits this in some 
cases (The window is broken), but not all. This issue is discussed at length in Holmes (forthcoming).
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The second type o f unaccusative construction is exemplified in (463).
(463) Warren wobbled.
Unlike the preceding examples, the construction in (463) is not, by itself, telic (464). 
However, like the telic unaccusatives these are non-stative (465).
(464) Warren wobbled for/* in five minutes.
(465) Warren is wobbling.
Since they are not telic, they do not select a result adverbial. They do permit a 
direction adverbial, predicated o f the subject (466), (468). This adverbial may itself be 
telic (467), (469).
(466) Warren wobbled around the garden for/*in five minutes.
(467) Warren wobbled into the water in/*for five minutes.
(468) Sally swung through the air for/*in five minutes.
(469) The door swung shut in/* for five minutes.43
This possibility is especially relevant in the case of verbs like w a l k , s w im , 
m a r c h , that profile typically locomotive actions (see 3.2.3, 4.1.2.4). These, like 
w o b b l e , are not by themselves telic (Sally swam for/*in five minutes). Even when 
telic, unaccusatives o f this type profile a process affecting the referent of the subject. 
This process involves a change of shape, posture or orientation (c u r l , f u r l , 
s t r a ig h t e n , TURN, ...)  or an alternation between shapes, postures or orientations 
( w ig g l e , w o b b l e , f l a p , s p in , r o l l , ...) . The profiled process/event may be controlled 
by the referent of the subject, but it need not be:
43 Warren wobbled into the water for five minutes and The door swung shut for five minutes are, in fact, 
both acceptable, on the interpretation where the result state (Warren being in the water, the door being 
shut) lasts for five minutes. This possibility is discussed at greater length elsewhere (3.2.2.3, 4.1.1, 
4.1.2).
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(470) Wally wobbled determinedly for hours, trying to inch his chair closer to the edge 
of the table.
(471) Wally wobbled dangerously when Sally shoved at the table, but she couldn’t 
make him fall off.
In German, the construction combines with h a b e n  in perfects, except in the 
case of the manner of motion verbs (472), (473). In Dutch, all verbs in the non-telic 
unaccusative construction combine with h e b b e n  but unaccusative constructions with 
telic direction adverbials combine with Z1JN (474), (475).
(472) Willy hat gewankt.
Willy has wobbled
(473) Willy ist gelaufen.
Willy is walked
(474) Willy heeft gewiebeld/gelopen.
Willy has wobbled/walked
(475) Willy is naar de stad gewiebeld/gelopen.
Willy is to the town wobbled/walked
Apparently auxiliary selection is determined by the verb in German and by the 
construction in Dutch. Notice, however, that while manner of motion verbs in German 
combine with se in  whether in a telic construction or not, the other process verbs can 
combine with se in  when there is a telic direction adverbial:
(476) Willy ist nach Wilhelmshaven gewankt.
Willy is to W ilhelmshaven wobbled
Interestingly, Wahrig (1982: 4104) lists w a n k en  as ambiguous: “unsicher 
stehen oder gehen” (‘stand or walk unsteadily’), which implies that auxiliary selection 
is in these cases determined by the construction, whereas Collins (1980: 741) gives 
two separate lemmas with different auxiliary selection properties, translating the 
second (with s e in ) as “totter” (unambiguously a kind of walking), thus preserving the
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assumption that verbs, rather than constructions, select auxiliaries in German. For a 
fuller discussion o f motion verbs, in English as well as Dutch and German, see 3.2.
The third type o f unaccusative I discuss here is exemplified in (477).
(477) Oxford lies on the Thames.
Perlmutter (1978) includes stative predicates (including adjectives) among the 
unaccusatives, since the states they profile are predicated of the subject, just like the 
changing or alternating states in the eventive unaccusative constructions. Since these 
constructions refer to states, they are clearly not telic (478); nor do they involve a 
change (479).
(478) Oxford lay on the Thames for/*in many centuries.
(479) *Oxford is lying on the Thames.
Again, since they are non-telic, these constructions do not permit resultative 
adverbials (selected or non-selected); they can appear in perfect constructions {Oxford 
has lain on the Thames fo r  centuries), and in both Dutch and German the auxiliary is 
h e b b e n / h a b e n , because z i j n / s e in  requires the subject to refer to an affected 
participant (which means the verb must have a telic eventive meaning).
5.2.1.4 Verbs with causative and unaccusative uses
In this section I investigate the capabilities of verbs capable of appearing in 
unaccusative constructions (be they telic, dynamic but not telic, or stative) to appear in 
causative constructions and vice-versa. I show that this pattern is regular and 
systematic, in that it applies in the same way (subject to semantic constraints) to large 
numbers of verbs.
The three unaccusative constructions discussed above have in common the fact 
that they all involve a state, or states, predicated of the subject. However, they differ 
aspectual ly.
(480) The window cracked in/* for five minutes.
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(481) The window is cracking.
(482) Benny wriggled for/*in five minutes.
(483) Benny is wriggling.
(484) Manchester lay in Cheshire for/*in many centuries.
(485) *Manchester is lying in Cheshire.
The aspectual differences between the three kinds of unaccusative can be seen in the 
above examples. The first type is telic (480) and dynamic (481); the second type is not 
telic (482), though it is nevertheless dynamic (483); the third type is not dynamic
(485), and therefore cannot be telic (see also (484)).
A further property these constructions have in common (and the reason for 
their inclusion in this chapter) is that many of the verbs appearing in one of the 
unaccusative constructions can also be used in a corresponding causative construction. 
In this section I present the relevant data and show that verbs that appear in one or 
other of the unaccusative constructions can also appear in a causative construction to 
the extent that they can have an affective interpretation: verbs with telic unaccusative 
interpretations generally also have telic causative interpretations; verbs with processive 
unaccusative interpretations also have processive causative interpretations, to the 
extent that the process can be construed as controlled from without, and many 
(including those that exclude external control) have telic causative interpretations; 
verbs with stative unaccusative interpretations may have telic causative interpretations, 
to the extent that they may also have telic unaccusative (inchoative) interpretations.
The first class, the telic unaccusatives, are central in this respect. Almost all 
verbs permitting telic unaccusatives also permit causatives (some exceptions are 
identified below, 5.2.3.5). The relevant verbs profile telic events, often externally 
caused or at least compatible with external causation (this distinction is found in Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav (1995), as well as elsewhere, it is discussed in some detail in 
5.2.3.5). Because they profile a change of state, these verbs fit very well into the frame 
of the unaccusative construction, with the affected entity as the referent of the subject. 
Because they profile a change of state, and to the extent that they allow for external 
causation, they fit very well into the frame of the causative construction, with the 
affected entity as the referent of the object and the causer as the referent of the subject.
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The second class, the process unaccusatives, is rather different. These verbs 
profile processes undergone by the referent of the subject and are often ambiguous as 
to agency. Because of this ambiguity many of the verbs fit equally well into the 
unaccusative and unergative constructions. As I argue in 4.2.2, it is the unergative 
construction that allows unselected resultative adverbials predicated of a (reflexive) 
dummy object, as in (486) and (487). If that is correct, then (488) and (489) must also 
be based on unergative constructions.
(486) The audience laughed themselves sick.
(487) We drank ourselves silly.
(488) Sally swam herself fit.
(489) Tom Jones wiggled himself into the top ten.
In these examples, the subject refers to an agent, in volitional control of a 
process affecting them (except, arguably, in the case of laughing). However, the telic 
event (becoming sick, silly etc) is separate from the process (laughing, drinking etc). 
The obligatoriness of the reflexive in these examples signals that the affected entity 
and the referent of the subject are only coincidentally the same ((490) and (491) show 
similar constructions where the affected entity is not identified with the agent).
(490) They laughed him off the stage.
(491) We drank the bar dry.
Also suggestive is that all of the examples (486)-(489) would be translated with 
HEBBEN in Dutch, which means that at least in Dutch they must be unergative 
constructions:
(492) Het publiek heeft zich kapot gelachen. 
the audience has [refl] broken laughed[pp]
(493) Wij hebben ons lam gedronken. 
we have us lame drunk[pp]
(494) Sally heeft zichzelf fit gezwommen.
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Sharon has herself fit swumfpp]
(495) Tom Jones heeft zichzelf in de top tien gewiebeld.
Tom Jones has him self in the top ten wiggledfpp]
(488) and (489) show unergative uses of the verbs s w im  and w ig g l e . They are 
appropriate in this construction since they profile a process that may be construed as 
being under internal (agentive) control. However, many of them, particularly those that 
can profile a change of position, also qualify for use in unaccusative constructions like 
those shown above ((464)-(469)). In many of these cases, the process may be further 
construed as being under external control, which means that many of the relevant verbs 
can also appear in causative constructions.
(496) Benny wiggled his toes.
(497) Benny wiggled the chair.
These examples are, in some ways, different from the causative constructions 
formed with lexically telic verbs. In (496), we see that w ig g l e  may be used 
causatively, with the object referring to a (body) part of the wiggler. This example 
shows some similarities to the unergative constructions with w ig g l e  discussed above. 
In fact, translating into German shows even more similarity, since an unergative 
construction must be used, the body part appearing as the complement of a preposition 
{Walter wackelte m it den Zeheri). The construction in (497) is just like the atelic 
causative constructions discussed above; in both causative and unaccusative uses, the 
verb retains its aspectual structure, profiling a dynamic process (498), (499). Telic 
constructions are possible with transitive w ig g l e , the telicity deriving from a 
resultative adverbial (500).
(498) Benny wiggled for/* in five minutes.
(499) Benny wiggled the chair for/* in five minutes.
(500) Tom wiggled himself into the Top Ten/the chair useless in/*for a week.
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Causative constructions with manner of motion verbs (501)-(503) are even 
more exceptional.
(501) She walked her fingers up his spine.
(502) Wally walked Stephanie to the station.
(503) Wally walked the wardrobe across the floor.
The causative construction implies agentive control and verbs profiling manners of 
motion may, as noted above, ascribe agentive control to the moving participant. Verbs 
whose profiles do not entail agency (eg r o l l , b o u n c e ) present no problem in 
causative constructions, but those (like w a l k ) whose profiles do can only be used in 
causative constructions under special circumstances. (503) is not exceptional, in that 
the subject refers to a controlling agent and the object to an affected patient. In fact, 
wardrobes cannot be said to walk at all without outside help: V.The wardrobe walked 
across the floor.
(502) is rather exceptional, as an example of a causative construction, in that 
the referent of the object retains some agentive control over the act of walking. It is 
unexceptional as a causative construction (and exceptional as a sentence made with 
w a l k ) in that the whole event (getting to the station by walking) is controlled by the 
referent of the subject, and not by the walker. In many cases, the causer must also be 
moving in the same manner (Wally cannot be said to have walked Stephanie to the 
station if he merely shows her on a map where it is, or lets down the tyres on her 
bicycle, nor even if he accompanies her on a bicycle, with her walking alongside and, 
in fact, if he walks and she cycles (or rides in her wheelchair), then he can be said to 
have walked her). Levin sees this as an important and defining difference between 
causatives made with manner of motion verbs and the telic causatives discussed above 
(1993: 31), though she notes that some cases permit the agent to remain stationary:
(504) The scientists ran the rats through the maze, (ibid)
A further special property of causatives made with manner of motion verbs is 
that the adverbial expression is often obligatory:
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(505) Betty bounced the ball (down the wicket).
(506) Wally walked his stepmother *(to the station).
(507) Wesley walked the dog (round the block).
Causative expressions made with b o u n c e  can be interpreted in one of two ways: the 
causer may be construed as simply causing the bouncer to bounce, or as causing it to 
move by bouncing (intransitive expressions with b o u n c e  show the same ambiguity). 
However, with w a l k , the first of these interpretations is (usually) ruled out, because 
the act of walking is by definition under the control of the walker. (506) must be 
construed as a telic event, whose result is the stepmother being at the station, with as 
agent the referent of the subject. For this reason the direction adverbial is obligatory, 
since without it the expression is not telic.
(507) shows that this constraint on the use of w a l k  in causative expressions 
can be overruled by convention. The adverbial may be left off in this example, since 
there exists a strong (cultural) framework in which walking the dog is a recognisably 
telic activity. The result is that the dog has been walked, even (euphemistically) that it 
has been taken outside and made to defecate. This event (the dog being given the 
opportunity to take a day’s exercise, or to relieve itself), is typically construed as 
controlled by a human agent, hence the acceptability of (507) without the adverbial.
Finally (501) above shows that verbs profiling manners of motion can also be 
used in causative constructions with a body part in the affected role. It is not 
immediately clear that this construction differs significantly from those in (502) or
(503).
So far I have discussed the eventive verbs associated with unaccusative 
constructions and their behaviour with respect to the causative construction. The third 
class, verbs profiling a state, also permit causative constructions under certain 
circumstances. The stative verbs of English can be separated into two broad classes, 
those profiling psychological states and those profiling states of existence (including
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location/spatial configuration).44 The verbs that are relevant here can be found among 
the latter group. They include Levin's “exist verbs” (1993: 249-250), which consist of a 
mixture of ‘true’ statives and processes, the “verbs of spatial configuration” (ibid: 255- 
256) and two small mixed classes, “meander verbs” and “verbs of contiguous 
location” (ibid: 256-257).
Some of these verbs profile lasting states. These are acceptable in simple 
present constructions (508)a but do not permit processive, or temporary state (508)b, 
inchoative (508)c or causative (508)d interpretations.
(508) a. Three powerful reasons exist for assuming this model of human cognition.
b. *No solution to this problem is currently existing.
c. *A solution suddenly existed.
d. * Einstein existed a solution.
Others profile states that can be construed as temporary, and so they 
additionally permit present progressive constructions referring to temporary states
(509)b.
(509) a. A remarkable culture flourishes in this city.
b. Felicity is flourishing in Florence.
c. * Felicity suddenly flourished when she arrived in Florence.
d. * Florence flourished Felicity.
Still others focus on the process taking place at a location, and so receive a 
processive interpretation in progressive constructions (510)b.
(510) a. The maglev hovers between two electromagnets.
b. A dragonfly is hovering over the pond.
c. *The dragonfly suddenly hovered over the pond.
44 Here I confine my attention to stative verbs. It should be noted, however, that English makes 
extensive use o f adjectives to profile states. Properly speaking, these should be treated here since so 
many verbs in both (telic) unaccusative and causative expressions are related by derivation to adjectives.
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d. *The engineers hovered the train between two magnets.
Others again allow inchoative interpretations, where the effect of the verb's 
profile (in the case of LOOM a sense of threat) is achieved by its argument beginning 
the relevant state or process (51 l)c.
(511) a. The mountain looms over the town.
b. A cloud is looming over the stadium.
c. A cloud suddenly loomed over the stadium.
d. *The ogre loomed his face over the parapet.
Finally, there are those that additionally permit causative uses (512)d. This is 
only possible for those that have inchoative unaccusative interpretations ((508)c,
(509)c, (510)c). Note also that the causative use can only have an inchoative 
interpretation (512)e.
(512) a. The stadium stands in Stepney.
b. Stacey is standing in Stanley.
c. Stacey stood up.
d. Stacey stood the stepladder on the edge of the cliff.
e. * Stacey is standing the stepladder.
In summary, many verbs capable of appearing in unaccusative constructions 
(be they telic, dynamic but not telic, or stative) can also appear in causative 
constructions and vice-versa. This pattern appears to be regular and systematic, in that 
it applies in the same way to large numbers of verbs. The challenge to lexical 
semantics is to develop an explanation of the systematic nature of the pattern, 
explaining how the changes in valency and meaning are controlled, what the 
mechanisms are that allow for this alternation in valency and meaning and what the 
limits of the regular mechanism are (which (classes of) lexical items does it apply to 
and which not, and why).
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In the following section I discuss some analyses collected from the literature on 
this alternation, in the course of which I also note some further data to be included in 
our explanation. In the final section I present a WG account, and consider the 
conclusions that it provides for the structure of the lexicon. In considering the analyses 
in the following section, I address specifically three questions about the kinds of 
lexical structure proposed in each: what kinds of information are represented in lexical 
semantic structure; does the causative unaccusative alternation rest on a single 
underspecified structure, on an ambiguous structure, or on two separate but lexically 
related structures; what is the nature of event types, and how do they affect the 
behaviour of verbs (more specifically: how are verb senses and their argument 
structures represented and how are they mapped on to event types)?
5.2.2 A survey
5.2.2.1 Croft
The first analysis I present is that of Croft (1990). Croft describes the alternation under 
investigation under the label “the flexible conceptualisation of events” (49): the 
analysis assumes that events, the meanings of verbs, are classified into a limited set of 
event types (in fact into three alternative views of the same event type). This 
idealisation (conceptualisation) is constrained by the thematic properties of the event, 
so that the alternating verbs, like b r e a k , are those whose events can be conceptualised 
in more than one way (flexibly).
In this way, Croft’s analysis is a ‘vagueness’ analysis: it assumes a single 
underspecified lexical structure for each verb. The three alternative event views 
constrain the interpretation of events that are conceptualised through them by a 
grammatical process called “coercion” (or “conversion” when it also involves 
morphosyntactic variation), which applies so systematically and regularly across the 
lexicon that it can be considered a pragmatic process operating over unambiguous 
lexical items: “the ambiguity analysis is unattractive in this case because the ambiguity 
is systematic” (ibid: 55).
The event types that structure the conceptualisation of events consist of 
segments of a causal network. Croft holds that causation provides the primary 
framework for understanding event structure and verb meaning. He recognises three
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broad approaches to the representation of causal relationships, which he characterises 
as events cause events (attributed to Davidson 1967), individuals bring about events 
(attributed to Gruber 1976, Dowty 1979), and individuals act on other individuals 
(attributed to Talmy 1972, 1975). Croft’s illustration of these three approaches is given 
here:
events cause events
Rock(r) & Window(w) & Contact (ei, r, w) & Become-Broken(e2, w) & Cause (ei, e2)
individuals bring about events
Cause(r, Become(Broken(w)))
individuals act on other individuals
rock window (window)
•   ► •   > ( • )  -------------------
cause become broken
Table 7. Three models of causal relations.
Croft favours the third approach on the grounds that it constrains the structure of the 
causal chain by excluding causally related events which do not share any arguments in 
common (consistent with our “commonsense model of causation” (1990: 50)), and also 
because the causal ordering of participants can be used in the expression of linking 
rules.
Levin (1993) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) (5.2.2.2) provide an 
example of the first approach (events cause events), Jackendoff (1990) the second 
(individuals bring about events) and Lemmens (1998) (5.2.2.3) the third 
(individuals act on individuals). The WG analysis I present in the following section 
assumes the first approach. This approach is more helpful there because it provides 
conceptual nodes representing the events in conceptual structure (that support the 
properties of events: time, duration, etc). Most of the causal structures developed do 
involve only causally related events sharing an argument, as Croft suggests, but it is 
my claim that the relevant event types need to be learnt in order to acquire the
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“commonsense model” that Croft refers to. The causal ordering of participants is 
mediated in WG through the relationships er and ee; Croft’s analysis does not make 
use of argument structure positions like these.
Croft's event types are Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs, see Lakoff 1987) 
and the idealisation has observable effects on verbal behaviour. The alternation 
between load the bus with beer and load the beer on the bus, for example, comes about 
because the conceptual structure of loading can be idealised in one of two ways. Also, 
significantly, each event type is in principle available as an ICM for any verb (any 
predicator: Croft’s account includes adjectives). This means that (universally), all 
predicators should be able to appear in each of the three constructions exemplified in 
(513).
(513) a. The boys broke the window.
b. The window broke.
c. The window is broken.
(514) a. Kenny killed the kangaroo.
b. The kangaroo got killed.
c. The kangaroo has been killed.
Some predicators must undergo morphosyntactic variation in order to appear in 
one or other of the constructions ((513)c, (514)b-c). Whether this will be so for a given 
event (verb) (in a given language), and which of the three event types it will apply to is 
predicted on a pragmatic basis, the (morphosyntactically) unmarked representation(s) 
being the most plausible given the meaning of the predicator.
All this means that the variation in (513) is mediated by a pragmatic model (in 
the terms of Croft 1998a, see 5.1.2). In the WG terms presented above, b r e a k  is not 
ambiguous: one lexical item suffices, since the differences in meaning are due to the 
coercion of the verb’s meaning by the three constructions.
This analysis depends on a separation of the semantic properties of events: the 
force-dynamic properties are represented in the “event-type” and the thematic 
properties in the “event-class” (Croft 1990: 53). Only the former have an effect on
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syntactic structure. A similar sort of separation is seen in other frameworks 
(Jackendoff 1983, 1990, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995) (see 2.2.1.1, 5.2.2.2).
The ideas discussed here are further developed in Croft (1998b), where 
specifically the restriction of event types to causatives, unaccusatives and statives and 
the claim that all verbal profiles (which necessarily conform to one of these event 
types) have the causative structure as their base are revised. The revised constraint on 
verbal profiles is that they correspond to some (continuous) section of the causal chain 
that defines event types. The base against which the verbal profile is construed must 
also be a segment of the causal chain, and in morphosyntactically unmarked cases the 
profile and base are the same (ibid: 48).
This revision allows, for example, the profiles of activities {sparkle, dance, 
walk, ...) to consist of segments of the causal chain not terminating in a result state. It 
is not clear (to me) how the appropriate segment of the causal chain is selected for a 
particular verb’s profile. The most appropriate mechanism would be to consider 
thematic (wider conceptual) properties of the verb’s meaning, but under Croft's 
analysis this is ruled out.
Once established, the verb’s profile directly determines its combinatorial 
properties: the argument positions in its event structure template are instantiated by 
other elements in the combinatorial structure.
5.2.2.2 Levin and Rappaport Hovav
The lexical semantic structures and linking mechanisms of Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav are described above (3.1.2). Here I characterise the way in which that system is 
applied to the causative alternation. For the most part the analysis described here 
derives from Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995, though some attention is paid to Levin 
1993 and Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s semantic structures are decompositional: they 
are structured predicate argument representations. As for Croft, these semantic 
structures are idealisations from general conceptual structure. Projection of lexical 
semantic structure onto syntactic structure is mediated by a level of predicate argument 
structure (PAS), which determines the number and status of the syntactic arguments.
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Lexical semantic structures are made of two types of component (Rappaport 
Hovav and Levin 1998: 107): primitive predicates, which make up the event type 
structure, and constants, which represent the thematic (idiosyncratic) semantic content 
(see 2.2.1.1). As for Croft, there is a finite set of event types, which in Rappaport 
Hovav and Levin are termed event structure templates (ESTs), made out of primitive 
predicates. The lexical semantics (event structure) of a verb then consists of a suitable 
event structure template, enriched by the constant associated with the verb.
This classification of components of semantic structure is the same one as we 
have met before. I suggest above (3.1.3, 3.1.4.3), and Rappaport Hovav and Levin 
suggest in a footnote (1998: 99) and in their appendix (127-130), that this separation of 
event type structure and idiosyncratic lexical semantics closely matches the separation 
of constructional meaning from lexical (verb) meaning found in other theories (eg 
Croft 1990, Goldberg 1993, and indeed the present work).
The implication of this is that the analysis outlined by Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav (1995), which is framed in terms of event structures lexically associated with 
verbs and the different ways they can project onto syntactic structure, is translationally 
equivalent to an analysis framed in terms of independent event structures (that 
determine the kinds of syntactic structure that they support). The mechanisms that, in 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s theory, determine on the basis of general thematic 
properties which of the battery of ESTs will be associated with a given verb should, in 
principle, also serve to determine which of the battery of constructions a verb will be 
compatible with. Rappaport Hovav and Levin are themselves fully aware of this 
possibility, though they doubt (1998: 129-130) that any existing accounts are yet able 
to satisfactorily deal with the question of compatibility.
Under the account where the event structure is a lexical property of the verb, 
what must be explained, in the case of the causative alternation, is how a verb comes to 
be associated with more than one lexical structure. This can be achieved in one of two 
ways: either alternating verbs are ambiguous, having more than one lexical structure, 
or the structures themselves can undergo transformations of form. Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav favour the latter alternative for reasons of parsimony (Levin (1993) 
gives roughly 80 alternations, which in combination with more than 3000 verbs would 
lead to a very large number of verb senses, even allowing for the fact that not all verbs
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participate in all alternations). They also adduce support for this decision from the 
apparent directionality of the alternation, quoting examples like (515), (516) to 
demonstrate that the causative use is more basic (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 
85).
(515) a. He broke his promise/the contract/the world record, 
b. *His promise/The contract/The world record broke.
(516) a. The waiter cleared the table, 
b. *The table cleared.
The selectional requirements of the unaccusative versions of b r e a k  and c l e a r  
can be shown to be more specific than those of the causative uses: “the set of possible 
subjects for the intransitive use of a verb appears to be a subset of the set of possible 
objects for the transitive use of the same verb” (ibid: 86). If one use of the verb is to be 
seen as derived from the other, then it is difficult to imagine how it can be that the 
derived use has a wider range of possible arguments than the basic one (without 
proposing some mechanism for widening the set of possible arguments).
I argue below that other cases of the causative alternation show the opposite 
directionality, and use this as evidence against the procedural analysis presented here. 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav do consider some of the examples I use in this way, 
giving them alternative analyses with the intention of demonstrating that they represent 
a separate phenomenon from the causative alternation.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim that verbs that permit both causative and 
unaccusative constructions are basically causative, even in their unaccusative uses. 
Their lexical syntactic representations are dyadic (having two arguments), which 
reflects the externally caused nature of the event they profile. Internally caused events 
lead to monadic lexical semantic representations. The dyadic event structure supports a 
dyadic PAS, with one external and one internal argument. These two arguments are 
linked, by the relevant linking rules, to the subject and the object respectively in deep 
syntactic structure. However, the dyadic event structure can also undergo an operation 
that prevents the causer argument from being projected to the lexical syntactic 
representation (the PAS). This results in a PAS with just one, internal, argument,
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which by the relevant linking rule projects on to a deep syntactic object and thence to a 
surface syntactic subject.
This detransitivisation is seen as a binding (existential quantification) operation 
on the causer argument that takes place between the levels of event structure and PAS. 
This argument, once bound in this way, is not expressed at the lexical syntactic level. It 
applies only to externally caused events, as defined by their event structure 
representation. The relevant template is shown in (517) (ibid: 94).
(517) [[x DO-SOMETHING] CAUSE [y BECOME STATE\]
Some verbs denoting externally caused events (which therefore have event 
structures instantiating the template in (517)) do not allow their causers to be bound in 
this way as shown in (518)-(520).
(518) a. The baker cut the bread.
b. *The bread cut.(on the relevant interpretation)
(519) a. The terrorist killed/assassinated/murdered the senator, 
b. *The senator killed/assassinated/murdered.
(520) a. Anita Brookner just wrote a new novel, 
b. *A new novel wrote, (ibid: 102)
Levin and Rappaport Hovav explain this by appealing to the plausibility of the events 
denoted by the verbs in these examples being caused without outside agency. Cutting, 
killing and writing, it is claimed, all make particular requirements of their causers, so 
that it is not plausible to speak of a cutting, killing or writing event that happens 
without a causer. This idea is also found in Levin (1993), where participation in the 
causative alternation is restricted to “pure change of state verbs” (ibid: 9).
Other verbs that do not participate in the causative alternation, but exist only in 
intransitive uses behave as they do, Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim, because the 
events they denote are not plausibly caused by any external factor. Verbs like b lo o m  
and d e c a y  that refer to events caused by the internal properties of the affected
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argum ent, and verb s o f  e x is te n c e  and appearance (l iv e , a p p e a r , v a n is h , e tc ) have  
m on ad ic  ev en t structures and so , as ex p la in ed  a b o v e , d o  n o t perm it ca u sa tiv e  uses:
(521) a. The cactus bloomed/blossomed/flowered early.
b. *The gardener bloomed/blossomed/flowered the cactus early. (Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav 1995: 97)
(522) a. A picture appeared (on the screen).
b. *The programmer appeared a picture (on the screen), (ibid: 121)
Levin and Rappaport Hovav note, as I do above (5.2.1.4), that manner of 
motion verbs also have both causative and unaccusative uses:
(523) a. The soldiers marched to the tents.
b. The general marched the soldiers to the tents.
(524) a. The horse jumped over the fence.
b. The rider jumped the horse over the fence.
(525) a. The mouse ran through the maze.
b. We ran the mouse through the maze, (ibid: 111)
as do some other activity verbs they call “non-agentive internally caused verbs”, 
specifically verbs of (sound) emission:
(526) a. The baby burped.
b. The nurse burped the baby.
(527) a. The doorbell buzzed/rang.
b. The postman buzzed/rang the doorbell.
(528) a. The flashlight beamed/shone.
b. We beamed/shone the flashlight, (ibid: 115)
and verbs of spatial configuration (see 5.2.1.4):
(529) a. The bicycle leaned against the fence
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b. I leaned the bicycle against the fence.
(530) a. A statue of Jefferson stood on the pedestal.
b. They stood the statue of Jefferson on the pedestal, (ibid: 128)
These three classes of apparently alternating verbs give the appearance of being 
basically intransitive (rather than transitive as required by the explanation just given). 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav take this as evidence that the alternation seen in the above 
sets of examples, while regular, is constrained by a different mechanism from that 
proposed for the alternation shown by verbs like b r e a k . In support of this, they 
demonstrate that the transitive and intransitive variants of verbs in these three classes 
have properties that are not shared by the corresponding variants of the “pure change 
of state verbs”.
They point out that while intransitive constructions with manner of motion 
verbs are insensitive to the presence of a preposition giving a destination, similar 
transitive constructions are impossible (or at least less common) without this 
preposition:
(531) a. The soldiers marched (to the tents).
b. The general marched the soldiers ??(to the tents).
(532) a. The horse jumped (over the fence).
b. The rider jumped the horse ??(over the fence).
(533) a. The mouse ran (through the maze).
b. We ran the mouse * (through the maze), (ibid: 111)
They also point out that these verbs make more particular demands on the semantic 
role of subjects in transitive constructions (534), (535), and show that in other 
languages (specifically Modem Hebrew) these verbs are morphologically marked 
when they appear in transitive constructions.
(534) *The firecracker jumped the horse over the fence, (ibid: 112)
(535) The firecracker broke the window.
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Similar arguments are given for the emission verbs: the transitive construction 
is not permitted when the object refers to an animate entity or something that 
conventionally emits the relevant sound under its own steam:
(536) *The postman buzzed the bees.
(537) *The cloud seeding flashed the lightning, (ibid: 117)
For the verbs of spatial configuration, Levin and Rappaport Hovav show that 
there are irregularities on both sides of the alternation. They also claim that although 
most of these verbs permit intransitive constructions with an EST like (538), it is 
implausible to suggest that this can be derived from the EST supporting transitive uses 
of the same verb (shown in (539), ibid: 131).
(538) [y b e c o m e  AT z /SPAT1AL-CONFIG]
(539) [[x DO-SOMETHING] CAUSE [y BECOME AT Z I SPATIAL-CON FIG]]
Summarising briefly, the account for the causative alternation given in Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav (1995) describes it as a process transforming dyadic ESTs 
(which otherwise project to dyadic PASs) into monadic ones (which project onto 
monadic and unaccusative PASs). This conforms to the derivational model of Croft 
(1998a). The decausativisation process does not apply to all verbs with dyadic ESTs, 
since some of these refer to events that are necessarily externally caused, and for this 
reason unaccusative constructions made with them have implausible meanings. It also 
does not apply to verbs that have monadic ESTs (evidently, since it is an operation on 
dyadic ESTs), some of which are unaccusative (and so match the intransitive variants 
of alternating verbs).
Further, there exist at least three classes of verbs that have ESTs to some 
degree matching one or other variant of the alternation (or both), some of which 
participate in superficially similar alternations, controlled by different mechanisms. In 
the case of the manner of motion verbs, the alternation is controlled by a process of 
causativisation applying to the basic, monadic EST, only in the presence of a 
directional phrase (again, this conforms to Croft’s derivational model (1998a)). The
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verbs of emission form two separate classes of verbs sharing the same constant and 
name; these verbs form “spurious” (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1998: 119) pairs of 
causative and unaccusative predicates not related by lexical rule (this conforms to 
Croft’s polysemy model (1998a)). A similar analysis is used for the spatial 
configuration verbs.
The lexical semantic structures are decompositional and made out of predicates 
and generic arguments that encode force-dynamic and aspectual meanings; positions in 
these structures can be filled by constants representing the thematic content of lexical 
words. It is the conceptual (non-linguistic) semantics of the lexical item that 
determines the type of event structure that is appropriate and the position to be 
instantiated by the constant. Linking between these structures and syntactic structures 
is mediated by a further level of predicate argument structure (PAS), that determines 
which of the arguments in the syntactic representation are expressed in surface 
structure. PAS is derived from event structure by linking rules that refer to argument 
positions in that event structure, and syntactic structure is derived from PAS by 
something like X-Bar syntax.
In the final section of this chapter, I make extensive use of some of the insights 
of this analysis, and offer some criticism of the basic mechanism (particularly the 
derivational process operating between eg transitive and intransitive ESTs).
5.2.2.3 Lemmens
Lemmens (1998) proposes an account for the causative alternation that is based on a 
“cognitive lexical-paradigmatic [=lexical/constructional] approach” (ibid: 22). This 
approach describes grammatical structure and specifically syntactic and semantic 
behaviour in terms of the compatibility of particular verbs with particular 
constructional schemas (rather like the alternative approach outlined by Rappaport 
Hovav and Levin (1998), discussed above).
The battery of available constructions (event types) is established according to 
the claims of Davidse (1991, 1992) that “the English grammar of causative 
constructions is governed by the transitive and ergative paradigms” (Lemmens 1998: 
3). The lexical structures of individual verbs are determined by their own conceptual 
properties and it is these lexical structures that determine which are the appropriate
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construction types. Variation, in this framework, is controlled by two kinds of 
mechanism: some regular alternations (for example the causative alternation, see 
below) are constructional, in that the relevant constructions themselves support the 
variability (any lexical item that supports construction C also supports construction 
C’); others are lexical, in that the relevant lexical items are compatible with more than 
one construction type. Lexical items that show variable behaviour in this second sense 
(‘ambiguous lexical items’) are arranged on a scale (similar to the ones discussed 
above in 5.1) ranging between vagueness through polysemy to homonymy (Lemmens 
refers to Tuggy (1993)). Many of the individual lexical items proposed by Lemmens 
consist of complex network structures representing more than one ‘meaning’; it seems 
that these are to be taken as single lexical entries permitting a vagueness analysis for 
the kinds of variation the word shows.
The available construction types are defined according to two parameters, one 
force dynamic and the other thematic. Table 8, adapted from Lemmens (1998: 44), 
gives a selection of the construction types proposed by Lemmens (I have omitted 
pseudo-effective constructions, like He died a slow death and The house blew a fuse 
and middles, like Stale bread cuts easily and The window opened only with great 
difficulty). The argument structure representations ( [A c -P r o c e s s -G o ] etc) are 
explained shortly.
PARADIGM
(thematic)
C O N S T R U C T I O N ^ ^
(force-dynamic)
TRANSITIVE
(Agent centred)
ERGATIVE 
(Medium centred)
EFFECTIVE John killed Mary 
[A c -P r o c e s s -G o ] 
John killed 
[A c -P r o c e ss-(G o )]
John suffocated Mary 
[Is -P r o c e s s -M e ]
NON-EFFECTIVE Mary died!John is running 
[A c -P r o c e s s]
Mary suffocated 
[M e -P r o c e s s ]
Table 8. Selection of construction types from Lemmens (1998).
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These construction types are classified in the first place according to the 
number of participants in the event structure: effectives have two participants one of 
which acts on the other in some way (the second participant may be unexpressed, as in 
John kills), and non-effectives have just one. Constructions are also classified 
according to their thematic structure, which is determined by the nature of the roles 
played by the participants. This second parameter is more closely related to the 
specific conceptual semantics of the individual verb, which determines which roles 
will be played by the participants {suffocated refers to an ergative event because the 
suffocator (medium) undergoes some process), but Lemmens is at pains to point out 
that the paradigm type is not an inalienable property of the verb: “it is incorrect to talk 
about ergative or transitive ‘verbs’, ... what is at issue is their transitive or ergative use” 
(ibid: 60 emphasis in original).
Individual verbs denote events, which are idealised according to one or other of 
the paradigms; some verbs, with non-prototypical or multiple meanings, can be 
idealised according to either paradigm. Lemmens (ibid: 58) gives the following 
diagram showing the range of possible idealisations of some verbs of killing:
transitive
murder 
fynch butcher idff 
slaughter  ^ execute
^massacre murder 
assassinate ^
throttle
j  t
[strangle s m
\  i
V  smother
I sutfocate\ 
j asphyxiate.
choke
drowninstrument
knife
v  garret^/
/ starve
! starve 
\  famishshoot
Figure 108 Lemmens on killing (and dying).
The two paradigms represent different ways of conceptualising causal events 
(processes). In Davidse’s (1992) analysis, events are classified into relational, mental
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and material processes, the latter class being further subdivided into transitives and 
ergatives. Halliday (1985) proposes a similar classification of event types, though for 
him the transitive/ergative distinction is logically prior. Halliday’s transitive process 
types (discussed in 3.1.3) are existential, relational, verbal, mental, behavioural and 
material and these are collectively defined in opposition to the ergative processes. 
Lemmens adopts Davidse’s classification.
In the ergative paradigm it is the affected argument that is understood as being 
most centrally involved in the process. This argument, called the medium (Me in the 
diagrams) by Davidse, “co-participates” in the process, and it is for this reason that the 
medium is selected as the single argument of non-effective ergatives. The other 
argument (the agent) in a two participant ergative structure is termed instigator (Is); 
this participant is not a central part of an ergative process, but may be present, since 
the process affecting the medium may be instigated by some outside agency.
The central participant in a transitive process is the actor (Ac) who directly 
initiates and controls the process. That process (in two participant transitive structures) 
may be directed at a goal (Go), which does not “co-participate”, but simply passively 
undergoes the relevant process. These two process types are characterised as in the 
diagram (taken from Lemmens: 41).
(a)
Is ^ ----  Process —  Me
(a)
A c   Process — -►Go
Figure 109 Ergative and transitive process types.
Each process type has two representations. The first representation of each 
shows the core participants ringed together (process and medium in the ergative 
structure, actor and process in the transitive). The arrow shows that the process can be 
extended in each case: the ergative structure can be extended “to the left” to include an
(b)
▼
Is
(b)
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instigator; the transitive structure can be extended “to the right” to include a goal. The 
second representation of each shows the relationships between the participants and the 
processes. The ergative structure consists of two processes (or “processual layers” 
(ibid: 40)): the instigation (carried out by the instigator) and the process (undergone by 
the medium). The transitive structure consists of just one process, directed at the inert 
goal by the actor.
It is these process type characterisations that, for Lemmens, determine whether 
a verb participates in the causative alternation: verbs profiling ergative processes can 
exploit the extended or unextended ergative models, since the internal (Lemmens calls 
it “nuclear” ibid: 40) process and medium structure is able to exist independently of 
the instigator. Verbs profiling transitive processes do not support unaccusative uses in 
this way. The nucleus of this structure is the actor and process structure. Translating 
briefly into more traditional terms, both models support both transitive and intransitive 
structures. In the case of the ergative model, these are causative and unaccusative 
respectively. In the case of the transitive model, they are transitive and unergative 
respectively.
As noted above, Lemmens’ model (of the causative alternation) relies on the 
interaction of lexical and constructional structures, rather than on alternative lexical 
structures for individual words (or word classes). However, because the different event 
types have different structures, verbs that are compatible with more than one event 
type must have more than one possible event structure. In the lexical framework 
employed by Lemmens this results in large lexical structures for each verb consisting 
of a network of schematic representations each of which represents a possible use of 
the verb. For example, the representation of the range of meanings of ABORT (ibid: 
217) consists of a network containing eleven separate event schemas (five transitive 
and six ergative; see Figure 47).
The strength of the constructional approach is that it allows generalisations 
over event type structures to be abstracted from the lexical structures of individual 
verbs. This strength is not exploited in Lemmens’ lexical structures, since the ability of 
a particular verb to appear in a particular construction is determined by the extent to 
which one of the verb’s event schemas instantiates the relevant constructional schema, 
and so the constructional schemas need to be duplicated in the lexical structure of the
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verb. Furthermore, the representations of verbal semantics do not make specific how 
the thematic properties of the verb’s profile determine which event type structures are 
represented in the schematic network and which are not, so that while they duplicate 
information (about event structure) that can more effectively be represented elsewhere, 
they also fail to carry relevant information that is not represented elsewhere.
5.2.3 A WG analysis: properties of verbs in causative and unaccusative
constructions; properties of'alternating' verbs; the 'causative alternation'; 
limits of the alternation
5.2.3.1 The data
In the course of this chapter, I have introduced various examples involving causative 
and other expressions. These examples (and a few others I introduce here) constitute 
the data to be explained in the analysis that follows. For the most part, they exemplify 
what Levin (1993: 27) terms the causative/inchoative alternation, though it should be 
clear that the current analysis does not treat the pattern as an alternation (and that not 
all of the intransitive variants have inchoative uses (see note 41)).
Verbs that are central in this pattern are telic (change of state) verbs.45 Many of 
these tolerate both causative and unaccusative constructions (540)-(541), though as 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav point out, some telic verbs tolerate either only causative 
or only unaccusative constructions (542)-(545).
(540) a. The burglars broke a window, 
b. The window broke.
(541) a. The bats blackened the sky. 
b. The sky blackened.
(542) a. The baker cut the bread.
b. *The bread cut.(on the relevant interpretation)
(543) a. The terrorist killed/assassinated/murdered the senator, 
b. *The senator killed/assassinated/murdered.
45 Expressions like this ( ‘telic verbs’) should be treated carefully. I endorse Lemmens’ warning, quoted 
above: “it is incorrect to talk about ergative or transitive ‘verbs’, ... what is at issue is their transitive or 
ergative use” (1998: 60 emphasis in original). Some words (perhaps many) have canonical aspectual and 
force-dynamic properties, and these may be described as ‘telic verbs’ or ‘causative verbs’ and so on 
from time to time, but this does not imply that they have only telic or causative uses.
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(544) a. Anita Brookner just wrote a new novel.
b. *A new novel wrote. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 102)
(545) a. *The gardener bloomed/blossomed/flowered the cactus early, 
b. The cactus bloomed/blossomed/flowered early, (ibid: 97)
That b r e a k  is telic can be seen from (546)-(548). Similar examples could be 
constructed for the other verbs in (540)-(545).
(546) a. The burglars broke the window in/*for ten minutes, 
b. The window broke in/*for ten minutes.
(547) a. The burglars broke the vase to bits/*leaky/*useless. 
b. The vase broke to bits/*leaky/*useless.
(548) a. *The burglars broke the room draughty/themselves into jail, 
b. *The window broke the room draughty/the burglars into jail.
However, both causative and unaccusative constructions are possible with verbs that 
do not receive telic interpretations ((549)- (551)). The verbs in (549) refer to processes: 
in both cases Warren wobbled for the specified time; in (a) it was because Wesley 
acted to cause it. The examples in (550) refer to ongoing processes and not to soon-to- 
be-completed accomplishments like the corresponding examples in (551).
(549) a. Wesley wobbled Warren all afternoon, 
b. Warren wobbled all afternoon.
(550) a. Wesley is wobbling Warren, 
b. Warren is wobbling.
(551) a. The elephants are breaking the bridge, 
b. The bridge is breaking.
Causative and unaccusative constructions with w o b b le  can receive telic 
interpretations: imagine (552) in the context of a wobbling competition. WOBBLE can 
refer to an event of starting to wobble, both causatively and unaccusatively. (553), 
adapted from Lemmens (1998: 43), makes this point for BOIL: ((553)a is ambiguous
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since, though the process undergone by the water necessarily lasted for 30 minutes, 
Billy’s involvement may have lasted considerably less (he may have put the pan on the 
stove and then sat down to do the crossword). Causative boiling consists of two events: 
the act of causing the water to boil (either bringing it to the boil, or acting to keep it 
boiling), and the boiling itself (either coming to the boil, or boiling continuously). 
((553)b is not ambiguous in this way.
(552) a. Wesley won: he wobbled Warren in 2 minutes 28. 
b. Wesley won: Warren wobbled in 2 minutes 28.
(553) a. Billy boiled the water for 30 minutes, 
b. The water boiled for 30 minutes.
Similar comments apply to the manner of motion verbs (including, sometimes, 
WOBBLE): unaccusatively they refer to processes, which may be directed, and are not 
by themselves telic though they do not exclude telic interpretations. Causatively they 
refer to processes induced by the causer; mostly these causative uses require a 
directional expression, though where the activity has some alternative purpose this 
requirement can be overridden; like the unaccusative uses, causative uses may or may 
not be telic.
(554) a. Wally walked Stephanie around town (all aftemoon)/to the station (in 25 
minutes).
b. Stephanie walked around town (all aftemoon)/to the station (in 25 minutes).
Finally, some verbs that canonically refer to states of existence, or to 
postures/positions (which are states), as well as some that canonically refer to changes 
in configuration or position can be used both unaccusatively and causatively in telic 
expressions. In the former case, these refer to inchoative events (assuming or causing 
to assume the relevant position) (555). The causative use cannot receive a non-telic 
interpretation ((556) refers to a soon-to-be-completed accomplishment, not to an 
ongoing state).
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(555) a. Teacher stood Stanley up/on the stool, 
b. Stanley stood up/on the stool.
(556) They are standing the statue on the plinth.
(557) a. Ferdie furled his umbrella, 
b. Ferdie’s umbrella furled.
The questions that must be addressed with respect to these examples are as 
follows:
> What are the shared properties of verbs that can appear in causative constructions, 
and of verbs that can appear in unaccusative constructions (what do b r e a k  and 
b l a c k e n  share with CUT, w r i t e  and k i l l  etc on the one hand and with BLOOM etc 
on the other)?
> And what are the properties that distinguish verbs that appear in either 
construction from the superficially similar ones that do not (what distinguishes 
b r e a k  and b l a c k e n  from b lo o m  etc on the one hand and from CUT, w r i t e  and 
KILL etc on the other)?
Causative expressions refer to complex events: the meaning of a causative 
construction consists of at least two dynamic events (as shown in (553)). One of these 
events causes the other, and this second event is usually itself telic (as in (555)a), 
though it may refer to a process (as in Wally walked Stephanie around town all 
afternoon, where the causing event is also a process). The second event, however, may 
not be a state.
The examples in (518)-(520) and (545) show that some verbs that we might 
expect to appear in both constructions do not. The verb in ((518)a {The baker cut the 
bread) refers to a dynamic event, which causes a second dynamic event affecting the 
referent of the object, just as the verb in ((541)a does. The verb in ((541 )b refers to that 
second event, which is dynamic and results in a state predicated of the referent of the 
subject (the sky being black), (518)b {The bread cut) is not possible (on the relevant 
interpretation), even though it apparently ought to refer to a corresponding event. 
These exceptions must be explained.
Further facts to be accounted for, involving these constructions or verbs that 
can appear in them, derive from the writers discussed above. For example, Croft
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(1990) notes that verbs and other predicators that do not permit particular constructions 
do frequently permit other morphosyntactically marked constructions with the same 
meanings (see 5.2.2.1):
(558) The food made John sick.
(559) The vase is broken.
(560) Torey is all danced out.
(561) The trench got dug yesterday.
(562) I got cut on the arm. (ibid: 56-57)
Also Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) note that some verbs that can appear 
in both constructions are more limited in their range of arguments in one construction 
or the other (see 5.2.2.2):
(563) a. The wind cleared the sky. 
b. The sky cleared.
(564) a. The waiter cleared the table.
b. *The table cleared. (ibid: 104)
(565) a. The postman buzzed the door bell,
b. The door bell buzzed.
(566) a. *The postman buzzed the bees.
b. The bees buzzed. (ibid: 117)
5.2.3.2 Properties of verbs in causative and unaccusative constructions
I begin this section with a comparison of the relational structure of WG with a 
predicate-based decompositional structure like that proposed by eg Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (1995). Compare the predicate argument structure for KILL in (567) 
with the relational structure in Figure 110.
(567) k i l l :  [ c a u s e  ( x , [b e c o m e  (y , [d e a d ]) ] ) ]
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Becoming Being
Making'
Dyingresult Dead
er
Killing
sense
l
KILL
Figure 110 k il l
The predicate argument structure contains three predicates, c a u s e , b e c o m e  
and d e a d , and two other elements, x and y, the arguments of the predicates. The 
predicates are of two kinds: the first two are Events and the third a State, and this 
forms part of the definition of CAUSE, BECOME and DEAD. The arguments are of 
another kind: they are Entities. The relationships between the different elements are 
defined by their positions in the structure: x is an Agent by virtue of being the first 
argument of CAUSE, y a Theme by virtue of being the first argument of BECOME, and so 
on. In predicate argument structure the categories of the elements are basic and the 
relationships between them are read off the structure.
In the relational structure the opposite is the case: the relationships are basic 
and they define the categories of the elements. The elements themselves are not 
differentiated except by the relationships they participate in: Dying is Dying because 
its result is Dead, and it is an example of Becoming because it has one other argument 
(the er) besides its result; similarly, Killing is Killing because its result is Dying and it 
is an example of Making because it has two other arguments (er and ee) besides its 
result.
The difference between the two structures has a number of consequences, three 
of which are, briefly, discussed here. Perhaps trivially the relational structure permits 
us to show that the affected of Killing, the er of Dying and the theme of Dead are the 
same entity (this can be achieved in the predicate argument structure by means of 
coindexing). More significantly, though, since the elements are defined by their 
relationships, they can be defined in more than one way. For example, Electrocuting is
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an example of Killing, but also of Electrifying, which defines the manner (see Figure 
111).
Becoming Being
Making'
ing resul
result Dead
er
-result- Killing
.erElectricElectrifying
result'result”
Electrocuting
esul
Figure 111 Electrocuting.
Figure 111 shows that Electrocuting is a kind of Killing, from which it inherits its 
causal structure, and that it is a kind of Electrifying, from which it inherits other 
properties (the application of Electricity to the ee by the er etc). This information can 
only be integrated into the predicate argument structure by introducing a further 
predicate into the structure (568). Notice that the network structure makes explicit the 
relationship between the killing and the electrifying (they are the same action), while 
the predicate argument structure cannot.
(568) ELECTROCUTE: [CAUSE (x, [BECOME (y, [DEAD])], BY [ELECTRIFY (x,y)])]
The relational structure provides for greater expressiveness in a third way. The 
predicate argument structure in (568) places the predicate DEAD in the argument 
structure of k il l , and so it represents a claim that all things that are dead are so as a 
result of having been killed; the relational structure in Figure 110 encodes a similar 
claim. However, the relational structure provides the means of representing a different 
claim: that Dying may occur not as a result of Killing (and indeed that being Dead may
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occur not as a result of Dying); this position is represented in Figure 112, where the 
result of Killing isa Dying (so that some cases of Dying are not the result of Killing) 
and the result of Dying isa Dead.
mgMaking'
Dead
esul
Killing'
result,er
sense
er-
KILL
Figure 112 Killing’.
Whichever of these analyses may be appropriate in the case of Killing and Dying 
(below I give evidence for the latter analysis), there will assuredly be cases that call for 
the contrasting analysis. The relational structure provides the means of representing 
this distinction, whereas the predicate argument structure does not.46
The lexical semantic structure given in Figure 112 is linked into the syntactic 
structure of sentences as shown in Figure 113, which gives a partial structure for 
Kathleen killed the kangaroo.
mg
Dead
resultresult
•er-
er
Kathleen
Killing
referent
referentsense
•subject •bject-
killed the kangarooKathleen
Figure 113 Kathleen killed the kangaroo.
46 It may be argued that the predicate argument structure in (567) does not represent the claim that all 
cases of DEAD are results o f KILL, since predicates appearing in the argument structures o f other 
predicates stand in for concepts that instantiate the relevant category. In this case the argument given 
here still applies, mutatis mutandis.
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The er and ee relationships have been linked, as described above (1.2.4.2, 
1.2.4.3, 3.1.4), to the subject and object relationships respectively. The linking of er 
and subject is mediated by the subject construction identified in 1.2.4.3 and that of ee 
and object by the object construction identified in 1.2.4.2.
The semantic structure assigns the er and ee relationships in the way that it 
does because it conforms to a general semantic model for causative events (this is 
represented by the Making event which Killing instantiates). Unaccusative events 
conform to a similar model (represented by the Becoming event which Dying 
instantiates). Figure 114 shows a partial structure of the sentence Skippy died, which is 
structured according to this second model.
Dead
—er- -result ^Skippy
Dying
referent sense
■subject-
diedSkippy
Figure 114 Skippy died.
Here the er has just the same force dynamic properties as the ee in the causative 
construction. This follows from the semantic structure of Becoming and more 
generally from the fact that there are no events in lexical structure that have an ee and 
no er. The structures of Making and Becoming are shown in Figure 115.
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Event
State
-result ^  •
Making Becoming er
.result
Creating sense
Making' er
ee referent
sense Unaccusative
referent referent
subject
Causative
object ;subject
Figure 115 Causative and Unaccusative.
Making and Becoming are generalisations over events, defined by their causative 
structures (they are therefore equivalent to Croft’s event types (1998b)), but they are 
also the senses of the ordinary verbs MAKE and BECOME respectively. Additionally, 
these two concepts are schematic for the senses of verbs referring to causative and 
unaccusative changes of state (verbs in causative and unaccusative constructions) and, 
along with their force dynamic properties, they have a number of thematic properties, 
including some of those associated with the subject and object linking rules.
5.2.3.3 Properties o f 4alternating’ verbs
The structure of a causative construction using b r e a k  should clearly match that given 
for k i l l  above (see Figure 113). Similarly, the structure of an unaccusative 
construction using b r e a k  should match that given for DIE above (see Figure 114). This 
implies that b r e a k  has a lexical semantic structure compatible with that shown in 
Figure 116, where Breaking/c represents causative breaking and Breaking/u 
unaccusative breaking.
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,ee er
er- esult-
er.er
-resulsense
The burglars broke the window
sense
sense
The window broke
Causative
a broken window
A
Unaccusative
yective
Figure 116 Two Breakings.
If both these semantic concepts are permitted as the sense of a verb with the 
base {break}, then causative and unaccusative constructions with such verbs can be 
straightforwardly structured in the same way as those with k i l l  and d ie  respectively. 
The question is how this non-monotonic relationship between form and sense is to be 
mediated. Clearly, according to the definition given in 5.1, this is a kind of ambiguity. 
In the following section, I consider which of the 8 kinds o f ambiguity discussed there 
best fits the data presented here, but first I look at some somewhat different verbs that 
show a similar ambiguity.
The two constructions used in Figure 116 (Causative and Unaccusative) form a 
subset of transitive and intransitive verbs respectively. Causative instantiates those 
transitive verbs whose sense isa Affecting, and whose object therefore refers to an 
affected theme; Unaccusative instantiates those intransitive verbs whose sense isa 
Becoming and whose subject therefore refers to an affected theme (see 3.1.4.2, 4.1.3).
Causative and unaccusative breaking are necessarily telic. However, as was 
noted above (5.2.1.4, 5.2.3.1) some non-telic unaccusative verbs also have 
corresponding causative uses:
(569) a. Eddy boiled the egg (hard) in 5 minutes,
b. The egg boiled (hard) in 5 minutes.
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(570) a. Billy boiled the water for 5 minutes,
b. The water boiled for 5 minutes.
The examples in (569) are telic: the result of the egg’s boiling is that it is cooked hard; 
Eddy’s action in (569)a (which lasts for part or all of the five minutes) results in the 
egg’s boiling until cooked, and is therefore also telic. The examples in (570) refer to 
processes: the water’s boiling extends over five minutes. However, the causing action 
may be telic: as noted above (5.2.3.1), examples like (570)a are ambiguous between an 
interpretation where the causer’s action is instantaneous (and therefore telic), initiating 
the process undergone by the theme, and one where the causer’s action consists of a 
process continuously maintaining the process undergone by the theme.
Examples like these conform to the pattern in Figure 116, except that the 
unaccusative sense is a process rather than an achievement/accomplishment. 
Integrating the pattern in Figure 116 with the aspectual structures presented in 4.1.2 
provides for a structural explanation of the ambiguity: in the first case, the causer's 
action has as its result the set that represents the caused process; in the second, each 
member of the set is a causative event (so the interpretation is not telic). The 
relationship between the three uses of b o il  is shown in Figure 117. Boiling/u is the 
sense of unaccusative uses, Boiling/c of causative uses where the causer's involvement 
consists of a single action, and Boiling/c2 of causative uses where the causer's 
involvement is ongoing.
Set
membel
-resuk-
Boiling/c2
Boiling/c
senselember-
Boiling/u
sense
Billy boiled the water [continuous involvement]sense
The water boiled for hours
Billy boiled the water [instantaneous involvement]
Figure 117 Three Boilings.
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A similar relationship holds between inchoative and stative uses of verbs of 
spatial configuration, except that the interpretation where the causer's involvement is 
ongoing is not permitted. As noted in 5.2.1.4, a verb like s t a n d  can be used in stative 
or eventive unaccusative constructions and in (telic) eventive causative constructions 
(571). The eventive (inchoative) unaccusative use refers to an event whose result isa 
(stative) standing; the causative use refers to an event whose result isa inchoative 
standing. The relevant structures are shown in Figure 118.
(571) a. The cathedral stands in a curve of the river.
b. The captain stood (up) on a chair.
c. They stood the dunces in the comer.
member
Standme/i
resutt
Standmg/c
sensesense
They stood him in the comer
Standing/p
*
sense
\
The cathedral stands in a curve o f the Wear
The captain stood up
Figure 118 Three Standings.
The explanation of the 'causative alternation' consists of a specification of the 
lexical structures underlying the patterns seen in the above three diagrams. These 
lexical stmctures will determine the (morpho-)syntactic and semantic properties of the 
verbs in the causative and unaccusative constmctions, and will also determine which 
verbs do and which do not show this kind of variable behaviour.
It was noted above that the pattern is widespread, affecting a wide range of 
verbs, so the lexical structure proposed to account for the pattern must be able to
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generalise. It was also noted above, however, that the productivity of the pattern is 
limited in that there are verbs to which (contrary to expectation) it does not apply, so 
limits must be set on that generalisation. In the next section I explore the structures that 
license the variability, presenting two accounts of the way in which lexical items can 
be used in more than one construction and in the following section (5.2.3.5) I explore 
the limits of the alternation.
5.2.3.4 The 'causative alternation'
In each of the three diagrams above (Figure 116, Figure 117, Figure 118), the different 
verb uses share the same form, as noted, and (where relevant) they further share the 
same irregular morphology. The generality and productivity of the pattern suggest that 
it involves just one lexeme in each case. However, the fact that each use has a different 
syntactic valency appears to demand a treatment in terms of two lexemes. If there are 
two lexemes, it may be that one is derived from the other by a productive rule, or that 
they both have equal status as lexical units. The three possibilities are sketched in 
Figure 119. In the first case ('polysemy’) the verb b r e a k  is ambiguous, just like DOG; 
it has a base {break} and two alternative senses Breaking/c and Breaking/u. In the 
second case ('derivation') b r e a k  is a basically causative verb with base {break} and 
sense Breaking/c; it additionally has an anticausative BREAK/dec which shares its base 
and has the sense Breaking/u (the anticausative relationship is a derivational 
relationship just like er-nominal (see 1.2.3.1) or like the denominal relationship 
between POCKET/n and p o c k e t /v ) .  And in the third case ('bivalence') the two semantic 
concepts are the senses of separate verbs, b r e a k /c  and b r e a k /u ,  which inherit their 
base from the more general b r e a k . The first of these alternatives is a case of 
polysemy, the second and third of ambiguity between lexemes (see paragraphs e and g 
in 5.1.1).
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-result -result-
-result-
Breaking/c 
\
sense sense
V
BREAK
I
form
I
{break}
polysemy
Breaking/u
/
Breaking/c Breaking/u
I
sense
Breaking/c
A
sense
i
BREAK/c
Breaking/u
A
sense
I
BREAK/u
BREAK BREAK/dec
form form 
{break}
BREAK
I
form
I
{break}
bivalencederivation
Figure 119 Three possible representations of the causative alternation.
The first model should be preferred, if only out of parsimony: the alternating 
verbs are so numerous that to propose an extra lexeme (an extra two lexemes in the 
case of the third model) for each one is to impose a heavy load on the lexicon. 
However, the fact that the verb's valency varies with the sense suggests that two 
separate lexemes are involved (since the lexeme is the locus of information about 
valency). The second model appears to satisfy these two conflicting demands, since it 
provides a generalised, productive mechanism that creates a second lexeme when it is 
required.
However, I argue against this middle way because o f the predictions it makes 
of directionality. I also show that the linking mechanisms outlined in 3.1.4 allow the 
valency of a word to be predicted from the semantic structure of its sense, so that a 
single, polysemous lexeme may have two alternative valencies. While arguing for the 
single lexeme analysis in the first model, I note also that the two lexeme analysis in the 
third may provide for a more credible account of the way in which these structures are 
learned. Further, as argued by Croft (1998a, see above), mere generality does not 
provide sufficient evidence to rule out the more specific model, though I hold it as 
significant that no evidence exists that rules out the more general model.
The derivation model applies to verbs with the appropriate causative semantics, 
producing a matching unaccusative. Under this analysis the causative alternation 
would exhibit directionality, the causative pole being basic and the unaccusative pole 
derived. As noted above (5.2.2.2, 5.2.3.1), Levin and Rappaport Hovav advance 
evidence that the alternation does exhibit just this kind of directionality {Something
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cleared the sky/the table: The sky/*the table cleared). However, just as there are verbs 
that are more basic in the causative use, so there are also verbs that are more basic in 
the unaccusative use. For example, while COLLECT has more causative senses than 
unaccusative ones ((572), (573)), GROW has more unaccusative senses than causative 
ones ((574), (575)).47
(572) a. We collected mushrooms in my hat.
b. His lectures collected large audiences.
c. I'm collecting money for Scope.
d. Do you collect stamps in Japan?
e. You can collect your parcel at the post office.
(573) a. The mushrooms collected in my hat.
b. Large audiences collected in his lectures.
c. *£500 collected for Scope.
d. *Do stamps collect in Japan?
e. *Your parcel can collect at the post office.
(574) a. The tree grew.
b. The goat grew.
c. A leaf/beard grew (on the tree/goat).
d. They grew tired.
e. My feelings of unease grew.
f. The business grew overnight.
(575) a. I grew a tree.
b. *1 grew a goat.
c. The tree/goat grew a leaf/beard.
d. *The journey grew them tired.
e. *The situation grew my feeling of unease.
f. *The new acquisitions grew the company overnight.
47 The examples quoted for collect and GROW are constructed on the basis o f a summary o f the 
separate senses given in the OED (1989). They are distinguished by differences in the semantic class o f 
the referent o f the subject and object (transitive uses) and o f the verb itself.
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In order for causative c o l l e c t  to attract the range of senses it has, it must have 
independent existence in the lexicon so it cannot be derived; and similarly for 
unaccusative g r o w ,  so  g r o w  provides counterevidence for the derivation analysis of 
the alternation (or we must introduce a second alternation that derives causative from 
unaccusative verbs).
A further argument against the derivation analysis is provided by Williams's 
target syntax argument (1991, see 1.2.3.3). This holds that where the properties of 
supposedly derived structures match those of non-derived ones, the generalisation over 
the two sorts of structure is most effectively treated as an argument structure 
construction in its own right. The existence of verbs appearing only in causative 
constructions and verbs appearing only in unaccusative constructions means that we 
must have argument structure configurations that account for these two kinds of 
construction separately (ie without one being derived from the other). Then to analyse 
anticausative verbs according to the derivational model, as opposed to the unaccusative 
construction is to imply that they are different in argument structure terms.
If we accept this argument then multiple valency can only be analysed in terms 
of the compatibility of the relevant lexeme(s) with more than one construction, as in 
the polysemy model, or in terms of two separate lexemes with single valencies as in 
the bivalence model.
The bivalence model certainly seems to be in accord with experimental 
findings in language acquisition (eg Tomasello and Brooks 1998, Brooks and 
Tomasello 1999), which show that children initially observe “strict lexical 
conservatism” (Pinker 1989: 17), learning and using lexical items only in the 
constructions they have been observed in and only later abstracting away from these 
specific pairings to more general construction schemas. However, if the relevant 
argument structure constructions are, as I have argued, tied to semantic, rather than 
syntactic, structures then these findings are also consistent with the polysemy model.
The mechanism that mediates the variable valencies of these polysemous items 
is the same as that that allows for the use of indirect objects with appropriate verbs (see
1.2.3.3). The valencies are determined by a set of constructions linking semantic and 
syntactic structures (the subject and object constructions identified above in 1.2.4.2,
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1.2.4.3). The different sense of the alternating verbs participate in these constructions 
in different ways.
Possible counterevidence to the polysemy model comes from considerations of 
the limits of the alternation: if simply having resultative semantics is sufficient 
qualification to appear in both causative and unaccusative constructions, then what of 
those verbs that are constrained to appear in only one kind of construction? These 
cases are discussed in the following section.
§.2.3.5 Limits of the ‘causative alternation9
If the ‘causative alternation’ is a product of general lexical patterns, then it should be 
expected to apply regularly to all those cases that conform to the relevant pattern. The 
prediction is that all verbs with eventive unaccusative uses should also have causative 
uses, and vice versa. However, as I have shown, k i l l  and d ie  have causative and 
unaccusative lexical semantics respectively, yet they do not have corresponding 
unaccusative and causative uses. Other causative verbs without unaccusative uses 
include a s s a s s i n a t e ,  m u r d e r  etc, and some others like CUT; verbs with only 
unaccusative uses include a p p e a r  and v a n is h .  The structures of these verbs are 
discussed here.
(576) a. The general killed the slaves.
b. The slaves killed, [‘the slaves killed somebody’]
(577) a. *The priest died the goat, 
b. The goat died.
(578) a. The terrorists assassinated the president, 
b. *The president assassinated.
(579) a. The duke cut the ribbon.
b. The ribbon cut. ['the ribbon cut something']
(580) a. *The varlet vanished the violin, 
b. The violin vanished.
The examples in (576)-(580) appear to show that not all verbs with resultative 
semantics participate in the causative alternation. For this reason they present possible
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counterevidence to an account based on general lexical properties (as all the accounts 
discussed in this chapter are). Croft (1998a) argues that lexical idiosyncrasy provides 
evidence against generalised accounts of variable behaviour (see 5.1.2), since it 
requires information to be stipulated at the level of the individual lexeme. The 
generalisation can still be saved, however, by demonstrating that the apparent 
exception in fact conforms to the rule. In this case, this means in practice either that the 
generalisation must be amended to exclude the exceptions or that some property of the 
exceptional verbs must be shown to be preventing the missing uses. This is 
undoubtedly the intention behind Levin’s claim (1993: 9-10) that only “pure” change 
of state verbs can participate in the causative alternation.
I argue here that the special properties these exceptional verbs have that 
prevent them from appearing in either causative or unaccusative constructions are 
thematic properties deriving from the representation of their full meaning in the 
network structure.
First CUT, which here represents a larger class of verbs with similar meanings, 
which also do not have unaccusative uses. Levin lists 43 “Verbs of Cutting” (1993: 
156-157) divided into the “CW Verbs” (of which there are 10) and the “Carve verbs” 
(of which there are 33). The behaviour of these verbs with respect to the causative 
alternation is the same as that of some others including b u i ld .  The meanings of CUT 
and the verbs like it are characterised partly in terms of the result, here represented by 
the state Apart (Hale and Keyser (1987) refer to a “separation in material integrity”), 
but they are differentiated from each other by the specification of the means by which 
that result is brought about. Many, like CUT, refer to the instrument used.
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Touching
instrument
Figure 120 Lexical semantic structure o f  CUT.
The lexical semantic structure of CUT is shown in Figure 120. The agent of the 
Cutting acts on the instrument, causing it to come into contact with the referent of the 
object and this contact in turn causes the separation of material integrity (represented 
in the figure by the state (which isa) Apart). Notice that the result o f the causative 
event (which isa Touching) has the instrument as its er, and the referent of the object as 
its ee. In this way, the presence of the instrument in the lexical semantic structure 
prevents the verb from appearing in an unaccusative construction, since the event that 
usually provides the sense in such a construction has the instrument as its er. (581) 
shows a sentence structured around this sense. The subject refers to the instrument and 
the object to the theme. Levin correctly identifies the presence of the instrument as the 
property that excludes these verbs from the causative alternation (1993:10).
(581) The sabre cut the ribbon.
The verbs that refer to acts of killing are also differentiated by properties of the 
causing event. Some, like ELECTROCUTE profile the means; others, like ASSASSINATE, 
the intentions of the killer.48 The result in each case is the same: the victim (the killee) 
is dead. The referent of an unaccusative construction made with m u r d e r  would be 
indistinguishable from that of one made with e x e c u t e .  Furthermore, they would both
48 Assassination also specifies some properties o f the victim: they must be a prominent political figure. 
However, this is not a sufficient condition for assassination, since such people can be accidentally killed, 
or murdered for non-political reasons.
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be indistinguishable from that of one made with d ie  (except in as much as only human 
beings can be murdered or executed) since in all three cases the theme simply 
undergoes an event that results in their death. A similar argument was made in 3.2.1 
and 4.2.2.1 to account for the absence of stative passives made with certain resultative 
verbs.
Some verbs referring to ways of killing profile parts of the dying process, and 
these can be used unaccusatively. d r o w n , s u f f o c a t e  and a s p h y x ia t e  all have 
unaccusative as well as causative uses, as does STARVE. This insight is captured by 
Lemmens (1998: 58) by assigning ergative semantics to these verbs (and transitive 
semantics to the other killing verbs). Lemmens’ classification of the verbs of killing 
was given above in Figure 108, which is repeated here.
transitive
murder
lynch butcher Ml 
slaughter execute
^nassacre murdBr
assassinate ^
/  throttle 
( sftangfe > * 
^  smother
I suffocates 
I asphyxiate.
choke
drowninstrument
knife
s .  garrot^/
shoot
Figure 121 Lemmens on killing and dying.
The cross classification of the verbs of killing is required in Lemmens’ 
framework since the class of the predicate profiled by a verb is the major factor 
determining its syntactic behaviour. In the WG framework, however, the behaviour of 
these verbs with respect to the causative alternation is explained by specific properties 
of their lexical semantic structures.
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Figure 122 Killing, Murdering and Executing.
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Figure 123 Dying, Drowning and Starving.
I now turn to those verbs which have unaccusative but no causative uses. As 
has already been noted, DIE refers to a change of state in the theme, and yet it has no 
causative use. Similarly verbs like (d is )a p p e a r  profile changes of state and have no 
causative uses. In lexical terms this is very easy to explain: by simply assigning lexical
319
semantic structures to these verbs that have no causing event. Figure 124 shows the 
lexical structure of v a n is h .
Invisible
er.
er
•resultVanishing
sense
\
VANISH
Figure 124 v a n is h .
This rather begs the question, however, since it offers no explanation for the 
absence of a causative use (and indeed for the fact that ‘creative’ causative uses are 
also impossible with these verbs). This explanation turns on the fact that events like 
vanishing are typically “internally caused” (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 91). 
Responsibility for the vanishing event is held to lie with its theme: the vanishing takes 
place because of properties specific to the theme. This means that vanishing is an 
inherently unaccusative event and so is implausibly expressed in a causative 
construction.
Dying is similarly internally caused, in contrast with killing, which is 
externally caused. It is obviously part of our experience that things die from internal 
(or unobservable external) causes as well as from external causes; because of the 
significance of death (particularly in humans) it is of course important to be aware of 
the difference between internally and externally caused deaths. This awareness is 
encoded in the lexical semantics of the relevant verbs.
In this way, the ‘non-alternating’ unaccusative verbs are prevented from 
appearing in causative constructions by consideration of plausibility: they cannot be 
used in causative constructions because they refer to events which in normal 
experience are not caused by external agencies.
A similar argument applies to the verbs of motion. Most verbs referring to 
changes of location refer to explicitly externally or explicitly internally caused events. 
Some, like p u sh , refer to clearly causative events, involving the action of an agent on a 
theme resulting in a change in its location. Others, like s t u m b le ,  refer to clearly non­
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causative events, involving an activity carried out by the theme that results in the 
change in location.
(582) Polly pushed the pea to Powys.
(583) Stanley stumbled out of the bar.
Under certain circumstances, some of these verbs can be used in non-canonical 
constructions. Some of these were discussed above (5.2.1.4, 5.2.2.2). (584) repeats 
(531) from above; (585) shows that this alternation is also available for canonically 
externally caused verbs of motion.
(584) a. The soldiers marched (to the tents).
b. The general marched the soldiers ??(to the tents).
(585) a. The gardener swept the leaves (into the barrow), 
b. The leaves swept * (across the lawn).
The properties of verbs of motion, including those determining their behaviour with 
respect to the 'causative alternation', are discussed at length in 3.2.
5.3 Conclusion
5.3.1 The issues
A number of theoretical issues/parameters distinguish the analyses discussed above 
from each other, and from the WG analysis. Some of these are material to the analysis, 
while others are (with respect to the current data at any rate) more or less elective. 
They are discussed here, where I deal with the attitude taken to each issue under the 
analyses presented above:
lexical representations: What properties of the lexical representations of the verbs 
like b r e a k  support their ability to appear in more than one kind of construction? 
Specifically, is this variability constrained by the lexical representations of the 
verbs, or of the constructions? If the former, are the verbs polysemous (having more 
than one sense), do they form pairs of derivationally related but separate lexical
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items, or are they simply vague (schematic)? If the latter how do the lexical 
representations of the words and the constructions interact?
classes and roles: Are the relevant generalisations over the behaviour of words in 
constructions more felicitously stated in terms of the classes of the various elements 
or in terms of the relationships they support? Does the category an element belongs 
to define its properties or do the properties define the class?
directionality: Is there a sense in which it can be said of a verb that can be used in 
more than one constructions that one or other of the uses is conceptually or logically 
prior or more basic? If there exists a meaningful directionality in the kind of 
variation under discussion, does it always operate in the same direction?
encoding o f semantic properties: Are the properties of meanings best represented in 
decompositional (predicate argument) structures, or in entailments between 
semantic elements? Further, is there some principled difference in the roles played 
by words of different (syntactic) classes in the semantic representation?
division o f  properties: Can the properties of lexical structures helpfully be divided 
into classes that do or do not affect particular linguistic phenomena? Is there for 
example a difference between the structural and content properties of a lexical 
semantic representation, or between its force-dynamic and thematic properties?
Croft:
lexical representations: Croft’s analysis of the kind of variable behaviour under 
discussion, as noted above, does not assume ambiguous lexical semantic 
representations for the relevant verbs. Instead, those representations are schematic 
(vague), and the semantics of compositional structures is determined, in part, by the 
properties of the event type (construction). Event types coerce the meanings of verbs 
by determining which portions of their thematic structures are to be expressed, and 
how.
classes and roles: Croft’s analysis makes use of two kinds of class (see below): 
event class and event type (1990: 53). The former is a property of the verb (or other 
predicator), the latter a property of the construction. A word’s event class is
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determined by its thematic structure: by the kinds of thematic relationship it supports. 
The event class, however, does not affect syntactic structure, which is entirely 
determined by the event type (constructional schema).
The roles of arguments in the event type schema are determined by the schema 
itself, so that the linguistic structure of a composite expression is largely determined by 
the structure of the event type template, though as explored in the following paragraph, 
thematic (conceptual) properties do affect the kind of event type template that a word 
fits more naturally in.
directionality. For Croft, the causal chain that structures the force dynamics of 
event types constitutes an event prototype: “any event can be structured or 
conceptualised as the three-unit causal chain, ‘cause-become-state’” (ibid: 58). This 
means that in principle any word that profiles an event (including changes of state, 
processes and states) can be construed according to any of the three views of the event 
structure (event types). That some words do so only in the presence of “conversion 
morphosyntax” (ibid: 59) (that their unmarked forms are found only in certain event 
views) is due to their thematic properties. In this sense, at least, it makes sense under 
Croft’s analysis to say that a given word has, by virtue of its event class, a typical or 
salient event view: “a given event class (such as colours or acts of creation) has a 
prototypical event view” (ibid: 59). This is used to account for the exclusion of certain 
words from certain constructions (in their unmarked forms), but no case is made for 
there being events (or event classes) that while being conceptually more basic (natural) 
under one event view still can appear unmarked in one or more others.
The ability o f a word’s event class to affect the event views it appears in, noted 
above, should not be taken to imply that there is a causal relationship between the two 
properties: the event class helps to motivate the choice of event view, but there remains 
an element of convention, as demonstrated by the fact that similar event classes in 
different languages project onto different event views.
encoding o f  semantic properties: Croft’s semantic structures appear to be 
essentially decompositional, in that each denotation consists of a number of subevents 
connecting the participants in the action chain. It is verbs (and other predicators like 
adjectives) that denote relevant sections of the causal chain, and their arguments fill 
the argument positions in that chain.
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division o f  properties: Croft explicitly separates event type/view (which has 
force-dynamic properties and directly affects syntactic structure) from event class 
(which reflects thematic/conceptual properties and does not directly affect syntactic 
structure). As noted above, the latter is a property of verbs (or other words) and the 
former a property of constructions. This separation closely parallels the separation 
noted elsewhere (3.1.3, 3.1.4.3, 5.2.2.1) between structural and conceptual semantic 
properties.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav:
lexical representations'. Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s analysis of the causative 
alternation is a derivational one: the lexical structure supporting unaccusative 
constructions with a given verb is derived by rule from that supporting causative 
constructions. This rule is productive and applies to all lexical semantic structures that 
have the appropriate form, so that variability is a function of a verb’s lexical semantic 
structure. Only one lexical structure is needed per verb, since the productive, and 
general, rule means that the unaccusative variants need not be stored in the lexicon.
classes and roles: Like Croft, Levin and Rappaport Hovav classify verbs into 
thematic classes. As I show below, Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s predicate argument 
structure (PAS) plays the same role as Croft’s event views and for Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav as for Croft the PAS is determined by the event class of the verb. 
The projection of thematic structure onto PAS is, for Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 
mediated by linking rules that refer to thematic argument positions in the thematic 
structure, yet the nature of those roles is determined by the event class.
directionality: Because Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s account is based on a 
derivational relationship between the lexical structures supporting the two 
constructions, the directionality of that relationship is a crucial part of their account. So 
much so, in fact, that examples showing the opposite directionality need to be assigned 
to a separate mechanism. The derivational rule, by definition, applies to (all and only) 
members of one semantic verb class and derives those of another. The classes are 
defined by their participation in the derivation, which means that verbs that are 
superficially similar to one or other pole of the alternation but do not have uses 
corresponding to the opposite pole (as well as those verbs that have uses corresponding
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to each pole but which participate in the alternation in a different way) must belong to 
some other class.
encoding o f  semantic properties: Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s semantic 
structures are also decompositional. The lexical conceptual structure of a verb consists 
of a function argument representation. The predicates are primitive event types 
(CAUSE, BECOME, etc) and the arguments are variables to be instantiated in surface 
structure or constants representing the conceptual content of the verb’s meaning. 
Generally speaking, verbs denote predicates and nouns their arguments. The 
contribution of prepositions to the semantics is largely ignored.
division o f  properties: The separation of predicates from arguments just 
described is also the basis for the separation of semantic information into event type 
structure (defined by the predicates), which directly affects (deep) syntactic structure, 
and thematic content (defined by the constants), which does not. The event type 
structure projects onto PAS, which contains no thematic information, and which 
constrains syntactic structure. As noted above, this PAS therefore corresponds to the 
event type structure of Croft’s analysis (except in as much as it is explicitly a property 
of the word, rather than of the construction).
Lemmens:
lexical representations: In Lemmens’ analysis, as in Croft’s, it is principally 
the constructional schemas that define linguistic structures. A verb’s lexical 
representation (thematic properties) determines which of the available event structure 
schemas it is compatible with. Some verbs are (because of vagueness or ambiguity) 
compatible with more than one event structure schema, but that is not the relevant 
property as far as the causative alternation is concerned: the causative alternation is 
controlled by the ergative paradigm (an event structure representation), which projects 
variably onto surface structure.
classes and roles: Although Lemmens’ account of the causative alternation is 
founded on the event type schema elaborated by the verb, that event type schema is 
itself derived from the thematic roles associated with the verb: suffocate (usually) 
instantiates an ergative schema because it has a Medium; kill a transitive one because 
it has an A ctor. This is the way in which the thematic properties of a verb determine
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th e  k in d s o f  con stru ctio n  it ca n  appear in  (th ou gh  the prin cip les accord in g  to  w h ich  the 
argum ents o f  a  particular verb al p ro file  are c la ss if ie d  as M e d iu m , A c t o r , etc  rem ain  
so m ew h a t unclear).
directionality: Because of the way in which the transitive and ergative 
paradigms are defined in terms of the A c t o r  and M ed iu m  roles respectively, there is 
an implicit directionality (there are in fact two implicit directionalities) in the 
effective/non-effective axis: transitive event structures are based around the 
A c t o r / P r o c e s s  relationship, and can extend to the right to include a G o a l ,  whereas 
ergative event structures are based around the P r o c e s s /M e d iu m  relationship and can 
extend to the left to include an I n s t i g a t o r .  Notice that this means the directionality 
of the causative alternation is the opposite of that assumed by Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav.
encoding o f  semantic properties: Lemmens’ conceptual structures are basically 
decompositional, in that event structure is broken down into separate processes and 
participants in those processes. Individual lexical items instantiate different parts of the 
event structure template, though there is no difference in kind between the 
contributions of words of different syntactic classes.
division o f  properties: In Lemmens’ approach, force dynamic and thematic 
properties are separated, but they both contribute equally to linguistic structure. The 
event type structure of a verb is determined by a process of idealisation that funnels the 
(idiosyncratic) conceptual representation of the verb’s meaning through one or other of 
the paradigms. The resulting structure contains both force dynamic and thematic 
information, the former represented in the effectiveness/non-effectiveness axis, the 
latter in the transitive/ergative axis.
Word grammar:
lexical representations: The problem of the ‘causative alternation’ is basically a 
linking problem, and so the mechanism that accounts for it in WG is basically a linking 
mechanism: verbs that appear in causative constructions do so by virtue of having the 
appropriate lexical semantic structures, and those that appear in unaccusative 
constructions likewise. The WG treatment of variability does not predetermine whether 
it will be mediated by ambiguous or vague lexical structures. The minimal assumption
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is that each verb has a single lexical representation, which is compatible with more 
than one constructional semantics. However, this minimal assumption can be 
disproved by demonstrating that the individual uses have specific properties not 
predictable from the (meanings of the) two constructions (see Croft 1998a).
The presence of a separate sense in each use does not necessarily support an 
analysis in terms of separate lexemes, but other factors (eg argument selection 
properties shown in one use but not the other) may do in some cases. In these cases, 
properties common to the two uses are assigned to a single lexical item that is 
schematic for both of them.
classes and roles: WG linguistic structures are defined by the relationships that 
make up the conceptual network. The concepts and classes that encode lexical 
information do so by virtue of the relationships they support. The syntactic behaviour 
of a verb’s arguments is determined by the dependency type they instantiate, and their 
semantic behaviour by their semantic role type. The event classes causative and 
unaccusative identified above to a great extent determine the linguistic structures of 
utterances, but only in that they represent the lexical structures of the relevant 
dependency types: the unaccusative construction represents a regular relationship 
between the subject relationship and a specific semantic role; the causative 
construction represents a regular relationship between the object relationship and that 
same semantic role (subjects in causative constructions have the same properties as 
subjects in other, more general, constructions).
directionality: In the WG account the appearance of a given verb in one or 
other construction is determined by the structural properties of the verb and the 
construction. The two constructions are not connected by a derivational relationship, so 
the analysis makes no predictions of directionality. Since the pattern is general (and 
more or less creative), the relationship between the two constructions must be 
expressed in a lexical structure, but that structure does not assign basicness to either 
construction. Individual verbs may be more usual either in one or in the other 
construction, but this is a function of their specific meaning and use, and so the 
basicness is a property of a given verb in the relevant construction, not of that 
construction in general.
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encoding o f  semantic properties: The semantic structures of WG, as outlined in 
chapter 1, are decompositional in that the meanings of words are constructed of 
separate meaning components. However, unlike most decompositional analyses, these 
separate components are not viewed as contained in individual lexical semantic 
structures but rather form a network of mutually defining concepts. In this way, the 
relationships that delimit this conceptual network are much more akin to meaning 
postulates than to properties of decomposition: to say, as I do in 1.2.3.1, that the sense 
of g iv e  has a result which isa Having (and that this is the sense of HAVE) is the same as 
to say that if you give someone something then they have it.
A second consequence of the network structure is that the logical kind of the 
concept that represents the meaning of a word does not depend on the word’s syntactic 
class. In many decompositional approaches, the meanings of verbs are decomposed 
into predicate structures and the meanings of nouns and prepositions slotted into 
argument positions in these predicate structures. In WG, the meanings of words of all 
classes are represented in more or less complex bundles of relationships and the 
meanings of words that appear together in constructions fill each others dependent 
positions.
division o f  properties: As noted in several places above, WG does not 
distinguish between syntactic and semantic information, nor between lexical and 
structural information, nor between different kinds of semantic information either 
formally, in terms of the kinds of structure that represent it, or descriptively, in terms 
of the kinds of linguistic phenomena to which it is relevant. The three frameworks 
described above all recognise a separation of thematic and force dynamic semantic 
properties (though it is only in Croft’s and Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s analysis that 
this distinction determines which properties may and which may not affect the 
syntactic behaviour of verbs).
In Croft’s analysis, this was expressed as a distinction between event class, a 
lexical property of verbs, and event type, a formal property of constructions. This 
distinction is reflected in the lexical structures of WG, since the behaviour of verbs in 
constructions is determined by the interaction between the verb’s lexical structure and 
that of the relevant dependencies or constructions. However, this distinction is 
emergent (like that between syntax and semantics or that between lexical and
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encyclopedic semantics, see 1.2.2, 3.1.4.1) and has no grammatical status. The only 
difference between the lexical structure of GIVE, say, and that of Ditransitive verbs (see 
1.2.3.3) is that the former has a specific form, which the latter lacks.
5.3.2 Summary
In this thesis, I have given a description of Word Grammar (more properly of a Word 
Grammar), identifying a number of significant properties. WG is a monostratal 
declarative dependency grammar, where knowledge of language (indeed all of 
knowledge) is represented in a symbolic network. The elements in the network are 
concepts, arranged in a default inheritance hierarchy, and relations holding between 
them, which are arranged in a similar hierarchy. WG lexical structure consists of 
representations, at varying levels of generality, of the properties of words and other 
concepts (pronunciations, word-meanings etc)
I have developed the framework in the areas of argument linking, aspect and 
the treatment of ambiguity, giving accounts in these (and other) areas that exploit the 
network structures of WG. I explain argument linking in terms of regular symbolic 
relationships between syntactic and semantic relations (associations), and 
correspondences between the associations involved in these symbolic relationships and 
sets of co-occurring grammatical (morphological, syntactic, force-dynamic, thematic 
etc) properties. I explain aspect in terms of the force-dynamic and thematic properties 
of the conceptual representations of states and events, and their realisation in syntactic 
structure. I explain ambiguity in terms of nonmonotonic linkings between levels of 
representation, and in terms of the exploitation of lexical constructions to extend or 
coerce the meanings and valencies of other lexical items.
I have presented analyses in this framework of a number of different linguistic 
phenomena, including the behaviour of various verbs referring to motion events, the 
distribution of resultative expressions and use of certain verbs in both causative and 
unaccusative constructions. These analyses have depended on the network structure of 
WG in that the explanations are given in terms of specific lexical properties of the 
relevant words and constructions. The kinds of lexical properties that are relevant in 
the explanations are not limited: morphological, syntactic, force-dynamic and thematic 
properties are all relevant.
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In doing all this, I hope to have provided a clear description of WG and its 
properties, and to have shown that the assumptions and structures of WG, as presented, 
provide for a clear and meaningful description of a wide range of grammatical 
phenomena. In addition to the descriptive success of the framework, I have noted some 
useful claims that it makes about the learning and representation of linguistic 
information in the minds of speakers.
At the start (1.1.2) I gave a list of requirements for a properly developed theory 
of lexical structure; these requirements are satisfied by the WG model in the following 
ways:
> an account of how the meanings of words are formed, how they relate to each 
other and how they are learned;
The meanings of words consist of parts of an integrated decompositional conceptual 
network. A word is directly associated with one (or more) concept in this network and 
the relationships that it supports define the meaning of the relevant word. 
Relationships between word meanings are defined similarly by the structure of the 
network, which is continuous (even outside linguistic semantics). The learning of a 
word and its meaning consists of the extraction of generalisations over sets of similar 
tokens.
> an account of how words and their meanings are related, both systematically and 
idiosyncratically, and how systematic word/meaning relationships are learned and 
used productively;
The relation between words and their meanings is mediated by the two relationships 
sense (which is lexical) and referent (which is contextual). The referent is determined 
by the effects of context (including the lexical structures of other words and 
constructions) in conventional and less conventional ways.
> a structured theory of syntax and other word/word relationships, including 
derivation, collocation and agreement, together with an account of how the 
syntactic and other properties of words are derived from their lexical structures;
The WG theory of syntax has been presented in some detail; it consists of a set of 
generalisations over dependencies (relationships between words), each having
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associated properties. I have discussed derivation relations (1.2.3.1, 5.2.3.4 and, to a 
lesser extent, both collocation (1.2.4, 1.2.5) and agreement (1.2.2, 1.2.4) relations.
> an account of the relationship between words and their forms, which explains 
regular variations in form that correspond to regular syntactic or semantic 
variations; and an account of the relationships that hold among forms.
I have sketched the WG account of the formal properties of words and of inflectional 
relations (1.2.2, 1.2.4.3). A word has two kinds of form: a base, and a fif (fully 
inflected form), which are by default the same. The forms are atoms, which are 
realised in phonemes or written letters. Inflected words inherit from their own lexeme 
and an inflectional class, which specifies properties of the fif. In suffixation, the base 
provides the model for the first part of the fif, and the inflectional class determines the 
form of the second part.
> Finally, if the syntactic properties (or some of them) are to be shown to follow 
from lexical semantic properties of words, then we require additionally an account 
of how word meanings are combined in compositional structures, and how the 
relationships between word meanings are projected onto syntactic structure. To 
infer a linking rule of this sort, we need a robust syntactic pattern and an equally 
robust semantic pattern and the two need to be clearly related in a regular and 
explanatory (motivated) way.
I discuss the linking mechanisms of WG in chapter 3. Syntactic and semantic 
associative relationships participate in symbolic relationships: syntactic dependencies 
have meanings, which serve to determine the interpretations of compositional 
structures, as well as to constrain the possibilities for composition. Just as the (default) 
properties of syntactic associations are given in terms of a network of related concepts 
and properties surrounding the dependency class they instantiate, so are the (default) 
properties of semantic associations. In the sections on compositionality, and on 
derivation and ambiguity I have looked at some systematic patterns influencing the 
linking of syntactic concepts and relationships with semantic ones.
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